FATALISM AND DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL

Alan Macfarlane

[From Michael Hutt (ed.), Nepal in the Nineties (Oxford Univ. Press, Delhi, 1994)

p.106

It is possible to take very different views about the way in which Nepal

is currently heading.(1) An optimistic assessment culled from official

statistics and superficial impressions could be made. In contrast to India

there appears to be little absolute poverty, with no begging and no real

shanty towns. Famines are infrequent. There is a notable absence of

violence; the police are few, crime rates are low, and political violence

has been limited.

These impressions could be backed by impressive statistics. From a

standing start in 1950, when the Ranas were overthrown and Nepal

began to be transformed from a medieval oriental despotism into a

modern nation-state, a great deal has been done. An all but roadless

country In 1950, Nepal had built more than six thousand miles of

property paved highways by the late 1980s. Between 1950 and 1980 the

cumulative growth in various sectors has been estimated as follows: '70

times in power generation, 13 times in irrigation facility, 134 times in

school enrolment, 12 times in number of hospital beds'. (2) Epidemic

diseases have been practically eliminated. Infant mortality rates have

been halved. Piped water has been brought to most villages. An

international airline has been started. Nepal now exports goods worth

more than 25 million US dollars a year. A large tourist industry has

been created, with over 300,000 tourists (other than Indians) a year. A

literacy rate of two per cent in 195 1 had been increased to over 40 per

cent by the late 1980s. There are more than 150 university campuses.

Kathmandu and other towns have grown remarkably and now have

many facilities, including television, computers and many modern

goods and services. All this has been achieved with no significant revo-

lution or bloodshed. It looks like an economic and social miracle.

Yet an equally convincing case could be made to support a

(1) This article was originally published in Cambridge Anthropology, 14:

1 (1990). 1 am grateful to the Editors of that journal for permission to

reprint it in this collection. Some of the fieldwork upon which it is based

was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. Sarah Harrison

gave valuable advice on earlier drafts of the article and helped with the

fieldwork. Some interesting comments on an abbreviated form of the article

are contained in a letter by David Seddon to the London Review of Books,

16 August 1990.

2 Gurung, 1926: 246.

107

pessimistic assessment. Despite a long established family planning

policy, there has been little success in controlling population. In 1800

there were less than two and a half million people in Nepal. By 1941

there were about six million. By 1971 the population had nearly

doubled to eleven and a half million. It is currently over eighteen

million and is projected to be at least twenty-five million by the year

2001. It will thus have increased four-fold in sixty years. At present the

population is growing faster than almost anywhere in Asia, at 2.7 per

cent per annum, and the use and knowledge of contraception is lower

than in any other Asian country. (3)

This population pressure is particularly worrying because of the eco-

logical situation. The population density in relation to cultivable land

is as high as in many of the far more fertile Asiatic deltas. People press

on land that is usually a thin covering of soil on extremely steep rocky

slopes, swept by torrential monsoon rains. The growing numbers

exploit the remaining forest ever more intensively for firewood, fodder

and grazing. The results are very serious. Moddie concludes that 'Nepal

provides the most dramatic example of the spread of desertification....

In a flash, within the decade ending 197 1, Nepal had lost 50 per cent of

its forest cover....' (4) Eckholm claimed that Nepal faces 'the world's

most acute national soil erosion problem'. (5) One expert estimated that

Nepal was losing 164,000 cubic inches of top soil each year. (6) A figure

quoted by the Annapurna Conservation Area Project suggests that 'one

hectare of cleared forest loses 30-75 tons of soil annually. In Nepal,

approximately 400,000 hectares are cleared each year....' As Seddon

puts it, 'the country now faces a crisis whose major components

include serious over-population, ecological collapse in the densely

populated and highly vulnerable hill areas ... and overall declining yields

in agriculture. (7) In one hundred years, with present trends, the

mountains will be stripped of forest and soil, and a population of over

one hundred million will be forced to live in absolute poverty or

migrate elsewhere.

These facts arc well known and easily visible. Less obvious is the

serious deterioration in the material standard of life of a majority of the

population, despite the massive inflow of 'aid'. One of the most omi-

nous developments in the last thirty years in Nepal has been the way in

which the formerly rice-surplus middle hills have become grain deficit

areas. The western hills, for instance, became short of grain before

1976, with an average of up to three per cent decline in food production

per annum over the last few years. (It is predicted that the food deficit in

3 Seddon, 1984: 1, 87.

4 Quoted in Gurung, op.cit.: 191.

5 Quoted in Seddon, op.cit.: 72.

6 Gurung, op.cit.: 192

7 Seddon, 1979: 46.

108

Nepal will increase at least ten times between 1985 and 2000.8 Hill

farmers, who once produced a surplus, now only survive with the help

of a steady flow of outside grains. Harka Gurung quotes a recent

estimate that 'in comparison to the 2.12 per cent annual increase in

population during 1964-78, annual agricultural growth was only 0.78

per cent and this indicated a reduction of annually 21 kg. per head in

food consumption'. (9)

What these general trends mean for individuals is best seen in one

central hill village where data has been collected over the last twenty

years. Between 1970 and 1990 there has been an almost 50 per cent

drop in grain production as the land loses its fertility and goes out of

production. In 1970 most families had enough rice for themselves and

practically no rice was bought outside the village. By 1990 only a quar-

ter of the villagers had enough rice for their needs; rice had become a

luxury rather than a necessity and a large amount was being bought

from the south.

The number of animals has also dropped by half. This means that

less manure is available for the fields, hence there are reduced crops. It

also means a worsening of the diet. Twenty years ago people in mid-

dling families had a protein-rich diet, eating meat every two or three

days, drinking milk at almost every meal. Now they eat meat only once

or twice a month and drink milk occasionally. Their personal wealth

has visibly declined; the women have sold their gold ornaments, the

clothing is less adequate, the houses and paths are deteriorating.

This growing impoverishment reflects a dramatic decline in the

return on labour. It is estimated that the maize equivalent (the poor eat

maize) of wage rates fell by roughly 30-60 per cent in the period 1968-9

to 1976-7 alone.'() In the sample hill village, there has been an

approximate halving on the returns on labour during the last twenty

years, thus a halving in the standard of living. For instance, in 1970 it

took just over a day's work to earn enough to buy a chicken. In 1990 it

takes two to three days work to do so. A day's hard work in the fields

produces grain worth 15-20 rupees (30-40p sterling in 1990); this Is

certainly not enough to feed a family, let alone clothe, house, marry,

bury, nurse and educate it. Many villages are propped up by money

from migratory labour in the army or civilian work in India.

Thus, on the one hand, we have the national statistics of growing

literacy, improved health, water, roads, trade, while on the other the ma-

jority of the population are year by year growing poorer and worse fed

and the environment is rapidly deteriorating. A strange contradiction.

Furthermore, the contrast between a small affluent minority in

Kathmandu and other towns, who enjoy almost First World standards,

8 Gurung, op.cit.: 182.

9 Ibid.

10 Seddon, 1984: 115-6.

109

and the 95 per cent who live in growing poverty, is growing ever

sharper.

In fact, the contradiction between progress and impoverishment is

not as dramatic as it seems, for behind the impressive statistics, the

actual progress is far less notable. The figures giving total numbers of

schools, hospitals, health workers, miles of road constructed, are mean-

ingless without taking into account the quality of what is being devel-

oped. Those who have worked in Nepal all have their own stories. The

following tiny set of examples, all taken from one small valley over a

short period of time, could be multiplied a million-fold.

The school statistics are impressive and some of the private schools

are good. But the average village school is very badly equipped, often

not even having benches or blackboards; it teaches a curriculum which

is of practically no use to the children unless they obtain one of the

scarce office jobs in a town. Many of the teachers do not understand the

language of the ethnic group they are working with and are disillusioned

and homesick. Much learning is by rote, there is high absenteeism, and

a high failure rate in exams. Attempts to reform the educational system

have been unsuccessful and the general standard is very low. Likewise

the universities are very poorly equipped, the staff badly paid and in

constant turmoil. Education is avidly sought by the wealthier, who send

their children to expensive schools, thereby using up all their own capi-

tal and producing an alienated middle strata who find it impossible to

reintegrate into the basically agrarian economy.

There has been a massive foreign investment in medical improve-

ments and a superficial counting of the number of medical personnel or

health posts would suggest a country going through a medical revolu-

tion. Yet if one visits the hospitals and health posts, or talks to vil-

lagers who have tried to use them, there is an overwhelming impression

of a waste of resources and considerable inefficiency. The government

hospital in the second largest hill town, Pokhara, is notorious for its

absentee doctors, poor hygiene, careless operations, shortage of

medicine. The wrong limbs lopped off, all the nurses absent when

women are in labour, totally inaccurate diagnosis and prescription, the

siphoning off of time and medicines to private stores, all are endlessly

alleged. Even allowing for exaggeration and gossip, there seems to be

much to be concerned about.

Likewise, the health posts are over-staffed, but under-equipped. One

near the sample village has ten workers, but anyone seeking the sim-

plest medicine for sores or cuts will be told to walk a day and buy their

own in the bazaar. There are two nurses, but neither has even the sim-

plest of gynaecological instruments. Other large villages have no health

post or health worker and women die needlessly in childbirth, unable to

make the eight hour journey to the nearest nurse. The government con-

tribution in one such village of a thousand people is one rupee per year

110

(less than 2p sterling in 1990). This is the reality of medicine in Nepal.

The situation with agricultural development projects is broadly simi-

lar. Most of the budget goes on constructing buildings, often in the

towns, and on paying staff. Very little reaches the villages and fields for

which it is destined. The staff themselves are often disinterested in agri-

culture. As Bista writes, 'Agricultural training institutions are built yet

farmers are not the ones who go there for training. People who have no

interest in the soil are the ones who get degrees in agricultural science'.

A typical example in the related field of veterinary medicine concerns

the location of the nearest veterinary station to the sample village.

When I asked why it was located in the plain, two thousand feet below

any of the villages where the animals which it was to treat were located,

I was told that the expert who worked there lived in a nearby town. He

did not want to walk up the steep hill to his office. It Is not surprising,

with no animals. that it is seldom used. Furthermore, villagers allege

that they are unable to find anyone present most of the time. When

there was a chicken epidemic and they enquired about vaccinations, the

official demanded a large amount for merely walking to the village, let

alone payment for the injections. They did not bother and almost all the

chickens in the village died.

Another example could be taken from the massive effort to install

piped water. A large system, starting in the sample village, is currently

being built. It is in its early stages but is already a catalogue of ineffi-

ciency. The pipe joints are inappropriate and will soon break, the junc-

tion pipes are set at the wrong angle, the pipe is left exposed at crucial

points to be punctured by passing livestock, the inflow and outflow

pipes in the tank are at the wrong level. After a few months, a landslide

fell and blocked the top reservoir entirely, and a rock fell a little lower

down and severed the pipe. This was quickly reported and a team came

to investigate. Eight months later, nothing has been done and no engin-

neers have been seen. The water dribbles down to only one or two of

the taps in the village.

Again, there are constant complaints about the working of minor

bureaucrats, who need bribes, are insolent, and are usually absent from

their offices. Villagers commonly allege that even for the most minor

business they are told to come back another day, unless they produce

extra cash, when the business will be quickly done. There are fears of

the police, who can be brutal, undiscriminating and not accountable for

their behaviour.

As for the transport revolution, many of the bridges are unfinished

or badly maintained, the roads soon deteriorate into a bad condition, the

public transport is ramshackle, public facilities scarce.

The question then is, why is Nepal heading towards economic, eco-

logical and demographic crisis, and why has foreign aid had so little

impact? Two possibilities can be immediately ruled out. The first is

111

that the people themselves are incapable of developing. In fact, the

country is rich in human talent. For a century and a half the middle

hills have supplied the Gurkha troops in the British and Indian armies.

With training, leadership and organisation, these hill soldiers have

earned a reputation as one of the most efficient, brave, hard-working and

efficient fighting forces in the world. They are full of initiative, practi-

cal, flexible. quick to pick up new ideas. These qualities, if effectively

harnessed, Could have turned Nepal into a small example of the south-

east Asian economic miracle. The religion, social structure and egalitar-

ian values are very similar to what are called the 'Confucian cultures',

which have been so successful. Yet this is not happening.

Another possibility is that aid has not been at a sufficiently gener-

ous level. Again this does not seem to be the case. It is probable that in

terms of its Gross Domestic Product, Nepal has received more foreign

aid per head than any other country in the world. Its strategic position

as a zone between two power blocks, with India and China competing

for friendship, and Russia and America for cold war influence, is com-

bined with the sentiments of the Gurkha association and Swiss-like en-

vironment which bring in British and European aid. This means that

Nepal has been flooded with aid and advice. Nepal was only able to

spend less than 65 per cent of the total allocated aid budget during the

first five year plan period of 1956-6 1. During the two decades 1951-2 to

1969-70 foreign aid totalled more than 178 dollars. (11) If we remember

that at that time the total exports of goods were worth less than an

average of 10 million dollars a year, we can see that money from aid far

outstripped all foreign earnings. There can be few countries in that

position. Since 1970 the amount of aid has grown substantially. Of

course. much of the money went back to the donor countries in the

form of large salaries to their 'experts' and to pay for machinery and

goods from the donor country. But even after this, there has been a great

deal left to spend. Combining this money, the offered expertise and the

natural talent might have led to real advance. As it is, while the towns

grow and a small segment of the rich get richer, the population rockets

and the number in considerable poverty grows daily. How and why has

this happened?

The conventional wisdom comes in two main forms, demographic-

ecological -geographical, and- politico-social. The first argument is as

follows. Nepal is a barren, mountainous country with little good agri-

cultural land. Furthermore, there are few useful mineral resources, coal.

oil, gas, metals. Communications are very difficult because the country

is long and thin, from east to west, while the ridges cut across this

from north to south. There is no sea access and trade has to pass

through India. All these geographical considerations make it unlikely

that Nepal would become wealthy.

11 Gurung, op.cit.: 6 1.

112

On top of this is the rapid and uncontrolled growth of population

which has already been documented. It is truly a Malthusian situation,

and it is not surprising that Malthus himself quoted Turner's 'Embassy

to Tibet' to the effect that 'It certainly appears that a superabundant

population in an unfertile country must be the greatest of all calamities,

and produce eternal warfare or eternal want'. (12) It is argued that the

combination of growing population and poor resources is enough to

account for most of the problem. (13)

While it would be foolish to ignore such arguments, and they do

indeed provide some of the essential explanatory frameworks, they do

not account for all the present trends. The Malthusian argument only

suggests possible tendencies, what will happen if all else is equal. But,

of course, all else is not equal. As Malthus himself argued in the second

edition of his 'Essay on Population', people can control their popula-

tion if they wish. Furthermore, since Malthus wrote, the equations have

been altered by the industrial and scientific revolutions, which allow

production to expand exponentially with the application of non-organic

energy. Consequently, population and resources are not determining,

they condition the situation. We only have to look at Holland, Japan,

Singapore, or Hong Kong, to see how an inauspicious environment can

be transformed into a centre of wealth through human ingenuity. In

principle, there is no reason why this should not happen in Nepal. We

therefore have to seek other causes.

A second set of arguments concerns the political economy of Nepal.

In a series of studies, Blaikie, Cameron and Seddon have extensively

documented what they call 'Nepal in Crisis'. They give detailed evi-

dence to support many of the impressions noted above. They quote the

Fourth Five Year Plan (1970-75) to the effect that 'although a number

of development works have been undertaken in different sectors of the

economy, there has not been virtually any noteworthy change in the

basic condition of agriculture'. (14) Most of the money from foreign aid

and the surpluses generated in the villages is siphoned off to the