Modes of Reproduction *

Alan Macfarlane

[From Geoffrey Hawthorn (ed.), Population and Development; High and Low Fertility in Poorer Countries (Frank Cass, London, 1978)]

p.100

The continued rapid growth of population in many parts of the world and

the failure of most family -planning campaigns makes the topic of the value

and desirability of children into more than a purely academic one. If some

general theory could be devised which would account for the very different

fertility rates and attitudes to fertility in different societies, this would be of

practical as well as theoretical importance. Despite intensive research and a

vast expenditure of time and money we still do not know how to influence

reproduction, largely because we do not yet know why children are highly

valued. Yet the importance of the topic justifies what is bound to

be an over-ambitious solution to the puzzle. Firstly we may briefly

look at some previous theories which provide hints of a solution, but which in

their crude form have not been accepted. The question we are seeking to

answer is this: what accounts for the very large differences in attitudes towards

having children in various societies?

One suggestion is a demographic answer which has already become part

of the conventional wisdom. It is the argument that high fertility and desire

for children is the "result' of high infant mortality. It is pointed out that in

many societies. in order to ensure living heirs, parents needed to stockpile

children, as for example, argued by Gould [Marshall and Polgar, 1976:

188-91]. The practical consequence is that family planning will not work

until death control is introduced. There is an element of truth in this, but as

a general theory to account for all differences over time and space it is far

too simple. It is not difficult to find instances where, as in Taiwan in the late

1960s, people living in areas of high infant mortality show more enthusiasm

for birth control than those where infant mortality is much lower [Kantner

and McCaffrey, 1975: 273]. Historical data from England in the

seventeenth century also shows that family planning can be combined with

very high mortality rates [Wrigley,, 1966]. One reason for the absence of a

direct connection is the fact that perceptions and attitudes are involved.

Mortality rates may decline, but individuals may still operate as if they were

high. There is no direct link between reproductive behaviour and

contemporary events. This is well shown in a study of an Eskimo

community by Masnick and Katz which shows that women's fertility does

not reflect their present economic circumstances. but those in which they

began their reproduction [in Kaplan, 1976: 37-58]. It could also be shown

* Lecturer in the Dept. of Social Anthropology, Cambridge. I am grateful to the Social Science Research Council for support in the historical project upon which some of this article is based and to Sarah Harrison and Geoffrey Hawthorn for their comments on an earlier draft. The first half was originally given as the Malinowski Memorial Lecture at the London School of Economics, February 1978.

101

that fertility has been encouraged and children highly desired even where

mortality rates were low and many children survived. A simple

demographic explanation only gets us a little way. As Mamdani states: *an

overwhelming majority of the people ... have a large number of children

not because they overestimate their infant mortality rates, but because they

want larger families' [Mamdani, 1972: 43].

Others see the explanation lying in what may broadly be termed

'technology' and non-human resources. This is roughly where Malthus

stands. He noted that pastoral and arable parts of Switzerland varied

greatly in their population growth rates; population was stationary in

pastoral regions, whereas it grew rapidly in arable areas. He generalised

even further when stating that corn countries are more populous than

pasture countries, and rice countries more populous than corn countries

[Malthus: i, 314]. He also noted that population where potatoes were grown

was denser than in areas where wheat was grown [Malthus.- ii, 73]. He did

not consider the alternative explanation of the correlation put forward by

Boserup that population density altered the agricultural technology

[Boserup, 1965]. For Malthus it was the nature of the means of subsistence

which 'allowed' births to exceed deaths. A more careful reading of Malthus

suggests that he did not predict that every increase in food would

necessarily lead to increased population, but that in the absence of

preventive and other checks it would do so. The sequence, over- simplified,

was firstly the discovery of a new technique, or an accidental 'windfall' in

the shape of a new food source appearing, then increased food which

allowed the natural pressure towards higher fertility. Recently an

alternative and attractive form of technological determinism has emerged

in the work of several anthropologists. It is the view that the tools/crops

and 'means of production' generally will determine the value of labour, and

that the value of labour will determine the attitude towards having

children. We may look at three rather different applications of the

argument.

Nag in a recent survey has tried to take account of the fact that even in

densely populated countries such as India, parents who are poor seem to

want more children, even though it would appear to planners to be against

their self-interest. Nag's argument is that this is rational behaviour.

Making a broad dichotomy between industrial and agricultural societies,

he brings forward some statistics to show that, in the absence of machinery,

the scarce factor in production. at least in terms of power, is human labour

[in Marshall and Polgar, 1976: 3-23]. This is the development of an

argument put forward long ago by Kingsley Davis [Davis, 1955: 37]. It is

one of the essential components of 'Demographic Transition Theory',

which argued that fertility was bound to fall rapidly as heavy industry made

human labour redundant. The explanation has been most powerfully put

forward by Mamdani as the major explanation of the desire for children in

a Punjab village, which undermined an intensive family planning project in

the area. People need extra labour: 'Given a very small income, to have to

hire even one farm hand can mean disaster. If such a farmer is merely to

survive, he must rely on his family for the necessary labour power"

[Mamdani, 1972: 76]. 'Labour is the most important factor [in production].

102

For them, family planning means voluntarily reducing the family labour

force' [Mamdani, i, 19 76: 103]. All but the very young and the very old make

some productive contribution to the economy of the household' [Mamdani,

1976: 129]. With intensive agriculture, and a very marked seasonal demand

for \ children are economically valuable. But with the introduction

of other forms of power . he argues. the desire for children may decline; the

introduction of tractors among the upper level Jats may already be having

this effect. 'It is therefore true that the newly married sons of the

mechanized farmers are the Jat group most favourable to the idea of family

planning through the use of modern contraception' [Mamdani, 1976: 87].

This type of argument is given an added dimension by contrasts between

'hoe' cultures of Africa, where female labour is often more valuable than

male. and the *plough' cultures of Asia and Europe, where the demand for

male labour means that there is a male-specific desire for children [Boserup,

1970: 15-52; Goody, 1976]. In both areas human labour is the source of

wealth and prestige and children, who become net producers in their early

teens, are greatly desired. There is much to attract us in this theory, since it

strikes one as plausible and explains a good deal. Yet it is again too simple.

We know that the attitude towards having children and fertility rates varies

enormously between societies with the same agricultural technology, for

instance that Japan and China in the early twentieth century had

contrasted fertility patterns, though both were wet-rice cultivating

countries or that Northern Thailand and India are contrasted.

Furthermore, we know that many of the simplest societies, where human

labour is even more basic in production and even animal power is absent,

namely Hunters and Gatherers, usually have little stress on fertility.

The reason for the inadequacy of the theory seems to lie in the fact that

the objective value, from an economist's point of view, of the child's labour

both as an adolescent and later as an adult is not the issue. It is the value to

its parents. The crucial factors concern the length and nature of the

children's contribution to their parent's prestige and economy, how long

they are expected to contribute to the family fund. This suggests that it is

not in the means of production, but in the relations of production, in Marx's

sense, that we are likely to find the solution to the desirability of children,

and the reason why identical technologies produce entirely different

fertility patterns. This was the heart of Marx's criticism of Malthus. We

must look at the specific 'mode of production', which encompasses the

family organisation if we are to see what determines fertility patterns: 'In

different modes of social production there are different laws of the increase

of population and of over-population' [Marx, 1973: 604]. The 'baboon'

Malthus had oversimplified far too much in making a general law based on

a 'false and childish' conception of a simple relationship between only two

variables, reproduction and the means of subsistence. In fact we need to

look at the 'very complicated and varying relations' within a 'specific

historic development' [Marx, 1973: 605-6]. We will do this shortly. But

before doing so it is worth considering one further general hypothesis

concerning the determinants of fertility which approaches closer to an

analysis in terms of the relations of production than any other.

Two inextricably muddled but separate arguments have been put

103

forward concerning the way in which social structure, as manifest in

kinship, has influenced fertility. One is that there is a correlation between

household structure and fertility, the other is that household structure is

only one aspect of kinship in a society and that the important variable is the

whole kinship system including the method of reckoning descent. Frank

Lorimer long ago argued that fertility would be higher in societies with

'corporate' kinship groups, which usually means those where descent is

exclusively traced through males or females. With bounded groups formed,

children are especially valued as they expand a particular lineage [Lorimer,

1954: 200, 247]. Thus large-scale societies with unilineal kinship such as

India or China had high fertility; bilateral societies in modern industrial

settings, or even the small groups of Hunters and Gatherers who usually

have cognatic descent, have a low emphasis on fertility. There appears to be

a certain plausibility in this argument, but it became discredited largely

because it became muddled with another concerning the nature of the

household. Unilineal systems often, though not invariably, produce

households where, for a time, married brothers live together with their

parents. It was suggested that there were several reasons why the

combination of permanent groups and large, complex households, should

encourage fertility. These were summarised by Kingsley Davis [Davis,

1955: 34-5]:

(i) the economic cost of rearing children does not impinge directly on

the parents to the same extent as in a 'nuclear' family system.

(ii) the inconvenience and effort of child care do not fall so heavily on

the parents alone.

(iii) the age at marriage can be quite young, because under joint

household conditions there is no necessity for the husband to be able to

support his wife and their family independently immediately at marriage-

a woman and her children are absorbed by a larger group.

Although attractive, both parts of the argument came under attack. As

regards household composition, there is considerable evidence, for

instance from India. that fertility in households with a 'nuclear' structure is

often higher than that in 'joint' households [Myrdal, 1968: ii, 1515 note;

Freedman, 1961-2: 50]. A recent study by Ryder tests the hypothesis in

Yucatan and supports the growing number of studies which have failed to

show any simple correlation between household structure and fertility [in

Kaplan, 1976: 93-97]. Defined in terms of residence, recent work from

South India by Montgomery also finds no correlation [in Marshall and

Polgar, 1976: 50-61. The difficulty here is that the counter-evidence comes

mainly from census-type data. If the hypothesis was more carefully

formulated to contrast not residence, but operation, it might have more

chance of survival. An Indian village may be filled with groups of brothers

and their parents who live apart but who operate social and economic units

larger than the nuclear family. In such a situation there may well be a

different attitude to fertility than in a system, such as that of the modern

west, or small bands of Hunters, where the effective unit is husband and

wife who are cut off from their kin. The second major attack has been made

on the negative side of the argument. It is predicted that, all else being

equal, fertility in non-unilineal systems will be lower. Put in this simple

104

form, it is easy to find counter-examples and Nag cites two American tribal

groups which he studied with high fertility and in which 'no corporate

unilineal descent groups were present' [Nag, 1962: 69]. Yet he admits that

'the traditional ideal in both the tribes is an extended family system based

upon patrilocal residence'. even though most households at present are

nuclear units (as they often are in unilineal systems). and that there are

'bilateral kin group. Much of the criticism against Lorimer is now

irrelevant in view of the emergence during the 1950s and 1960s of a new

contrast which make,, a distinction not between unilineal and non-unilineal

but between those societies. whether cognatic, agnatic or uterine where the

formation of groups is possible through an ancestor-focused descent

system. and those where there are no groups because descent is reckoned

from the ego [Fox, 1967: (,h. 1, 6]. Using this new distinction. the thesis

could be reformulated to state that where there are groups formed, by

whatever principle, fertility will be favoured, whereas where individuals are

the centre of a web of relations, as in the simplest Hunting and Gathering

bands or the most complex of modern cities, there will be a de-emphasis on

fertility. But such a thesis is only one step in the direction of suggesting a

new interpretation. We need to complement kinship with economics,

particularly ownership of property. In order to do this we must approach

the puzzle from a different direction.

On the basis of recent work in historical and comparative demography it

is possible to suggest that three models describe the population patterns of

most historically recorded societies. These have been analysed in my work

on the Gurungs of Nepal [Macfarlane, 1976: 303-10]. The 'pre-transition

phase I' model postulates perennial and uncontrolled fertility controlled by

perennial high mortality, which cancel each other out and keep the

population steady. Few societies have conformed to such a model for long

periods. More frequently they have fitted into a 'crisis' model, where

perennial high and uncontrolled fertility is not counterbalanced by annual

high mortality, but periodic crises, war, epidemics, famine, topple the

population, which then mounts again. This is characteristic of China,

traditional India and much of Europe. The third, 'homeostatic', model is

one where fertility is controlled, even in the presence of abundant

resources, by social and economic controls, and mortality is not the main

factor in preventing population growth. This fits certain animal and human

populations and parts of Western Europe in the seventeenth to twentieth

centuries. When discussing fertility, the first of these models can be

amalgamated to form the 'uncontrolled' situation, the third being

'controlled'. For certain purposes, as Matras has argued [quoted in

Zubrow, 1976: 211], it is useful to break each of these in half in terms of age

at marriage. thus:

Fertility

Uncontrolled Controlled

Marriage Early A B

Late C D

-------------

105

This makes it possible to compare societies which move from A to C or

from A to D. But for the purpose of the present argument, just two models

will suffice: the 'uncontrolled' and the 'controlled', whether the means is

contraception, abortion or late age at marriage, thus amalgamating

Malthus' prudential checks (celibacy, late marriage) and 'vice' (con-

traception, abortion). In summarising these models, apart from noting

their approximate location and some instances, no attempt was made to

explain why they occurred in various societies, to what social, economic or

ideological facts they were related. In order to proceed with this much

harder task we may first look at a few hints offered by others who have

attempted to find a solution.

It will be remembered that the answer seems to lie not in the means of

production, but in these combined with the relations of production-in

other words, as Marx claims, in the whole assemblage of beliefs and

practices he labelled 'mode of production'. This is indirectly alluded to by

Mamdani, but never directly confronted. In explaining a possible growth of

a desire to limit childbearing, he is not content to stop at tractors;

something is also happening to the relations of production: a labourer is

paid for the work he does, rather than being given a customary amount in

bundles of wheat, 'In short, labour is becoming a commodity in Manupur.

Feudal relations of work are giving way to capitalist relations of work'

[Mamdani, 1972: 91]. This is an important clue. Another is his statement

that the 'fact that the family is the basic unit of work has important social

implications' [Mamdani, 1972: 132]. It also has important demographic

implications, but these are not explicitly pursued since it would only have

been by comparing India with other countries that Mamdani would have

seen that what he took to be the result of a certain type of agriculture, is in

fact the result of a certain social structure, or mode of production. This

solution is indirectly implied by the common assumption that 'peasants-"

by whom are meant those who not only live in the country, but organise

production in a certain way, have an almost universally pro-natalist

attitude. Goode has assumed that fertility is a highly valued attribute in

peasant societies [Goode, 1963: 111]; Notestein stated 'peasant societies in

Europe, and almost universally throughout the world, are organized in

ways that bring strong pressures on their members to reproduce'

[Notestein, 1953: 15]. Galeski noted that peasant families in Poland were

distinguished by a higher birth rate than other groups [Galeski, 1972: 58].

At first sight this fits well. If we look at a map of areas of dense population

on the earth and a map of the distribution of peasantries the two exactly

overlap; India, China, Europe are both. Of course there is still a chicken

and egg difficulty and there may well be tautology since the word 'peasant'

may have built into part of its definition features which necessitate there

being a dense population. Yet there is something intriguing and worth

pursuing. To do this let us construct two further ideal-type 'modes of

production' which seem to coincide quite well with the 'controlled' and

uncontrolled' fertility models earlier alluded to.

The first can be termed 'peasant' or 'domestic' according to one's fancy.

The central feature of this mode is that production and consumption are

inextricably bound to the unit of reproduction or family; units of social and

106

economic reproduction are identical. The farm and family are found

together as the place where both wealth and children are produced. This

central feature of peasantry is described by Thorner as follows:

Our fifth and final criterion. the most fundamental. is that of the unit of

production. In our concept of peasant economy the typical and most

representative units of production are the peasant family households. We

define a peasant family household as a socio-economic unit which grows crops

principally the physical efforts of the members of the family [in Shanin, 1971: 205].

As Shanin puts it 'the family is the basic unit of peasant ownership,

production consumption and social life. The individual, the family and the

farm, appear as an indivisible whole [Shanin, 1971: 241]. Or as

Chayanov summarised the position:

The first fundamental characteristic of the farm economy of the peasant is that

it is a family economy. Its whole organization is determined by the size and

composition of the peasant family and by the coordination of its consumptive

demands with the number of its working hands [quoted in Wolf, 1966: 14].

This has nothing, as yet, to do with the nature of the residential household,

nor even the kinship system. It is basically the assertion that in many

agricultural societies the basic or smallest unit of production and

consumption is not the individual, but the members of a family, which may

merely consist of parents and children, or a larger group. All those born