Please note carefully

This is a set of notes I wrote between March and December 1991, after my first visit to Japan in August 1990. It is an attempt to integrate my experience in Japan and some subsequent reading (particularly of Norman Jacobs, *The Origin of Modern Capitalism and Eastern Asia*, Hong Kong University Press, 1958, which is quoted frequently as ‘Jacobs’) into my more general ideas.

It is important to stress that these are just rough notes; the quotations have not been checked and the reported comments of various people we met have not been checked with them.

It is just to show a very early stage of my evolving effort to make sense of my encounter with Japan. Some of the ideas that ended up in the final book, *Japan Through the Looking Glass* (Profile Books, 2007) are foreshadowed here.

Much of what I saw and read I still found very confusing.
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1 THE NATURE OF THE MIRACLE IN THE WEST

The wealth of nations

Despite some faltering, when historians of the twentieth century look back over the previous centuries, they will be struck by the development from the later eighteenth century of an apparently new and wealthier world in certain parts of the globe. Among the features they are likely to emphasize are continuous and planned technological growth; the destruction of widespread hunger and famine; sustained economic growth; the elimination of many diseases and prolongation of life; the ever-increasing growth of scientific knowledge and decline of religious bigotry. The contrasts come out best if we compare, for instance twentieth century Scandinavia or Switzerland with eighteenth century China or India. A Malthusian world dominated by the three horsemen of the Apocalypse - war, famine and disease - has given way to relatively undreamed of material affluence for a large proportion of the population.

Reversing the historian's position, if he or she had been writing in the seventeenth century, it is difficult to believe that much of the current affluence of parts of the world could have been predicted. The experience of a steady-state world where most people lived in considerable hardship in the larger agrarian civilizations would have made it very difficult to imagine what was about to happen.

For us, it is very difficult to both know that it did happen and wish to explain it, and yet to unthink away what now seems inevitable. In considering explanations of the most momentous changes that the world has seen - industrialization, urbanization and modern democracy - for many centuries, it is worth stepping back and considering how unlikely the outcome was.

Why did the industrial, technological and scientific revolution occur?

The original problem to be explored is as follows. Why did the industrial revolution occur at all? Why did it first occur in north-western Europe? Why did it start in one particular part of north-western Europe, namely England, some fifty years at least before anywhere else (cf. Rostow)? Why did it occur at a particular point in time, namely the period between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. These are some of the major questions which have perennially attracted sociologists and historians. They imply other questions.

Why did industrialization and the scientific revolution not occur in other civilizations, for example India and China, which were at the start of the process in the West much more sophisticated and wealthy and apparently more technologically advanced.
Then there are further questions. What is the link between industrialization and the general mode of production we term capitalism, and what is distinctive about European capitalism?

Later one will have to distinguish necessary and sufficient causes, causes to explain industrialism and others to explain capitalism etc. In chapter two, I will make a start by looking at a few of the well-known theories.

**A world dominated by capitalism.**

Capitalism and industrialism constitute a world system, with little left to compete with, having more or less liquidated its opponents. So what is the system with which we are familiar in western Europe and North America?

**The unlikeness of the escape.**

Gellner's problem is how, against all the odds, the first society escaped through a gate from Agraria to Industria. It was miraculous, for "almost everything in the ethos, and in the balance of power of the society, generally militates against the possibility of an explosive growth in either production or cognition". The Agrarian Age "was basically a period of stagnation, oppression and superstition"; all these are reversed as one civilization miraculously "escaped" from this rural idiocy. (Plough, 103, 22).

A sketch of the normal course of human history might run as follows. In very simple (Hunter Gatherer) societies, there is often a situation where no institution dominates entirely. Politics, religion, the family and economy are balanced. This gives these societies that curious feeling of free-floating individualism.

The normal tendency is that when 'tribal' societies are formed, one sphere, characteristically the family or lineage, dominates. Hence 'kinship is king', there are Unilineal Descent Groups etc. Everything is embedded in kinship. This covers the long phase between about ten thousand and two thousand years ago, from the beginning of cultivation to the beginnings of a State.

With the emergence of the State, the emphasis tends to change. The economy becomes more powerful and its surpluses are siphoned off by the powerful - by the State. The State or ruling group tend to take over from the family, though the family often remains very powerful. The State also tends to enter into an alliance with the Church. The mixture produced characteristically leads to domination where the individual becomes embedded in larger wholes. In India this develops into caste, in China into the Confucian state and kinship, in Russia into absolutism and then Communism. There seems to be an almost gravitational pull towards one of these solutions.

Among other effects is the stifling of the individual and economy. Societies reach a technological and social and political dead-end (one variant of which is the 'high equilibrium trap' of Elvin,
another, the 'Oriental Despotism' of Marx and Wittfogel), another the 'Ancien Regime' world described by De Tocqueville.

But two parts of the world and two alone 'escaped' through a door in the wall of this locked garden of 'Agraria'. Or, perhaps more properly, they never entered Agraria proper at all. They went down a different route. The alternatives might be represented thus:

HG ......> Tribal ......> Agrarian/ Ancien Regime
HG ......> Tribal ......> Feudal (special) ......> Industrial

Of course, this is all anticipated to a considerable extent by Marx and others. But without the historical background and without fully considering the comparative cases, Marx did not understand how or why it happened.

The essence of the alternative is that fossilisation did not occur and something strange was kept alive, or was re-born - "modernism" or where we are now.

Maine on the usual course of history.

As Gellner observed, "Maine's vision of human history was rather of the characteristically twentieth-century 'Gatekeeper' kind: 'the stationary condition of the human race is the rule the progressive the exception'..." (EP, History, xxviii). Interestingly, Gellner's quotation here, presumably from Ancient Law, is almost word for word identical to a passage by Maine his last work, Popular Government, where he affirmed that he believed that "The natural condition of mankind...is not the progressive condition. It is the condition not of changeableness but of unchangeableness. The immobility of society is the rule; its mobility is the exception." (quoted in Burrow, 160). Hence the "progressive societies", which had taken the historic step from Status to Contract, were the exception.

Gellner on the miracle of the escape; the absence of necessity

see also Jones on the 'European miracle'.
others on the unlikeliness of the escape, the normal condition in India (Dumont), China (Needham) etc. etc.

Adam Smith's theories.

Adam Smith was well aware that there was something extraordinary happening in eighteenth century England and Holland. This comes out in the comparisons he makes between England, Scotland and France in his Wealth of Nations. For instance, he wrote: "When you go from Scotland to England, the difference which you may remark between the dress and countenance of the
common people in the one country and in the other, sufficiently indicates the difference in their condition. The contrast is still greater when you return from France. France, though no doubt a richer country than Scotland, seems not to be going forward so fast. It is a common and even a popular opinion in the country, that it is going backwards..."(i, 102).

The use of the word 'backwards' reminds us that Smith was not merely concerned with absolute wealth, but rather with whether an economy was growing. This is shown in the comparison with China, which was "a much richer country than any part of Europe" (i, 210). The real difference lay in what we would call the rate of economic growth: "for the greater part of Europe being in an improving state, while China seems to be standing still" ii, 211) Why and how had certain societies, and particularly England and Holland, started on the unusual path of sustained economic growth?

One key, he believed, lay in the social structure. His model of the economy and society is extremely 'modern'; it is not based on the usual Ancien Regime structure of a number of legally separate 'estates' of nobility, peasantry, clergy, bourgeois, who exchange goods and services. It is split into "three different orders of people...those who live by rent...by wages...by profit. These are the three great, original and constituent orders of every civilized society" (i,276). These are the landlords, wage-labourers and employers of our modern capitalist state. It is clear from his analysis that he built this model up on the basis of his observations of how English society worked.

When trying to explain why England was so successful, he considered its geographical advantages, agreeing that it is "perhaps as well fitted by nature as any large country in Europe, to be the seat of foreign commerce..."(i, 442). He also pointed out that its legal code was favourable to commerce: "in reality there is no country in Europe, Holland itself not excepted, of which the law is, upon the whole, more favourable to this sort of industry..." (i, 442). But the geographical and legal advantages were less important than one other; "what is of much more importance than all of them, the yeomanry of England are rendered as secure, as independent, and as respectable as law can make them...". In other words, it is the curious position of what roughly might be called "the middle class" that is crucial.

Smith asks rhetorically, what would the position of England have been if it "had left the yeomanry in the same condition as in most other countries of Europe?"(i, 443). He believed that "Those laws and customs so favourable to the yeomanry, have perhaps contributed more to the present grandeur of England, than all their boasted regulations of commerce taken together." (i,415). For their position and status was very different in England. "Through the greater part of Europe the yeomanry are regarded as an inferior rank of people, even to the better sort of tradesmen and mechanics..." (i, 418). There is consequently little investment by townsmen in the countryside, be believed, except in England, Holland and Berne in Switzerland.

As to why the yeomanry should be so powerful and prosperous, Smith's answer seem to be that in England, above all, the property law was such that they had private property and security of tenure. Even leases are more secure than elsewhere. "In England, therefore, the security of the tenant is
equal to that of the proprietor. In England besides a lease for life of forty shillings a year value is a freehold, and entitles the lessee to vote for a member of parliament; and as a great part of the yeomanry have freeholds of this kind, the whole order becomes respectable to the landlords on account of the political considerations which this gives them. There is, I believe, no-where in Europe, except in England, any instance of the tenant building upon the land of which he had not lease, and trusting that the honour of his landlord would take no advantage of so important an improvement...The law which secures the longest leases against successors of every kind is, so far as I know, peculiar to Great Britain..." (415).

These differences were at least several centuries old, Smith thought. Whereas in France still in the eighteenth century, Smith had been told that five-sixths of the whole kingdom was still held by some form of older share-cropping agreement, the metayer, such tenures "have been so long in disuse in England that at present I know no English name for them" (i, 413-4).

These were differences in social structure which were reflected and made even more visible in the differences between the situations in the various colonies of France, Spain, England and other European nations. Thus he felt that "the political institutions of the English colonies have been more favourable to the improvement and cultivation" of the New World than those of Continental countries. One of the central differences was that of alienability of land. In the continental colonies, the land was held as family land, in English colonies as an alienable commodity. Thus he described the differences, whereby in English colonies "the tenure of the lands, which are all held by free socage, facilitates alienation", whereas in Spanish and Portuguese colonies "what is called the right of Majorazzo takes place in the succession of all those great estates to which any title of honour is annexed. Such estates go all to one person, and are in effect entailed an unalienable...", while in French colonies, "if any part of an estate, held by the noble tenure of chivalry and homage, is alienated, it is, for a limited time, subject to the right of redemption, either by the heir of the superior or by the heir of the family...which necessarily embarrass alienation." ii, 84). Thus the English system would tend to create a mass of middling folk, and the Continental systems would re-create the great divide between nobility and peasantry of the homeland.

Smith noted that "In none of the English colonies is there any hereditary nobility". There is a difference of esteem, but not of law; "the descendant of an old colony family is more respected than an upstart of equal merit and fortune: but he is only more respected, and he has no privileges by which he can be troublesome to his neighbours" (ii, 98) Indeed, he argues, it is a feature of the commercial states of which both old and new England were examples, that "riches...very seldom remain long in the same family" (i,440). The "common law of England, indeed, is said to abhor perpetuities" and hence entails were in England "more restricted than in (any?) other European monarchy". (i.409)

Smith's picture of eighteenth century England and New England is of a modern commercial society. The empire was created to provide customers for England. "To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers, may at first sight appear a project fit only for a
nation of shop-keepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by shopkeepers." (ii,129) And, more surprisingly, Smith assumes that such a mentality is very old.

In a sense Smith turns the problem on its head. He assumes that capitalism, or at least the propensity to accumulate, is 'natural', but that it has been stifled in certain places and times. He assumes that "Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command..." (i, 475); "A man must be perfectly crazy who, where there is tolerable security, does not employ all the stock which he commands..." (i, 301). The driving force which leads to the division of labour and accumulation of wealth is "a certain propensity in human nature...to truck, to barter, and exchange one thing for another". (ii, 17) This is a distinctive and original feature of mankind, connected to the development of reason and speech. "It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts". (i, 17) Once this natural tendency is allowed freedom, the division of labour groups. "Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society." (i, 26).

The problem, thus, for Smith, is how this natural tendency towards capitalism is crushed at certain stages of history. He half accepted his friend David Hume's account of how the lawless confusion of mediaeval Europe had almost wiped out this tendency. He thus accepted that there was a different and insecure land system and that the miraculous social structure, with its independent peasantry, was probably a resurgence, after the Dark Ages. "Even in England, the country perhaps of Europe where the yeomanry has always been most respected, it was not till about the 14th of Henry the VIIIth that the action of ejectment was invented..." (i, 415), thus giving security of tenure. Before then, "the occupiers of land were in every as dependent upon the great proprietor as his retainers. Even such of them as were not in a state of villeinage, were tenants at will..."( i, 434). In this insecure and different land-tenure system, he believed that "the greater part of the county must probably have been uncultivated before the reign of Elizabeth". (i, 443).

He paints a picture of a "war of all against all" in the mediaeval period, which gradually gave way to the peaceful and civilized society which he realized must have existed for at least two hundred years. How had this transition occurred? Here Smith seems to have had an idea of an almost necessary spread of 'Enlightenment'. Citing David Hume, he describes how "commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors" (i,433). It was the improvement of "arts, manufactures, and commerce, the same causes which destroyed the power of the great barons" (ii, 325). Gradually, the centralization of power and law which was the pre-condition for the market economy occurred.

Smith believes that this was almost a natural progression, "the natural progress of England towards wealth and improvement..." (i, 366-7). But this leaves him with the problem of why it
should have happened in England and Holland, but not elsewhere. He noted that in Poland "the feudal system still continues to take place..." and in Spain and Portugal "though the feudal system has been abolished...but it has not been succeeded by a much better." (i. 264-5) Yet he is unable to explain the peculiarity. By lumping England with the Continent, he is unable to explain why it became different, for the commerce and industry which he believed broke up the older system could have developed anywhere and the disintegrating effects of the towns (i, 426) was also likely to occur in all parts of Europe.

This is just one of the unresolved problems in Smith, connected to the even deeper one of why it was inevitable that trade and commerce and the 'modern' society should emerge at all. The necessity for this emergence seems to be connected with his inconsistent belief that despite the fact that in every way the mediaeval, 'feudal' society was different, yet people, at heart, were still instinctively traders and accumulators. It was the break-down of order which suppressed trade and commerce. Leave human beings in peace and security, and the wealth of nations and the open civil society will grow. Dugald Steward reported that Smith believed that "little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural order of things" (quoted in Hall, Powers, 141). The problem, thus, was to create the political foundations for the market.

One reason for Smith's curious confidence that the economic motive was not entirely extinguished during the medieval period was that when he turned to the original documents of the medieval period, rather than depending on Hume, he witnessed a world which was more 'commercial' than might be expected. For example, noted that as early as 1262, Henry III "revived an ancient statute" called, The assize of Bread and Ale which Smith thought was probably "as old at least as the time of his grandfather Henry II, and may have been as old as the conquest". The interesting thing about this statute is that "it regulated the price of bread according as the prices of what may happen to be" (i, 199). The very passing of these statutes seems to imply both that there is a widespread monetized economy and also that the simple things like bread and ale, which in true "subsistence" economies are made in the household and therefore do not enter the market, were bought and sold.

Or again, examining the accounts of an Augustinian prior for 1309, Smith describes a list of articles which are also carefully priced (i, 199?). A survey of the prices of commodities over the period 1350-1570 does not seem to suggest that England is moving from a largely subsistence to a "market" society (i, 200-1). Smith assumes that the economic laws which applied in his time would apply back to the fourteenth century and earlier. Thus, as an economic history, he saw no great break between the medieval and modern period, while as a social and political historian commentator, dependent on Hume, he accepts the break. Smith even suggests that rather than, as in the famous Tawney thesis, the Tudors starting to allow the borrowing of money at interest, thus breaking away from an "embedded" economic system, it looks as if interest rates were legally fixed at ten per cent for the first time in the early sixteenth century, having been higher before. As capitalism proceeded they tended to drop, being fixed at a lower and lower rate until the eighteenth century. (i, 99-100).
He does not seem to believe that medieval man was unable to lend money at interest.

If we take Smiths central proposition, that trading instincts are 'natural' and that the drive towards capitalism is not such a problem, add to it his realization that what impedes this is usually the social and political context, we have a useful preliminary way of formulating the problem. We are then left with the problem of explaining why the natural tendency, which is naturally destroyed in the majority of societies (including much of Europe) was allowed to escape for the first time. In answering this, we receive the hint from Smith that perhaps the economy was not as non-existent during the English middle ages as his friend Hume's history would suggest. But beyond that, we have to devise other explanations for Smith cannot really take us any further than suggesting several of the most important correlates of capitalism by the eighteenth century. Where they had come from and why England was different, is a problem he was unable to solve.
CHAPTER 2. THE JAPANESE MIRACLE

The importance of comparative models

The important features in Japan and England are the absences - the dogs that did not bark, the inverted mirror images, the weakness of kinship, the plurality of religion, the balance of the State etc. These can only be detected if we have a strong positive image of what is normal in the course of history, and then see that in the miraculous cases the predicted did not happen - and something strange did so. This was the case with my discovery of the absence of 'peasantry' in England, and is even more so here. The absence of such strong comparative models is one of the reasons why there has been so little success in explaining the origins of modernity, and in particular England and Japan as industrial societies.

A third case: Nepal

When discussing the book I was planning with John Davey, he asked whether there would be a third case - i.e. extreme - to balance England and Japan. I mentioned something about Nepal (implicitly). But it might be possible, wine we are working in Nepal anyway and the literature is so small and contained, to cover Nepal as well - as an instance of somewhere where the dissociation did not occur, which until the 1960's was closed etc. In Nepal, a battle for its soul between 'open capitalism' and 'closed communism/ Brahminism' is taking place, which is unusual and illuminates many of the contradictions which I'm interested in.

The use of comparisons

In trying to understand what are the central features of modern societies, and the reasons for its emergence, it would, of course, be possible to look at only one case, for instance modern Europe. If one did this, there would be an implicit comparison, namely pre-industrial/ pre-capitalist/ pre-modern somewhere (probably Europe) and its opposite, post nineteenth century, character. Many people have approached the problem in this way and thought some discussions are illuminating, in the end one goes away dissatisfied for various reasons. There is a sort of inevitability about the account; we know it happened, therefore it is difficult not to believe that it had to happen. Secondly, it is really impossible to test causal hypotheses. Factors which are stressed as necessary and sufficient causes seem to be so if they are present, but we cannot carry out a counter-factual thought experiment and wish them away. Are they just 'noise' or are they really deeper causes?

Furthermore, we are left wondering whether there are other even more important and deeper factors which are necessary, a sort of lowest common denominator, which can only be exposed by looking at other examples. Given this desirability for some explicit comparisons, what shall we compare?
If we start with the assumption that the central case is England, the precocious developer of modern industrial capitalism, one strategy would be to compare it systematically with other parts of Europe. There is something to be gained for choosing areas where many of the factors could be held constant; within Europe we can assume an Indo-European language, a Graeco-Roman past, Christianity, a temperate climate and so on. And yet, it was within this common heritage that one country 'broke away'. Why was such a development blocked elsewhere? With such a strategy, we could compare England with almost anywhere in Europe, Ireland, Portugal, France, Italy etc. This procedure was mainly the one taken by thinkers until the nineteenth century, of whom Adam Smith, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Arthur Young and others are notable examples. It might be called the Enlightenment approach.

It gets us a certain way, but it is of limited use, since it leads us away from examining those very things which are held in common. It is the enormous facts of language, religion, climate, law etc. which are part of the necessary equation - alongside the differences. Just because they are in common, and in Ireland or Portugal there was a different outcome, cannot lead us to conclude that they are unimportant. Studying closely allied cultures tends to make us overlook the largest factors. We are like the crew of sailors who moored on a whale, thinking it an island; it is too big for us to see, and too close. We need to combine this approach with a move further away.

A second approach, which might be termed the Weberian or anthropological comparative approach, stretches the comparison much further, comparing the whole of Europe with civilizations which did not 'escape' into modernity. Weber did this with Islam, China and India, and Marx did it historically with the Asiatic and Ancient modes of production, and Maine with India and England. It was thus one of the favourite strategies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Such an approach gets us a long way further, in that the hidden whale one which we have moored is suddenly revealed. We realize the huge hidden weight of our peculiar linguistic, kinship, religious and political systems. Some very significant central features like Christianity, the peculiar nature of the western city, the peculiar kinship system, begin to be revealed.

But again, this seam of grand comparative work, later mined to good effect by Gellner, Goody, McNeill, Braudel and others, has run out of good returns. Perhaps part of the problem is that it tends to go to the other extreme of solution one. Instead of their being too much overlap, so that one misses the central features because they are assumed in the model, there is too little - and hence one is left with those vast binary oppositions (as in the work of Levi-Strauss on hot and cold societies etc.), which are again, ultimately, only of limited value. Since there are so many and do great differences, one is left confused as to which are important and which subsidiary. For instance, is it the absence of caste and pollution, is it the absence of magical religion, is it the absence of corporate kin groups, or other factors, which explain the curiosity of Europe. Furthermore, when we compare a civilization like India or China we instinctively compare it with Europe - thus lumping together different case.
A third approach, which has not really been tried, is to take a controlled comparison between England and Japan. It has the novel feature that both achieved the 'miracle', and more or less independently. This makes Japan different from France or Germany which were cases of 'emulation'. Therefore, we might assume that there must be something in common, assuming that there are some necessary ingredients to the process. Furthermore, there seems enough similarity in this and other respects for some interesting factors to emerge. Thus a comparison with Japan has an advantage over a comparison with something as dissimilar as India or China, which is too distant. On the other hand, the fact that Japan is in many respects so utterly different means that very large areas of apparently necessary and sufficient causation in one case, but not in the other, can be ruled out. It opens up deeper issues and stretches the mind.

Such a comparison also forces one to re-think the nature of capitalism, which through the earlier two methods was left unproblematic, either because in the European context it is unitary (all European capitalism is similar), or in the world context, where European capitalism is neither opposed nor achieved. But Japan has capitalism with a difference, and hence shows up the peculiarity of western capitalism itself, not only in comparison to preceding or non-capitalist societies, but also in relation to a very different form of equally successful industrial and technological society.

The two miracles; what is to be explained.

There are two "economic miracles" of which people speak. By "miracle" they mean: events that could not have been predicted, events that cannot be easily causally explained, events which are "once off", difficult or impossible to repeat or emulate; events which are rather sudden. These "miracles" are, firstly, the bursting forth of the first industrial and urban revolution in England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and secondly, the double growth of Japan, after the Meiji restoration in the period 1890-1940 and against after 1945.

These miracles are, of course, somewhat different in that the English was a 'boot-strapping' operation. There was no precedent, no model, and therefore everything had to be invented from scratch. It was self-ignition, spontaneous combustion, 'bootstrapping'. The Japanese miracle was fired from outside, with technological, social and other models available from elsewhere, and indeed pressing on Japan. Yet the Japanese was still miraculous in two ways. There was the amazing speed and success of the adaptation and domestication of these available modes, twice, with little upheaval. Then there was the miracle that it happened at all. The usual pattern was otherwise, as we can see from all of the rest of Asia, China, India and Africa, where it did not. There was nothing inevitable, or even probable, about this.

Would Japan have developed industrialism without the West?

Minamoto thought that even in the Tokugawa, every Han was trying to industrialize themselves, but not sure whether this could have achieved industrialism without the west.
What was the Japanese 'miracle' and how did it occur?

The Meiji restoration was a 'miracle' because out of an apparently unpropitious background (a minority revolt, mainly conservative and anti-foreigner), there came an outburst of energy and pro-western, pro-democratic, radical movement. It is impossible to explain, unless one sees, as does Fukuzawa a little, the deeper separation of spheres and latent 'modernism' of Japan, which had only been patched over by the Tokugawa.

Japan as a second miracle.

Establishing the fact that Japan is a true example of autonomous industrialization, and also, in certain senses, a species of capitalism. It has done this once in embryo (in C16) and twice more in actuality since, with the Meiji and post Second World War. Yet, it can be shown that it was, and is, not a society based on individualism, egalitarianism or rationality in the western sense.

The great difficulty of understanding Japan.

Japan, we were told, is like a "magic mirror" (or two-way mirror); people can look out, see out, but outsiders cannot see in. Some of the difficulties are also indicated by Barthes in his book 'Empire of Signs'. An exploration of the difficulties would be fruitful, since it would show something about Japan.

If we use the metaphor of De Tocqueville on America and England. America is straightforward, since it is planned on straight lines. England is complex, because it is very old and Gothic and contorted. Japan is a hall of mirrors, everything reflecting everything, inversions within inversions etc. A labyrinth, where the mind never rests, but is led on through another door etc. There is no centre to the culture; everything signifies something else (a 'sign' in Barthes sense). Likewise, there is no 'centre' to the individual - there is an emptiness at the centre, while the surfaces, which relate to and reflect others, is where the meaning lies.

While often odd and even contradictory, Japan does seem to be susceptible to the anthropological idea of trying to understand the culture as a whole, trying to search for the deeper patterns. It does seem that the art, etiquette, religion, business attitudes etc. of Japan all seem to fit together and the puzzle is to see the uniting thread. As De Tocqueville remarked of England (as opposed to America), it is a very complex, old and convoluted civilization. Yet there are some central organizing themes - the spirit of the society, or the 'pattern of the culture'. Hence Ruth Benedict was attracted to the culture and applied her 'patterns of culture' approach in the elegant 'Chrysanthemum and the Sword'.

A cultural vacuum hoover.
The difficulty of understanding Japan is compounded because Japan so quickly absorbs other traditions into itself. For instance, we discussed the Japanese love of imitation and novelty. It is like a searching mirror, or vacuum-hoover, which tries to suck the best out of other cultures. Hence there are fads and fashions for certain 'foreign' things. For a while everything was learnt from America. Now that America is no longer able to supply 'new' ideas, the Japanese are turning to the older, apparently more cultured and elegant cultures of Europe. Hence their particular interest in France, Germany and now Italy. After a few years of absorbing these, they will no doubt look elsewhere. They always want the best, hence brand names etc.

An anatomy of capitalism. (thoughts, April 1986)

It will be necessary first to show the outward features of capitalism, the material, physical, emotional world which it creates, the houses, parks, affluence and poverty, love, desire etc. This is the skin, the facial features.

Then try to describe the bones, sinews and blood of the system. The blood is money, literacy, law, and communications system. The sinews are the concepts, individualism, separation of spheres, equality etc. The bones are property, power etc. The skin and flesh are constantly changing - but the bones are of long duration and give an outline to the flesh.

In a sense, what one is trying to do in comparing Europe (England) and Japan is to disregard the skin (culture) and look at the rest which lie underneath, which are curiously similar.

Need to distinguish culture and structure.

"...societies which do not share a common cultural heritage (e.g. Japan and Western Europe) may have significant social heritages in common, whereas those sharing a common cultural heritage (e.g. Japan and China) may not share a common social heritage." (Jacobs, p. x)

Search for universal pre-conditions for emergence of capitalism

A comparison of Japan and China "poses the question whether it is possible to discover basic preconditions which are universally applicable for the 'sociological' (italics) explanation of the origins and development of capitalism." (Jacobs, p.1)

The three approaches; diffusion, difference, convergence

"If every similarity (i.e. of Japan and West - Alan) was due to borrowing, sociological analysis would be limited to social history. The independent origins standpoint, on the other hand, prevents generalized analysis, limiting the validity / of social analysis to one specific reference; the
The development of capitalism in both Japan and Western Europe would be attributed to coincidence. Following the principle of convergence, we see that the structures of Japan and western Europe show important underlying principles in common, despite variants in traits...." (Jacobs, 12-3)

Two types of pre-capitalist society - one can develop capitalism

"The solution here suggested is, in respect of method, to distinguish pre-capitalist or non-capitalist societies into at least two discontinuous types of social systems; and seek criteria to determine whether or not pre-capitalist societies 'can' or 'cannot' develop capitalism.../ we maintain that social systems which do not develop capitalism are distinctly and positively different 'in kind even in their pre-capitalist stage' from social systems which do develop capitalism." (Jacobs, 213)

An alternative to stage theory of nineteenth century sociology

"Recourse is to the hypothesis of a certain school / of sociological thought which has attempted to establish at least two basic society-types which are discontinuous and have no temporal relationship with each other, in contrast to the 'stage' theory of nineteenth century sociology." (Jacobs, 216)

The two major types of pre-industrial society

"Japan has been selected as the example of one type, of which western Europe is a member, and China as the example of a so-called 'oriental' type. The conclusions for Japan can be transferred directly as conclusions for the origins and development of western European capitalism, and the conclusions on China may be applied to another similar type of society (e.g. India). " (Jacobs, 217)

Very early roots of Japanese capitalism

"The establishment in 1868 of a political authority conducive to industrial capitalism represented the fulfillment of trends traceable to the introduction of the money economy in the Ashikaga Epoch." (Jacobs, 108)

The possibility rather than necessity of capitalism emerging

Jacobs argues that "modern capitalism could and did merge, therefore, at a particular period of technical and social development, as the best means of meeting the current requirements....In Japan, although no force arose positively to support the cause of modern capitalism, the constant changes allowed for the 'possibility' of capitalism....The existence of the 'possibility' itself, without the requisite of a positive capitalist sanction, is the main point of interest here." (Jacobs, 211)
Why the rise of Japanese industry and capitalism?

Minamoto retreated to the usual explanations; the Japanese are very industrious, they were part of a large south Asian trading zone in the C16, with a lot of trade, accumulation of capital, cotton etc. etc. But why not China?

What happened in the Meiji restoration:

a) destroying the lower levels of the over-powerful political system by abolition of the 'han' (feudalism)
b) destroying the power of the shogunate absolutism and supposedly introducing "democracy".
c) opening up the economy to foreign trade
d) investing in new technology
e) liberalizing legal codes to introduce individualism and equality
f) reducing the power of traditional religion (Buddhism), even though Shinto was re-instated.

The main need was to diminish hierarchy somewhat and to allow a little more equality and individualism. this is what happened, and led to an explosive power, as if pent up, in Japan.

In England the gradual, centuries long, growth of momentum, which was already present in the thirteenth centuries onwards, was a little different. There was a certain freeing of restraints in England, though earlier. The Reformation weakened the Church, the Civil War and 1688 Settlement limited the State. These allowed the economy to expand. But there was no massive 'opening up' equivalent to Japan. It is thus impossible to put one's finger on a certain point in time, in England, when the system changed - as opposed to Japan.
CHAPTER 3. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN ENGLAND AND JAPAN

Material conditions: natural resources and strategic placing.

There is a very considerable literature which argues that Northern Europe was particularly well endowed with various natural resources, particularly sources of energy such as coal, wood, wind and water, which gave it the natural advantage over other parts of the world. There were also special mineral resources - gold and silver, iron, copper etc. Absolute amounts were less important than the juxtaposition of resources - water near coal for example.

Then there was the climatic advantage; the current was fairly stable, avoiding the instabilities of a monsoon climate such as that in India and South-East Asia and, despite some long term shifts, climatically favourable. Northern Europe was particularly favoured in this respect, and it has been suggested that one of the reasons for the tip in the balance towards northern Europe in the sixteenth century was the shift in climate which dried up the Mediterranean region which had formerly been dominant (ref. ).

As to ways in which capitalism is thought to be explainable by the material conditions, it could be argued that the heavy soils of northern Europe led to an intensity of agriculture (the heavy northern plough) which enabled productive and intensive agriculture to developed and hence a particular social structure to be developed. In other words, Europe could develop a peasant civilization and this, at least provided a necessary, if not sufficient, cause for capitalism.

Unfortunately, there are grave difficulties in all this. It is difficult to argue that England was materially better off than many other parts of Europe, yet it was there that industrialism took off. The best one can argue is that resources are a useful, perhaps even necessary, but by no means sufficient explanation of why industrialization occurred, when it occurred and where it occurred.

Technological advantages

The central importance of technology, agricultural and military, has been a frequent them of work in this field. From the very early emphasis on the effects of the introduction of improvements in the ninth to twelfth centuries (stirrup, plough, water-mill, wind-mill etc) and the second wave in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries (clock, compass, gunpowder, printing, smelting etc.), to the third wave which we actually call the industrial revolution (steam, etc.) these and many other areas have been explored.

While it is clear that they are crucial, and some of the them are even necessary features of any explanation, it can fairly easily be shown that in terms of technology, England was in no way superior to Moghul India or Confucian China (as Weber and Needham among many others have pointed out). Again it is not possible to explain very much with this single variable. The use of the tools, and the invention of the method of invention, as with the use of the material environment are
shaped by social structure and ideology and are indeed part of the problem to be explained. However interesting discussions of wheel, horse, firearms, plough etc. are, they cannot get us very far with explaining industrialization and capitalism.

Trade and empire and the exploitation of other regions.

One consequence of a developed technology (ships and guns), combined with certain material resources (iron, cloth), was the development of Wallerstein's 'World System'. It is well known that this was the period of the most rapid conquest and expansion and exploration in world history (quote). It has been argued that Europe's later success in industrialization was the result of a predatory process in which the natural wealth of South America, India, China, Africa and elsewhere was siphoned off to enrich the north-west European population. This wealth then provided the capital base for rapid economic growth in the eighteenth century and the series of transactions which it encouraged led to the development of large entrepreneurial classes and cities, in other words bourgeois capitalism.

Again, there is clearly some truth in this variant of the 'frontier society' hypothesis and the plundering of other Empires in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries is widely documented in all its poignancy (quote Montaigne?). One powerful variant of this thesis is Hamilton's (e al) concerning the effects of the influx of gold and silver from South America; another is the argument that the English industrial revolution was largely financed from the profits of the English in India. It has been argued that income disparities may lead to the accumulation necessary for economic growth and thus at an international level the pooling of the then known world's wealth in one area of the globe, through superior force and cunning, may well have been crucial.

Again, we may have one of the necessary causes. But that it is not sufficient is suggested, for instance, by the fact that many of the major colonial powers, Portugal, Spain, Holland, did not turn this into industrialism and the scientific technology that goes with it. Fruitless wars and a specific social structure prevented them from re-investing the wealth in increasing agricultural and industrial production. The advantages of world trade were not mainly in the pillage, but rather the growth of shipping and weaponry, the opening up of large markets, particularly for cloth, the potential for exploiting surplus population, all these were crucial as well.

(cf. Weber's dismissal of this factor)

War, taxation and the advantages of being an island.

War on other people's territory could well be healthy for an economy, war on one's own could be disastrous. One reason for England's early industrialization could be her position as an island. While the French Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years War wracked Europe, England was relatively peaceful from the end of the fifteenth century onwards. Not only did this lead to less disruption, it meant that there was far less siphoned off in the way of tax to maintain a standing army and a large
court or nobility. England enjoyed during these centuries (like Japan?) unusually light taxation. The contrast with France (with stringent taxation) is well known. Increases in individual or family wealth were not immediately destroyed by marauding army, as in India or China, or seized by the equally predatory 'peace-keeping' nobility and rulers. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that the only other peasant (sic) society to 'indigenously' industrialize was also an island, Japan.

Demographic explanations.

An explanation which has become increasingly powerful is the demographic one. Recent work in historical demography has shown that the pattern of European population growth, and particularly English population, differs quite considerably from that in other large-scale peasant societies about which we know.

The characteristic pattern of most peasant societies may be termed a 'crisis' one, in other words fairly long-term swings with population building up and then being cut back, with a positive feed-back, in true Malthusian fashion, between agricultural production and population. Hence China, India, Egypt and parts of Europe had such a pattern.

What differentiated England, particularly, was that for a number of centuries, from the fourteenth to the eighteenth at least, two things happened. Firstly, population grew (by comparative standards), very slowly indeed. Secondly the usual Malthusian link between economy and population appeared to be broken. There was no long necessarily population growth when agricultural production increased (cf. Spengler et al.); consequently capital accumulation occurred. Then, when labour was critical, population started to grow rapidly. Thus the fit was just right - holding back and then a spurt. Curiously, the only other, almost exactly equivalent pattern (though achieved by other means) was Japan.

Yet to describe this necessary pattern is not to explain it. Demography is an intervening variable, the intersection of many other patterns and in itself requiring explanation. Since the demographic pattern was both crucial and unusual, it requires explanation.

Some economic similarities

These are listed elsewhere and include; emphasis on textiles, which encourages the development of small-scale "proto-industrial" production, and combines agriculture and industry in the countryside, which absorbed surplus population; a considerable amount of non-human power; light taxation; a relatively free land market; a highly productive and increasingly efficient agriculture; a large and affluent "middling" group who were eager to purchase artifacts of many kinds.

The result of all this was a country, England, where by the sixteenth century and earlier, cash had permeated through the whole of the economy, where half the inhabitants in many villages were not living directly off agriculture, and where farming was treated as a "commercial" activity. From my
initial reading, Japan was reaching this stage during the eighteenth century - in both cases about 150 years before rapid industrialization. Holland went through the same phenomenon even earlier than England, but then did not develop into industrialism. (cf. De Vries)

It is difficult, however, to find within the economic sphere itself an explanation of these developments. Why did a "nation of shopkeepers" emerge in England and later in Japan? The answer would only partly seem to lie in the economy.

Some similarities in the technological development

Since this is taken to be the thing to be explained (the explicandum), it is not certain how much attention should be paid to this sphere. One might take two views. On the one hand, one might argue that the 'feebleness' of the technology (Gellner) means that it was not a prey to the predatory political powers of coercion, and that was important was its low level (as opposed, for example, to the 'high level equilibrium trap' of China). Or one could argue that the growth of quite a strong, but independent economy ('free' cities as described by Pirenne, long-distance trade; widespread use of money etc), was important since it gave the economy resilience and power over and beyond itself. Both arguments are probably true in different ways.

One could easily list a number of tangential points which could be made about some of the correlates of the particular economies, which made the 'escape' possible. These include:

Literacy

It would appear that both Japan and England from quite early on, perhaps in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, had high literacy rates. These may have been a necessary background for sophisticated economic activities.

Literacy was very high. Ordinary peasants can read and write. Education in the middle of the nineteenth was higher than in France (Dore), with 45-50% able to read and write. The diary of a farmer shows how he taught Japanese calculation (abacus) to ordinary villagers, who were ready to learn the square root etc. in c. 1830. From the seventeenth century the village tried to provide a village school, employing as teachers a Buddhist priest or jobless samurai. Rich farmers funded schools.

The role of education in Japanese modernization.

I talked to an Associate Professor of Sociology of Education at Tokyo University, who was interested in the way in which education in Japan since the Meiji period has been used to encourage modernization. He thought that schools now, with their punctuality, meritocracy, orderliness etc. fitted well with the Protestant ethic.
Demography

Another curious similarity is that, as opposed to most 'traditional' societies, the population of both Japan and England grew very slowly in the several centuries before the industrial spurt. In England, there was slow growth from 1450-1750, in Japan from 1600-1850. During this period, the gains of increased productivity through an agricultural revolution in both cases, were not absorbed by the Malthusian mechanism of rapidly growing population. Again, in both cases, the fact that the two nations were islands may have given some sense of crowding and an anti-natalist attitude. But the roots of the controlled fertility were probably deeper than this.

The difference was that of the mechanisms used to control population. In England it was the 'Malthusian marriage pattern', in other words the desire for status delayed marriage. In Japan, since marriage was a group decision, and less amenable to individual choice, it was through what Malthus called 'vice' (in other words manipulating mortality rates through infanticide and abortion) rather than through limiting fertility, that population was controlled. But in each case there was a consciously planned rationality, a weighing of costs and benefits which made it possible to decide when to start and stop having children.

Inheritance by all males and over-population in China

"Overpopulation is an old and familiar story in China...the rural areas are permanently condemned to overpopulation."
(Jacobs, 156)

the various answers to the problems of younger children under primogeniture in Japan

"Under primogeniture, the relocation of the dispossessed younger children is an important functional problem. Possible solutions are: the balance of births and deaths (birth control); emigration, celibacy, sacerdotal or other; and commerce, internal or external. All but the first mentioned involve separation of the dispossessed from the patrimony, and their relocation elsewhere." (all four used in Japan) (Jacobs, 157)

The virtues of being an island.

In terms of resources, neither England, nor Japan (nor Holland, another interesting case, like Hong Kong), are particularly rich in natural resources, though coal was very important in England's industrial evolution. This suggests that rich resources are not essential. More important was the fact of being an island. Islandhood meant that there were good sea communications, with nowhere very far from the sea or a river and this encouraged local, internal, trade and cut down the cost of transport (as noted by Boserup, among others).

It meant that there was far less need to spend money on defence and a standing army (also
eliminating all the threats to liberty which a standing army brings). It also makes predatory foreign
conquest difficult. England and Japan were never fought over by foreign armies and seldom
conquered by outside forces (only once each in the last fifteen hundred years). Long years of peace
made capital accumulation possible, an advantage which the Continents off which the islands lay -
China and Europe - did not share.

The fact of being an island seems to have early instilled in each a sense of common identity; both
early on had one language, one law, and a developed sense of being one people. This again makes
communication and life easier. The absence of foreign threat, Weber argued, meant that there was
less stress on tying "peasants" to the land to act as a fighting force for the lords. A different kind of
social structure, with much more loyalty to the centre, rather than to the baronial lords, could be de-
veloped.

Related to being an island was the ecological diversity. Although they were small islands, there
was much ecological diversity between nearby areas than in a large continental mass. Hence, when
communications were costly and difficult, there was still much incentive to trade, exchange, and the
development of a market and money type of economy. This was much less likely in the vast plains
of China, India, Russia or Central Europe.
4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ENGLAND AND JAPAN

Personality and individualism.

Whatever their roots, it is clear that certain features of personality are related to industrialization and capitalism. A number of related aspects of this personality have been stressed; the importance of individual achievement; anxiety about salvation; obsession with time; emphasis on 'rational' decisions; pursuit of money as an end in itself; the unbounded accumulative urge; 'inner direction' rather than 'tradition-direction'. In general, then a number of acute observers have argued that a particular 'character-type' emerged in the sixteenth century in a part of north-western Europe, different from anything we find in traditional societies; rational, calculative, out for individual gain, anxious. This we find in the works of Riesman, Weber, Tawney and others.

We then have the problem to explain why and how this particular type emerged. The most famous is Weber's thesis, namely that the new personality and ethic were intimately interrelated with the anxiety caused by Calvinism; that Protestant and Catholic areas were different in this respect. This will need to be elaborated and the various criticisms brought forward against it looked at.

One promising development of the thesis is that both capitalism and protestantism were caused by something else, that is by anxiety (Walzer), which was in itself the result of other changes. One view is that intellectual and religious changes left people more insecure (for instance stripping them of their security as magic was destroyed, as described by Keith Thomas). Another is the view that there were changes in child-rearing sometime in the early eighteenth century which led to increasing 'achievement-orientation' (the McLelland thesis, as summarized in Flinn, pp.88f). In this way the Weber and Tawney thesis is given a specific set of causes in individual psychology.

Tonnies on Community and Association.

A good deal of what he has to say is either wrong or derivative. But as an ideal type, the central contrast between Community and Association, may be useful. It is the difference between a whole which is more than the sum of the individual, a union, or Community (Gemeinschaft) on the one hand and an aggregate or association of distinct parts on the other. It thus has similarities to Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity, or Dumont's holistic and individualistic societies. Tonnies stresses this again and again. "Gemeinschaft should be understood as a living organism. Gesellschaft as a mechanical aggregate and artifact..."(p.39) Individuals in the Gemeinschaft "remain essentially united in spite of all separating factors, whereas in the Gesellschaft" they are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors" (p.74). The Gesellschaft does not flow from the natural wills and feelings of the individuals; it is based on artificially created contracts entered into by wary individuals: "The theory of the Gesellschaft deal with the artificial construction of an aggregate of human beings" (p.74).
In another passage he argues that "Gesellschaft, an aggregate by convention and law of nature, is to be understood as a multitude of natural and artificial individuals, the wills and spheres of whom are in many relations with and to one another, and remain nevertheless independent of one another and devoid of mutual familiar relationships..." (p.87). Each individual is bound to others by exchange, contracts, money etc, but not by blood, multiplex ties, sentiment etc, as in Gemeinschaft. The whole is no longer than the sum of the parts, as it once had been. In the traditional situation, the people were dependent on the larger unit; thus "the existing town must be regarded as a whole on which the individual fellowships and families constituting it are necessarily dependent" (p.70). These supra-individual units are created by the sentiments which flow out of the three basic bonds in Gemeinschaft, what are variously called Blood, Place, Mind, or the bonds of kinship, neighbourhood, and friendship.

Tonnies himself summarized the major differences between the two ideal-types as follows: (p.211)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gemeinschaft</th>
<th>Gesellschaft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural will</td>
<td>Rational will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possession</td>
<td>Wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Law</td>
<td>Law of Contracts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The last of these is similar to Maine's contrast between status and contract).

If we re-date the transition from one to the other by dropping Tonnies view that it occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and accept Marx's better insight that it was already embodied in feudalism, then we have something useful for the West. But where does Japan fit?

It seems to be a very peculiar case indeed (as discussed elsewhere) which combines elements of the two extremes - it is 'flexible rigidities', 'artificial gemeinschaft', 'non-ascriptive Community', or a whole host of other labels. Basically, I suppose, it could be suggested that it takes the shape or form of Gemeinschaft - i.e. there are small and real 'Communities' formed, which have the feelings and sentiments and multi-strandedness of real Community. But unlike Tonnies belief, and contrary to anything else known in history, they are artificially created, flexible, can be joined etc. etc.

Now there is a tiny element of this in the many 'corporations' of western society - guilds, fellowships, companies, clubs etc. etc. But these are distinguished by always being of limited ends and purposes. They do not totally absorb the individual. The nearest, I suppose are monastic institutions, but even these preserve individual rights and independence within them. In Japan it is something deeper than this; total commitment and total involvement in small 'holistic' units of a face to face and multiplex kind, but units which are not necessarily given by blood or locality - the
traditional band of followers, the extended household or 'ie', the modern company. This complex intersection between two normally distinct and, one would have thought unmixable models (like oil and water), is what makes Japan both puzzling and intriguing - and powerful.

From family to individual, or status to contract (Maine).

Maine's central thesis of the movement from status to contract lies implicitly behind much theorizing on the origin of modern societies. His wide sweep allowed him to see "by what insensible gradations the relation of man to man substituted itself for the relation of the individual to his family, and of families to each other"; "Ancient Law...knows next to nothing of Individuals. It is concerned not with Individuals but with Families, not with single human beings, but with groups; "the point which above all other has to be apprehended in the constitution of primitive societies is that the individual creates for himself few or no rights, and few or no duties." (Anc. Law, 185, 258,311). If we take all these points together, we find that the "movement of the progressive societies has been inform in one respect...The Individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take account." (Ibid, 168).

His most famous formulation of this tendency is as follows. "Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals." (Ancient Law, 169). thus the relations of parent to child, master to slave, male to female, based on birth and ascribed status, melt before the negotiated relations of free individuals. It is in this sense that "we may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract. (Ibid, 170). Thus, "the society of our days is mainly distinguished from that of preceding generations by the largeness of the sphere which is occupied in it by Contract...old law fixed a man's social position irreversibly at his birth, modern law allows him to create it for himself by convention..." (Anc. Law, 304).

This has become one of the accepted view of 'modernity'. Thus, one of Maine's most thoughtful critics, Vinogradoff, agreed with him that "the most profound difference between modern and ancient organization consists in the fact that modern society starts from individuals and adjusts itself primarily to the claims of the individual, whereas ancient society starts from groups and subordinates individual interests to the claims of these groups." (Vinogradoff, 1920; i, 299).

(Yet, as we shall see, all this is only half-true, at best, in relation to Japan; see chapter 3, where it will be shown that the society is still based on the group rather than on the individual, and on a form of half-status, half-contract, which is at neither end of Maine's 'termini'. Nor does it look as if it is speeding along the line from one end to the other, 'progressing'. It looks as if it has a satisfactory alternative to either of the two classic solutions...)

Some deeper differences
England, while a very graded society, is based, like America, on the premise of equality and possibility of equal relationships (e.g. between friends). Japan is based, like India, on the premise of inequality, and the impossibility of equal relationships. This is explicit in the language and, among other things, has led to the term 'vertical society' (Nakane).

England is based on conceiving of the individual as very important and as the basic unit of society and thought; what one might call 'molecular individualism'. The Japanese, however, are absolutely anti-individualistic. They hardly every use the word corresponding to the personal pronoun 'I'. The basic unit is the group, the work and family group. The civilization approximates to Dumont's meaning of 'holism', as in India, where the individual has no meaning except in relation to the whole. It is the relationship rather than the individual as individual which is the basic unit of the society; it is a truly 'structural' society, in that meaning lies in the relations of relations, rather than in individual things.

In England, the central emotional core is the relationship between a man and a woman in companionate marriage, with its associations of romantic love etc. Japan's central emotional core is the concept of duty, especially filial duty. This filial duty is to the 'parent', whether that parent is father, boss or, traditionally, the Emperor.

England's central religious tradition has been one of Protestant Christianity, which leads to individual conscience and the sense of guilt and anxiety, fear of salvation etc. That of Japan is Confucian and Buddhist, with group pressure. This might be roughly likened to Ruth Benedict's well-known distinction between a shame culture (with external sanctions) and a guilt culture (with internal sanctions) or Riesman's between 'inner' and 'other' directed cultures.

**Individual rights in Japan.**

Yoh said that the concept of rights were not the same as in the West, although the word or phrase was often used in Japan nowadays. Rather it means that a person bequeaths something as by 'grace and favour' from a superior. To insist on one's rights is thought to be indecent behaviour in Japan.

**The relations between individualism, capitalism and equality.**

Although somewhat indirect, Professor Nakanishi seemed to be hinting at a feature of my theories which I had already noted as a weakness if it is going to be a general theory. This is as follows.

In England (and north west European) civilization, there is a strong connection between individualism, capitalism and equality. I had therefore assumed that these were necessary relations, in particular between individualism and capitalism. What Japan seems to teach one, if one accepts that comparison is at all possible, is as follows. (see diagram p.18 v).

England is individualistic, egalitarian within a graded society, and has individualistic capitalism.
Japan is 'holistic', but with quasi or fictive groups rather than real groups, inegalitarian within a vertical society, and has corporate capitalism.

Thus it looks as if a much more corporate or group based and intrinsically inegalitarian framework is compatible with capitalism. The English or American model is thus different from that of the Japanese.

The linguistic system in Japan reflects both of the above differences. In terms of individualism, the first and second person pronouns ('I' and 'You') are avoided, although the words exist, as too direct and dangerous. The verb itself indicates in terms of its degree of humility whether one is talking about oneself or the other person. Likewise, all the language is hierarchical. One talks to another person as either a superior or an inferior. It is difficult to hold an equal conversation. This reinforces the vertical relations of the society. As noted before, even the writing is vertical.

**Rethinking the relationships of individualism, capitalism etc.**

I discussed this matter with K. Shoji, Professor of Private Law. He thought the Japanese system was "not so rational and competitive". I pointed out that I had to rethink the relationship of things as follows: (see diagram p.19).

I had assumed that the following moves were somehow linked:

holism ..... individualism  

hierarchy....equality  

pre-industrial.....industrialism  

pre-capitalist.....capitalist

It has been widely assumed in the classical literature that there was an inevitable movement of the first two, when the second two occurred. Japan, however, is an exception, in that it seems to have combined advanced industrial capitalism with hierarchy and holism. Thus Japan is clearly industrialize, but can it be said to be capitalist?

One way of putting it would be to liken Japan to the Darwinian notion of altruistic competitiveness, the western to the selfish gene.

**Double standards and the two meanings of truth.**

Toshiko Nakamura said that Japan was noted for its 'double standards', for instance in relation to war (where the constitution said one thing, de jure, and the de facto situation was very different).
There is an 'inside' and an 'outside' truth, what one might call a 'surface' and 'deep' truth. This she also expressed as a clash between true desire (honne) and principle (hatemai). An example of this would be as follows. Businessmen only deal in the principles of the matter when talking to the head of a company during the day. But in the evening in the bar they will tell him their real desire, what is in their heart, their feelings. This may be entirely different.

**The Japanese as contextual, without fixed principles etc.**

We talked to Chie Nakane and I asked her what she had meant by the statement that "The Japanese have no principles", which got her into such trouble. What she had meant was as follows.

Firstly, she believed that most behaviour is context or socially bound; it is not done in relation to abstract or general principles. Thus social relations count above abstract 'principles'. This is because most behaviour occurs within small, powerful, social groups. It is a group-based society. Hence, when the behaviour is 'exposed' to the outside world (e.g. the political activity of a village) it is often seen as 'corrupt'. The top politicians behave in the same way. When so exposed, people's reactions is not usually moral shock, but rather, "oh, how unlucky to be found out". Thus Japan is still, as opposed to England or America, still a strong group-based society; but they are "artificial groups".

Secondly, there are only few and weak ethical codes. As she put it, beauty is more important than right and wrong in evaluating behaviour (rather like high-level mathematics and physics). This arises from the weakness and contradictions of the religious system. There is no strong feeling of absolutes of right and wrong. Art, aesthetics and beauty are more important than right and wrong. (see D.Riesman, who notes same thing. Perhaps more accurate to say that there is no contradiction seen. To adapt Keats famous "Truth is beauty, Beauty Truth', one might say that the Japanese believe 'Right is Beauty, Beauty Right'.) The blending of ethics and aesthetics is well shown in the curious institution of the tea ceremony.

**Situational ethic and context dependency**

Minamoto disagreed with Nakane's ideas on this, but admitted that one treats different people differently; there are universal standards, for instance, parents tell children not to tell a lie; there is a basic consensus on what is right and what is wrong and what is true and what is not true, there must be agreement and honest feeling. There are particularistic aspects, but within a basic agreement.

**A different form of logic**

There is no Japanese equivalent to the idea for "identity" meaning sameness, no idea of $a = b$, meaning that a and b are identical in the full mathematical sense. Hence, for example, they find it difficult (impossible?) to conceive of an identity between husband and wife. Things are complementary (more like yin and yang in China?). Perhaps this is related to the fact that nothing is complete in itself, it needs its counterpart, nothing is separate.
Thus, a number of the major premises of the western argument seem to be missing - namely individualism, equality, rationalism disenchantment. We thus need to consider the implications of Japan as a 'vertical' society: and as a 'group' rather than an individual based society and as having 'irrational' or 'situational' thought etc.

**Japan as an intermediate case**

There would appear to be three main options here in terms of social ranking. One can have unequal and permanent differences, as in systems of 'caste' and permanent 'estates' based on blood. One can have unequal relation, but temporary differences, based on wealth, and hence what one might call class. And one could have equality, with very minor temporary differences (as supposedly in the U.S.A.).

The basic premise of most societies is the 'premise of inequality', that all relationships are unequal from birth. Thus one has inequality of men and women, rich and poor, powerful and weak etc. But this tends to take two major forms.

There are societies based on the premise of 'natural inequality', and those based on the premise of 'natural equality'. Within each there are two types. Within 'natural inequality', there is the natural inequality of groups, which are immovable - as in caste and estates. This accounts for most agrarian civilizations (e.g. India, China, eighteenth century France). Or there is the natural inequality of individuals in relation to other individuals, as is the peculiar Japanese case.

With the premise of 'natural equality', there is the case where there is very considerable de facto inequality, caused by wealth and education, as in England. Then there are the inequalities where these are minimized or attempts made to eradicate them entirely, as in America or Revolutionary France.

Looked at from this perspective, England and Japan both lie in the middle. Both tend towards dynamic volatility, since it is always possible to change your position in the system. Yet it is still conceived of as a ranked, if not a hierarchical (in Dumont's sense) society. What happened at the Meiji restoration was to reverse the tendency of the Tokugawa and to proclaim the de jure 'natural equality, on the English and American model. Modern Japan is the result.

Another major division concerns the relations between individual and group. Here one might distinguish between the two extremes of pure individualism (USA) and pure holism (India). Most societies lie between these two extremes, as did England and Japan. What is difficult, is to tease apart these two cases.

In the English case, the individual was a separate world of rights, considered complete in him/her self in religion, law, economics etc. Yet he or she was also a citizen, which meant that s/he
was also a matrix of responsibilities to other peoples. Thus one had something that one could envisage as an immense network of nodes or balls, connected by lines to others, forming responsibilities and duties to them, with a developed sense of "public responsibility" etc. In Japan, the effect was not dissimilar, though the 'group' pull was a little larger. Here, rather than numerous vertical and lateral relationships as in England (fellows, friends, deference, noblesse d'oblige), only one direction was stressed, namely Chie Nakane's vertical society. This meant that there were unequal, and roughly homologous, relations of: husband/wife, parent/child, ruler/ruled, boss/worker. All these were vertical ties. Thus people were still not really absorbed into groups, except those created through loyalty to a single superior. Once that superior was gone, the group ended.

The group and the individual in Japan.

The idea of a natural consensus, the feeling that the 'will of the group' will emerge spontaneously out of the mutual harmony of interests to be embodied in the consensus statement of the leader is widespread. It will appear to come from outside, from the 'natural order of things'. "It appears that", "It is the case that" is asserted, not flowing from the will of an individual, but from the logic of the situation. (Compare the tendency for certain Conservative politicians to constantly use the phrase "The fact of the matter is...").

The Japanese do not like direct confrontation. They find it difficult to say 'no' directly. They usually try to turn the question.

Individualism and war memorials in Japan and England

There is no tradition of war memorials with particular names in Japan; just mass memorials. Minamoto was impressed with the English memorials in small villages, living continuities and respect for individual persons. It may be that this shows something about English individualism and Japanese communalism. In Hiroshima, for a while, there were individual memorials where victims lived or fell, then they were all pulled down and heaped in one place (Japan is one large stone - see national anthem).

Relaxation and lack of hurry in England

Minamoto thought that relax is the key-word of British society; Japan lacks this and lacks the tradition of the church and particularly the quietness of the village church. He was struck by the weight and function of the Anglican church in English society.
CHAPTER 5. A STRUCTURAL APPROACH

A structural approach to the problem.

One could at this point abandon the effort at a universal theory, arguing that there is nothing in common between the north European and the Japanese experience, that miracles can have independent origins and there is no point in trying to find common factors. This appears to me to be unduly negative. Instead, one could attempt to go to a deeper level and try to see a structural similarity, that lies behind the surface differences - ie. the relations of the parts. To quote 'Godel, Escher, Bach' (see passage at end of first chapter - seeing common roots QUOTE)

There is a common problem, namely why did the miracle occur in these two countries; are there any common explanatory factors? This should be set in the obvious context of huge differences; a rice and a non-rice culture, Christianity as opposed to Buddhism and Shinto, external as opposed to internal industrialization, language, rank as opposed to basic vertical society, individualism as opposed to groupism etc.

One can go through certain geographical, demographic, economic, political and religious similarities. Yet one is still left unsatisfied, unable really to explain both how and why things happened as they did. The above approach, based on a shopping-list/ single function approach, does not really seem to take us to the heart of the respective 'miracles'.

What is needed is a more 'structural' approach, in which it is the relations between the spheres which is important. An indication of what I mean is given in my essay for the Gellner symposium, pp. 4-6. One could then see how it is helpful in relation to England, where the development of the economy occurred within a relatively open environment (as opposed to Europe), as Weber and others noted ("England has progressed the furthest..."). One might then wonder how that applies to Japan? There seems to have been an open period up to the Tokugawa, then a partially 'closed' one under the Tokugawa, but with mounting wealth and some checks. Then when it was opened again, it erupted into growth. England was more gradual, since it was never dammed up.

A number of questions are left on one side. One can say categorically that England has never had a peasantry - what about Japan? One can say that England has never been absolutist. How about Japan? One can say that England has been essentially 'capitalist' from at least the thirteenth century. How about Japan?

Look at the cases of England and Japan over time and see how this structural relationship was allowed to develop and maintain itself without veering towards the usual despotisms. This is what I will attempt.
The special feature of capitalism/industrialism is the delicate - the delicate balance of the parts, not the intrinsic nature of the parts themselves. Hence the need for a structural approach which considers the relations of the parts.

Thoughts on the alternative solutions

**Thoughts on the alternative solutions.** (18.8.91)

After reading Smith, Japanese Society, it is apparent that it would be better not to think of a single progress. At first it was assumed that there is only one form of capitalism, which is inevitably associated with individualism. Since the Japanese are patently the absolute opposite of individualistic (a Japanese is a single hand; what is the sound of one hand clapping?), it seems obvious that there must be something deeper than individualism.

It would seem that the common denominator in the two cases is the absence of fixity or dominance by a single principle - there is in neither case a hegemonic infrastructure. In one case this is achieved by separation of spheres - so that the individual is isolated as the only nexus of feeling. In the Japanese case the opposite strategy is adopted, the total merging, so that the individual is 'free', but only contextually. He or she is infinitely mobile in the sense that "there are no principles", but also totally constrained by others. Truth, right etc are context dependent. But there are again none of those binding elements of kinship or religion which usually stop change.

So one might suggest the following:

England: bilateral kinship > pastoralism & grain production > individualism > capitalism

Japan: bilateral kinship > rice cultivation > small groupism > capitalism

In one case the individual is the molecule of action, in the other the small group. The fact that, as Smith stresses, it is the small group, ( and that, as he does not stress, this group is an artificial community, hence flexible), means that Japan is different from the fixed tribal/kinship groups of early societies or the groups of India and China.

If one accepts this account of the past, it is worth considering the future. The logical progression of the two forms is different. To go further along the road of efficiency in the English/American case, needs a kind of cancerous development, the splitting and sub-splitting of elements further and further: more individualism, more capitalism, more mental, social and economic division of labour etc. Hence more and more 'alienation' and anomic compensated, to some extent by more affluence. This is the route which Weber foresaw - a growth of irrationality within external rationality.

In Japan, on the contrary, as Smith notes to his surprise, industrialization instead of leading to individualism, seems to lead to even greater group cohesion. People are even more bound to their groups etc. They work even harder and have more loyalty to the group, in this case the factory etc.
As Smith says, it looks as if the trajectory of the two systems is parallel, rather than converging, and
indeed may be diverging. This may be good news for developing societies, which may find the
Japanese except rather more congenial and possible to follow.

It would also seem to be confirmation that while there are numerous parallels at a deep level
between England and Japan, they are in no sense identical. The idea of two paths which run
alongside each other, but do not meet, is perhaps best. They started close, ended close, but do not
overlap much.

Other theories to explain the miracle.

Hartley lists a number of other hypotheses that have been advanced to explain the phenomenon;
the character of the 'English'; the decline of epidemic illness in the eighteenth century in England;
"long-term changes in philosophy, religion, science, and a law, culminating in the eighteenth century
in secularism, rationalism, and economic individualism" (Hartley, p.59) and so on. All these,
however, are necessary not sufficient causes and indeed, a number of them are merely alternative
ways of describing what it is that needs to be explained.

The need for long-term explanations.

It has frequently been pointed out that we need both long-term and short-term explanations for the
'industrial revolution' and the development of capitalism. Thus, for example, it has been admitted
that "the mainspring of the industrial revolution may lie deep in the long history of European
civilization, the only civilization (Japan excepted) to yet to achieve industrialization, yet to achieve
industrialization, but a shorter-term process of economic change in eighteenth-century England also
has to be analysed." (Hartley, 63). The long-term explanations needs to encompass the whole period
from the ninth to the nineteenth centuries, for Marx correctly pointed out that one of the essential
pre-conditions for capitalism/industrialization was the preceding feudal organization. We therefore
need to look for an interrelated set of factors which a. was present over this whole period and b.
differentiated Europe, and particularly England, off from other major peasant civilizations. These
were factors which acted through such intervening variables as an individualistic ethic, slow
population growth, stress on accumulation rather than spending, a free labour market, high
geographical mobility, absence of tradition-bound and rigid social structure.

economic factors - see Hartwell & others who have attempted a basically economic interpretation,
including, to a certain extent, Marx.

It will be necessary to consider in some detail some of the eighteenth and nineteenth century
explanations. In particular, we will need to look at the place of individualism and the growing
division of labour (Durkheim); the growth of equality (De Tocqueville); the growth of rationality
and the role of Christianity (Weber). In order to make a start, we may look at some of the thoughts
of Marx on the crucial role of feudalism in the development of capitalism.

Two approaches; shopping list and recipe

**Two approaches; shopping list and recipe.**

I will first take a 'shopping list' approach, whereby each of the main spheres is looked at. This may suggest a list of ingredients or common features, and hence "necessary causes". But more fruitful than this is probably to see how the ingredients were mixed, their relationship to each other. As in cooking, capitalism is not merely a matter of ingredients, it is the mixing of the ingredients, and the timing of their use, that is essential. Too much salt can ruin a dish, too little likewise. Even the point at which the salt is put in, is important. Too much political order can crush initiative, too little can make capitalist development impossible.

**From a functional to a structural approach.**

It is not the individual parts that are ultimately important, but their relationship to each other; the balance between the parts, more than their innate nature. Hence, one could have a situation where the parts are totally dissimilar, but the over-all pattern has a structural similarity. (As with a concerto by Bach and Handel).

Since the secret of modern capitalism lies in how the market is constituted in relation to other aspects of the society, e.g. whether it is 'free' or submerged, this leads us to suspect that the solution lies in examining how those institutions which usually swallow it - a predatory State, a clinging family, an over-zealous religion, have been held in check.

With this in mind, we would be seeking for clues to suggest that there was something unusual about the component parts of the major institutions in Japan and north-western Europe that gave the market freedom to grow.

**Weber on the necessity for a structural approach.**

(Taken from Collins, Weberian Sociological Theory).

p.34. "For Weber's constant theme is that the **pattern of relations among the various factors** is crucial in determining their effect upon economic rationalization. Any one factor occurring by itself tends to have opposite effects overall, to those which it has in combination with the other factors."

p.35 "Weber saw the rise of large-scale capitalism, then, as the result of a series of combinations of conditions which had to occur together. This makes world history look like the result of configurations of events so rare as to appear accidental....the full-scale capitalist breakthrough itself
was a once-only event, radiating outward to transform all other institutions and societies."

p.36 "On a second level, one may say that the fundamental generalizations in Weber's theory of capitalism concern the crucial role of balances and tensions between opposing elements. 'All in all,' says Weber in a little-known passage (1968:1192-3), 'the specific roots of Occidental culture must be sought in the tension and peculiar balance, on the one hand, between office charisma and monasticism, and on the other between the contractual character of the feudal state and the autonomous bureaucratic hierarchy. (Note: In other words, the main features of the West depend on a tension between routinization of religious charisma in the church and the participatory communities of monks, and on a tension between the democratizing tendencies of self-supplied armies and the centralized bureaucratic state. These give us Weber's two great intermediate factors, a non-dualistic religious ethic and calculable law, respectively.) No one element must predominate if rationalization is to increase. More concretely, since each 'element' is composed of real people struggling for precedence, the creation of a calculable, open-market economy depends upon a continuous balance of power among differently organized groups. ....The capitalist economy depends on this balance. The open-market system is a situation of institutionalized strife. Its essence is struggle..../ The victory of any one side would spell the doom of the system. In this respect, as in others, Weber's theory is a conflict theory indeed."

The curious preservation and reinforcement of balance.

It has long been noted, with amusement, that African hunter-gatherers and hunter-gatherers in general are curiously 'modern' in many ways. They lacked the technology, literacy and so on, they often seem to have had the essential quality that nothing dominated ('free' individuals were not slaves to one institution) - religion, polity, economy or even kinship. From the start, then, it may be that 'modernity' existed a very long time ago. This is what Rousseau may have had in mind with his 'Noble Savage', born free without the chains; and Marx and Engels saw as the earliest stage before the growth of wealth, private property and the State shackled man.

The normal course of affairs was for this 'modernity' to be crushed during the long intervening years. As population grew more dense and wealth was congealed, hierarchies emerged, and mankind became dominated by religious or political institutions, or, usually, a mixture of the two. This ancien regime world was to be found in most of Asia or pre-Revolutionary Europe or South America. It seemed a necessary 'stage' in the famed transition between tribal and 'modern' societies. Its social concomitant was peasantry.

The curious mix thesis in the West.

In western Europe, it could be argued that after the fall of the Roman Empire, there was a strange mixture of several elements. The survival of traces of Romanism, the contractual political system of Germanic feudalism, the ascetic and individualistic (and according to Gellner, modest) religion of
Christianity, the non-segmentary kinship system, contributed over the centuries between about the fifth and eleventh a new and potentially very volatile, 'modern' system in terms of the division of spheres outlined above.

The secret must lie in the properties of the four main institutions, all of which must have a non-exclusive and limited character. This seems to have been the case. Christianity, especially in its heretical forms, and later in Protestantism, was not too deeply involved in this world, allowing people to render to Caesar that which was Caesar's. The bilateral kinship system cannot form the basis of the society since it built up no discrete political or social groupings. The political system, based on the contractual feudal system, was powerful enough to guarantee some order, but was always held in check by the countervailing devolution of power that is a necessary feature of feudalism. The ruler is the first among equals, unable to rule without consent, a limited monarch. The economy in this technologically backward and varied landscape was not strong enough to dominate the other spheres.

**Maintaining the balance in Europe.**

A sort of 'modern' balance had been achieved in much of western Europe by the eleventh century. But over much of the area, this changed and the widespread tendency which has been found in the older civilizations, such as those in India, South East Asia and China, manifested themselves. Over much of central, eastern and southern Europe a caste-like society arose with hereditary nobility, a King above the Law, a Church in alliance with the State. The usual re-confusion of economic, moral, political, social and religious spheres occurred.

Yet for reasons which are strictly historical and accidental, this widespread tendency did not occur in northern Europe to the same extent. In particular, in England much of the 'modernity' implicit over much of Europe in the tenth century survived. It continued and provided the balanced platform for the emergence, nearly a century before anywhere else, of a new technological order (industrialism) and a new social order (urbanism). There was no inevitability about this. But nor is there any particular mystery. By failing to gravitate towards absolutism, inquisition or familism, part of northern Europe preserved a balance which allowed free floating individuals to make themselves wealthier in peace, within a relatively secure framework. This was what the Pilgrims took to America.

Gellner is right to ask the question, "Just how did it come about that this privileged set of people developed, and were allowed to develop and maintain a spirit which, in the context of wider history, is so very unusual? How did they escape the logic of the agrarian situation, which prevails in most other parts of the world?" (Plough. 163).

The answer, briefly, seems to be that in this exceptional case, there were peoples who already had a politico-kinship system that was not segmentary and which already had a contractual, law-based, element. These people settled a wide area without becoming 'peasants'. They adopted a religion that

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did not fossilize into an intensive ritualistic system. In other words, they were agriculturists and traders, but they never went through a proper 'Agraria'. Thus certain peoples of northern Europe (and in a remarkably similar way Japan), moved from barbarism to modernity, without the intervening state of Agraria.

The separation and balance of powers: great thinkers on

The separation and balance of powers: great thinkers on.

Montesquieu's remark in the 'Spirit of the Laws' that England "had progressed the farthest of all peoples of the world in three important things: in piety, in commerce and in freedom" was commented on by Max Weber as follows: "Is it not possible that their commercial superiority and their adaptation to free political institutions are connected in some way with that record of piety which Montesquieu ascribes to them?" (Protestant, 45) Thus Montesquieu and Weber saw that it was in the interconnections, the balance between religion, polity and economy that the secret lay, and that autonomy or 'freedom' of spheres was essential.

David Hume independently noted something similar in his Essays. The English had a mixed political system, "mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy"; they were religiously pluralist, "all sects of religion are to be found among them." And consequently, though speaking one language and subject to one set of laws, "the great liberty and independency, which every man enjoys, allows him to display the manners peculiar to him". (Essays, 122). Much of this could, of course, be said of Japan - though 'every group' would have to be substituted for 'every man' in the last sentence.

Finally, there is Taine. When comparing England to France, he found each superior in certain ways. England was superior in three. Firstly, its political system "is liberal, and calls upon the individual citizen to take an active part in public life...British citizens enjoy full freedom of speech and association..." Politics, in other words, knows its limits; so does religion. "It subordinates ritual and dogma to ethics. It preaches 'self-government', the authority of conscience, and the cultivation of the will. It leaves a wide margin for personal interpretation and feeling. It is not altogether hostile to the spirit of modern science nor to the tendencies of the modern world." Finally, the economy is allowed to flourish in peace and security. "England has suffered no invasion for eight hundred years, and no civil war for two hundred years...Evidence of comfort and opulence is more plentiful in England than in any other country in the world." (Taine, Notes, 290-1).

A structural interpretation; the relationship of institutions.

The separation of spheres, where politics, economics, religion and kinship are artificially held apart, is the central feature of "modern" civilization (just as their blurring again, is perhaps a feature of post-modernism). There is no determining institution, but a precarious, and never to be taken for granted balance of power. What seems to have been peculiar in England and latently and sporadically in Japan before the Meiji period is that no single sphere predominated. Kinship,
religion, politics etc. none of them were strong enough to dominate. All this allowed room for the economy to become free. This situation allowed a peculiarly "open" society, which persisted in England from before the sixteenth century, and which was found in fifteenth and sixteenth century Japan, partly under the Tokugawa, and was re-established at the Meiji restoration. At that point, the over-powerful dominance of one sphere, the polity, which had grown up, was stripped off (insert Fukuzawa;pp.21-2, countervailing tendencies; p.654, lineage power under Tokugawa; p.125, lack of uniformity of opinions in the West, separate spheres).

If we liken a modern economy to an internal combustion engine, we might suggest that the framework, the machine, the engine, is the institutional structure of the administrative system, communications etc. In Japan this was strong by the middle of the nineteenth century. The fuel is the energy and intelligence and entrepreneurial yearnings of the people. This also was in abundance in Japan before the Restoration. What the Restoration provided was the oxygen to allow combustion - the freeing of restraints, the opening of ports, the encouragement of business. The spark to ignite the machine was provided by the advanced technology brought from the West. The machine had all these four features in England from the seventeenth century. In many countries, however, that vital separation of spheres, the adjusting of relations whereby each institution is kept within its bounds, had not occurred and still has not occurred. India is still submerged within religion, China within politics, Russia and Eastern Europe until recently within politics. France made a partial break in 1789 and completed the separation in the later nineteenth century at the same time as Japan.

In this process the particular character of the kinship, feudal and religious systems which I have sketched, exceptional though it was and really only to be found in north-western Europe (and particularly Japan), played their vital roles.

**The accident of a free-floating, open, society.**

Contrary to all other cases, a civilization emerged in England (and Japan) which did not lurch, as all others have done, towards the hegemony of one sphere. It did not solidify into kinship, it did not accept the Inquisition, it did not move to political absolutism. If anything, it enshrined the economy, the grumbling hive, but only within limits. How and why this happened can only be explained by narrating the events, using the conventional tools, for there was no necessity in it. That it happened, seems not to be in doubt. And that it happened has influenced and is influencing all the species on the globe.

What is interesting, adding in the Japanese case, is that it happened twice - in totally separate parts of the world, and for different reasons. Japan was heading in the same direction and nearly 'took off' in the sixteenth century, and some people argue would have spontaneously done so in the nineteenth, even without outside prodding (cf. Jacobs). It did so with a central similarity - the absence of hegemony, but also with a different mix of elements, more emphasis on the group, on hierarchy etc., as befitted a collectivized rice-growing culture.
Relationship of spheres.


Thoughts on the separation and spreading of spheres

It occurred to me that some sort of double process is indicated in the structure of the argument I am presenting. One the one hand we have, in section 2, separation, that is the separating of religion from economics, politics from kinship etc, so that each of the spheres becomes limited in its claims and somewhat autonomous within its own world. It is free from external harassment, as long as it makes limited claims on the sovereignty of others. No one sphere or institution dominates. In that section there are three chapters on how this happened in politics, religion and kinship.

But equally, and currently less stressed, is the next part which is about how a compensating spreading out occurred, whereby previously discrete fields were united, joined together or linked. Without this counter trend, the whole would have fallen apart. But when we come to examine what now held societies together, they are not the conventional or traditional forces - ritual, naked violence, blood, locality (the central features of Gemeinschaft as described by Tonnies). Rather, they are the new and artificial bonds of contract (implicit and explicit), of universal law, of literacy and writing and education, of universalistic and generalized morality, of scientific and technological mentality, of social and geographical mobility, of universal citizenship and national allegiance, and, of course, of the market, money, profit and the whole economic world.

It is as if as one is dealing with some substance like oil or water which, when it is blocked in one direction, spreads out in other directions. In a curious way, although in the earlier situation everything is interpenetrated and everything is embedded, there are, in other respects, huge barriers to communication. The paradox is that just as kinship, ritual, naked power are penned in and confined, so at the same time communication is made easier. But the new instruments of communication are symbolic instruments, which are much more powerful, abstract and general, rather than the representational and iconic instruments (like ritual, drama, clothing etc.) which were used before. No longer do people tend to communicate concretely in the here and now, but rather through money, writing etc, which communicate abstractly. These can transfer information over time and space and class in a way which the earlier forms of communication found impossible. This leads to a rather different structure to the book - for this revised plan see in the file 'plan'.

What holds a society together?
In the majority of societies, what holds the society together, i.e. provides integration, is either blood (kinship), or blood in association with something else (e.g. caste). What is very unusual is when a society cannot do this through kinship (being bilateral), and therefore has to use other mechanisms. In England, it seems to have been through the law, the State and, to a certain extent, through money and paper. I. In Japan, the legal system and the monetary system were not sufficiently advanced to do this, so instead they used three mechanisms: filial piety (ko) - to parents and Emperor, honour and duty (giri) and the loyalty to the 'House' (ie). Also very strong were ceremonial, etiquette and art. All these were very important in Japan in a world where money/law were underdeveloped. The 'glue' in Japanese society might be said to be etiquette and ceremony, and 'filial duty'. The 'glue' in England was law and money.

The absence of hegemony: a structural interpretation of capitalism (1.7.1990)

One of the mistakes which analysts have made in approaching the problem of the origins and effects of capitalism has been to approach it in a functional way, namely looking at a specific institution or feature, for example the wool-trade, toilet-training, coal, the Protestant ethic or whatever happens to be their hunch, and trying to see to what extent this functioned as a cause of capitalism.

Instead, one might see capitalism as a particular configuration in which it is the relations between institutions which are important, not the things in themselves. This is similar to Gellner's remark (Muslim, p.6), that in comparing Islam to the West, "The difference would seem to be less in the absence of ideological elements than in the particular balance of power which existed between the various institutions in that society." Or again, he writes: This "miraculous political and ideological balance of power in the non-economic parts of society make the expansion (i.e. industrialization) possible..." (Plough, 132). Or as I wrote (in Essays to Gellner ?, p.18), quoting Montesquieu and Weber, "Thus Montesquieu and Weber saw that it was in the interconnections, the balance between religion, polity and economy, that the secret lay, and that 'autonomy' or 'freedom' of spheres was essential." Thus, for example, it is not religion in itself that is important, but rather the way in which religion is articulated with politics, economics etc.

Thus one might conceive of two extremes (see diagram, notebook p.2b), with A as a situation where there is an embedded world where every institution coincides with every other (religion, kinship, economics, politics) to a 'modern' world (B) where kinship, polity, economy and religion are separate and discrete spheres, held together by etiquette, law, literacy, money, ethics etc.

In A, all the spheres overlap and it is impossible to disentangle them. Hence any economic act is also a religious, political and social act. In B, the realms have floated "free"; they are kept from too much conflict by law, and mediated between by paper and money. Put in another way, in 'A' there is usually an 'infrastructure', i.e. a hegemonic determining sphere, e.g. kinship or religion. In 'B' nothing determines the whole system, there is no over-riding principle. (Possibly similar to Giddens' idea of
'structuration').

The advantage of B is that it is an open world in which the basic unit, whether the individual (as in Britain or USA) or the firm (Japan) or small kin group (overseas Chinese, Indians etc), is 'free' to pursue its ends rationally. Rationality is very high, because ends and means can be brought into close alignment. If one wants to seek political goals, one does it by political means, not by religion or kinship. If one seeks religious goals, one does not have to involve kin groups, if one pursues economic goals, one does not need to consider ritual means etc. The arrow, so to speak, can be fired directly at the target. It is not warped by context. This is the advantage; increasing rationality, efficiency and control, a mastery over nature, technological and scientific advance.

The disadvantage is that there are constant and growing tensions for the individual. Natural life is not fractured and fragmented like this. Humans like to act simultaneously at the religious, kinship and other levels. In situation B, these are held apart. People thus not only feel divided loyalties between the spheres, but contradictions whereby the different spheres seek control over the same area.

The tendency also empties everything of meaning, since activities become one-dimensional. For instance, economic activity becomes an end in itself, rather than a means, as many people think it should be. So why pursue economic gains? Politics is just a power struggle, without any religious merit or kinship advantages. Family life is stripped of its ritual and religious meaning. The world becomes disenchanted, defamilized, depoliticized; "a darkling plain" where "confused armies clash by night".

This seems to confirm Gellner's insight that there seems to be an inverse ratio; as one gains rationality and division of spheres and 'freedom', so one loses meaning, coherence, warmth etc. The art is to seek some kind of balance between these two tendencies. The two extremes represented by the Yanomamo and Tokyo are neither of them very appealing. We cannot go back to Community (gemeinschaft), but inexorable gesellschaft is also an appalling prospect.

The Japanese have partly overcome the alienation by turning business into pleasure. Perhaps they have created a "haven in a heartless world" not in the weak refuge of the family (as in Britain or America), but in the very citadel of consumerism and production, the work place. They have created Community right in the core - in the business firm - and this makes their life tolerable and even pleasurable, not a strife between head and heart, as in the West. They proverbially enjoy their work so much that they refuse to take their full holidays, have break-downs at week-ends etc. etc.

Ultimately, as Maine realized, the great transition is from societies based on status (i.e. birth/ the family) to those based on contract. England had passed the Rubicon by the ninth century or earlier. When had Japan? There seems to be some evidence that it had done so by a similarly early date. Among the evidence known to me is:

a) the powerful feudalism of the fourteenth centuries onwards
b) the evidence that even the family was artificial/ contractual, being determined more by residence than by blood from early on.

Thus it is probably that the foundation for capitalism had occurred very early in both places, though it took a little longer to flourish in Japan because of the Tokugawa lurch towards absolutism.

Another way to put the question is to ask whether either Japan or England ever had an 'ancien regime' in the true sense meant by De Tocqueville, ie. castes of a sort, a closed order, religious domination, relations based on status etc. It would seem not.

Some comments on some of the special features of England, which also seem to apply in Japan, are contained in my article on Ernest Gellner. Thus (p.15), one could compare institutional features which seem to have prevented the hegemony of any one institution:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>feature</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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<tr>
<td>religion</td>
<td>non-ritualistic (Protestantism)</td>
<td>mixed non-ritual</td>
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<tr>
<td>kinship</td>
<td>bilateral networks, no groups</td>
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<td>politics</td>
<td>centralized feudalism</td>
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<td>economy</td>
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As I noted in that article (p.16), England failed, as did Japan, to gravitate towards absolutism, inquisition or familism. Likewise I noted (p.17) that "certain peoples of northern Europe (and possibly the Japanese as well) moved from barbarism to modernity, without the intervening stage of Agraria".

**Absence of a determining infrastructure in the West.**

In the majority of social systems one sphere of life determines all others. In tribal societies, this is kinship. In India, as Weber and other have shown, it is religion. In China it was kinship (clans) again - and then communism. In much of Ancien Regime Europe it was an alliance of Church and State, embodied in the Inquisition. Basically, this means that all other spheres are given coherence, are bound together, are dominated by, the 'hegemonic' institution. For instance, in tribal societies, law, economy, politics, religion are not discrete spheres of activity, they are encapsulated within kinship. All these are instances where society 'freezes', to use Levi-Strauss' metaphor, so that status comes to dominate, whether kinship status as in unilineal kinship systems, or religious status, as in caste societies, or political status as in communism. This is all well known.
What is perhaps less well known is that western capitalist civilization is the only known case where there is no hegemony - though Japan is the one other case, in a different form. There is no infrastructural determinant. We might point to the market, but it has clearly not eliminated or totally conquered the State, nor even the Church, the law and the family.

As Gellner argues when comparing Islam and the West. "The difference would seem to be less in the absence of ideological elements than in the particular balance of power which existed between the various institutions in that society." (Muslim, 6). In the west, we have a polity with "an unusual balance of power internally and externally". This "miraculous political and ideological balance of power in the non-economic parts of society made the expansion (i.e. industrialization, A.M.) possible..." (Plough, 277, 132).

In the west this has happened through a disassociation of spheres or realms. We operate in a plural world where there is an institutional division of labour; religion sticks to ethics within a circumscribed sphere; the family should keep out of politics and the economy; the law is an arbitrator between spheres; even economic rules need to be kept out of national parks, sport, love etc.

Now of course, this is an ideal-type model. There are, in practice, constant infringements of the boundaries, which we often call "corruption". But our ideal, and to a large extent it is achieved, is that no single major force should set the ground-rules. We oppose absolutist power, the sovereignty of the market, the creeping demands of the family, the intrusions into politics of the Church.

The benefit of this is flexibility, with the individual as the sole repository of the culture as a free actor. The price is constant contradictions and paradoxes of the kind we have mentioned; since there are no universal rules or infrastructures, everything is a compromise between competing allegiances. There is no such thing as a free lunch - everything has its cost, as well as its advantage. "Nothing except a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won." (Duke of Wellington, after Waterloo). The individual is constantly pulled in his or her loyalties; should he maximize his religious, economic, kinship or political power and merit, what are his overriding obligations etc.?

The Japanese case is both the same and different. It is the same in that no sphere is dominant - there is no infrastructure. But it is different in that this has been achieved not by splitting apart and keeping an artificial barrier between the parts, but by letting them blend again, but in an odd way. The locus of the blending is not the individual, but the small, artificially created, group - traditionally the ie or group of followers, now the work group. These groups are little holistic communities - no man is an island, indeed, in Japan. But unlike most situations, the islands are small and flexible. This is the curious compromise, the 'artificial community', the 'flexible rigidities' (Dore's book title), which one is trying to grasp in Japan.

Absence of hegemony; England and Japan.
What is peculiar about the two societies is that no single sphere predominates, for example kinship is fairly strong (and stronger in Japan), but not too strong (not determining politics, or religion, or economy, etc). The religion is quite widespread, but not so strong as to totally contain the polity. The political system is quite strong, but does not dominate religion and the family. This allows room for the economy. This was the situation of an 'open' society in England and Japan by the sixteenth century. In Japan it partially 'closed' somewhat under Tokugawa rule, with political predominance. But it was not an entire absolutism, just a closed and centralized feudalism, which is different.

CHAPTER 6. THE RESTRAINED STATE

Politics and kinship

There is a widespread tendency for the family to become the ultimate unit of political power. This operates at all levels. Within the family the had often has patriarchal, that is almost total, power over other members of the family - over women, children, younger brothers and so on. Such power over non-kin is also absolute, they are treated as chattels or slaves. All these are not citizens of a commonwealth, but subjects of a king. Parallels tend to be drawn between the absolute monarchy and the family. But each family becomes a political unit in opposition to other families, a tendency described, for instance, for Mediterranean countries (Bloch, Banfield and others) as 'amoral familism'. Loyalties are enormously strong within the family, but weak outside. The loyalty to kin far exceeds that to non-kin, including the political authorities.

This is a world of feuds, factions and familistic and dynastic quarrels, famously displayed in Romeo and Juliet, the novels of Walter Scott etc. At a higher level, the nobility or chiefs ( in a Scottish system) have enormous power - the world of the over mighty subject. Political power is decentralized and flows through blood ties. This is a world over-mighty subjects, of mafia, of outlaws and bandits, of nepotism, of patronage and fictive kinship ties being used to give and receive favours.

If we turn to the documents for England during the period from the thirteenth century onwards, how far does it seem that political power is coincidental with family ties? Within the family, power is not patriarchal; women and children and servants are, as Locke pointed out, in a contractual relationship towards the head of the household. He is a limited monarch, subject to the law. He has never had the power of sale, of life and death, unlimited chastisement, rights over personal possessions etc. which is to be found in the 'patria potestas' of Roman Law. Despite the best attempts of Robert Filmer, this is not a patriarchal society.

At the next level up, we find that village politics is not based on family ties. There are no family feuding groups, no mafia, no strong divisions along family lines. Patronage of kin is very weakly
developed - even between father and son, let alone more distant kin. Political obligations are to the State directly, not to one's close kin. Military recruitment and recruitment to national politics, elections etc., are on the basis of non-kinship ties, of money and bribery perhaps, but impersonal loyalties. Succession to local offices of power, Justices, constableships and so on, are on the basis of kinship.

God parenthood, often used as a quasi-kinship mechanism of recruiting a following or obtaining favours, is undeveloped. On the other hand, there is a developed concept of the political individual, who has rights in and of himself, independent of his family. In fact, the source of political power, is in the end, economic. Any male with enough property has a right to vote; one buys influence. Political power is therefore open to all males, in theory. But all political power is hedged about by law. The King is within the law.

The 'centralized feudalism' of England in the Middle Ages is curious because, although at times there was weakness, in principle allegiance to the Crown came before all other loyalties, whether to family or mesne lords. The principles of centralized power and absence of counter-balancing kinship cliques is obvious, for example, when compared to Scottish clans and their feuding. Lower down, there is little evidence that villages were filled with feuding kinship groups or that one moves back to a period where families suddenly became patriarchal in a different way.

In conclusion, one might say that power flowed chiefly from wealth and that political power was independent of blood and kinship. One's allies were not mainly kin, but those with whom one exchanged - waves, favours and so on. One found one's way through the patronage of non-kinsmen, through a master of some kind, whether in apprenticeship or education. This represents the perhaps the only known case of a large society where the basis of politics is not the family. With the possibly other exception of Japan, the curiously institutionalized and separated political sphere, with its absence of familism, is a crucial feature at the root of modern democracy, which treats each individual as having equal political rights, whatever his family connections. It is surely connected to the fact that every individual has family ties to a network of others and no discrete groups can form or be envisaged. There are no enduring political groups based on kinship in such a cognatic system - just temporary alliances, a fact long ago noted in another context by Max Gluckman in his work on 'the peace in the feud'.

**Marx on the necessity of the 'Germanic' or 'feudal' mode.**

Marx believed that individualism was absent in the Primitive, Asian and Ancient modes of production. The Germanic form, upon which feudalism and later capitalism was based, had a much more highly developed form of individualism than did the others: he contrasts the Germanic with the other modes thus: "...among the Germans...The property of the individual does not appear mediated through the community, but the existence of the community and of communal property as mediated through - i.e. as a mutual relation of - the independent subjects. At bottom every
individual household contains an entire economy..." (Pre-Capitalist, p.79). In other words, the basic unit of society is no longer the community or the city, but the individual household. It is becoming smaller and smaller. And instead of the earlier forms where "the community is...the substance of which the individuals are mere accidents..." (Pre-Capitalist, 71), and where, as in the Asian form, the fundamental principle is that "the individual does not become independent of the community" (Pre-Capitalist, 83), the emphasis has been shifted. Now "the community exists only in the mutual relations of the individual landowners as such" ((Pre-Capitalist, 80).

Having moved to the levels of households, the movement from this mode of production to capitalism was merely one more stage, occurring basically in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, when growing propertylessness, so that the workers no longer enjoyed the fruits of their labour, but could only exchange a part of themselves, their labour, for wages, reduced the civilization to one of individuals. It is the growth of exchanges, of production for exchange rather than for immediate use or consumption, which has mainly contributed to the distancing of the individual. In exchange, "Each serves the other in order to serve himself; each makes use of the other, reciprocally, as his means. " (Grundrisse, 243). People enter into abrupt, immediately ended, dead, apparently balanced and single stranded exchanges. This modern world consists of numerous propertyless individuals involved in endless exchanges, of their labour for something else. In such exchanges, "Both sides confront each other as persons. Formally (i.e. on the surface, A.M.), their relation has the equality and freedom of exchange as such...the free worker.. sells the particular expenditure of force to a particular capitalist, whom he confronts as an independent individual." (Grundrisse, 464). This is the world of Adam Smith. "According to Adam Smith, society is a commercial enterprise. Every one of its members is a salesman." (ibid).

**Marx's depiction of 'Germanic', feudal or 'estate' mode.**

This is his third mode of production (after primitive and ancient), and with it we get the emergence of 'pure' private property, the medieval system, heavily influenced by the Germanic social customs which swept Europe after the fall of Rome. Marx's description of this mode of production, the necessary gateway to capitalism, is worth quoting at some length.

"The third form of ownership is feudal or estate-property...feudal property developed under the influence of the Germanic military constitution. Like tribal and communal ownership, it is based again on a community; but the directly producing class standing over against it is not, as in the case of the ancient community, the slaves, but the enserfed small peasantry...the hierarchical system of land ownership, and the armed bodies of retainers associated with it, gave the nobility power over the serfs...This feudal organization of land-ownership had its counterpart in the towns in the shape of corporate property, the feudal organization of trades. Here property consisted chiefly in the labour of each individual person.. Thus the chief form of property during the feudal epoch consisted on the one hand of landed property with surf-labour chained to it, and on the other of individual labour with small capital commanding the labour of journeymen..."(Pre-Capitalist, pp.125-6).

Thus, individuals owned estates on which others worked; probably the major differences between
this situation and later fully developed capitalism were as follows. Firstly, it was based on the
countryside and land, rather than towns and manufactures, secondly, that production was
consequently still mainly for consumption (use) rather than for exchange. Furthermore, even the
serfs sometimes grew some of their own food and were not necessarily a totally propertyless class.

Yet the central point, is that the vital bridge from communal property to private property has been
passed. Marx recognizes this, in the same way that Maine recognized that the crucial shift from
Status to Contract, occurred with feudalism. The means of production, particularly land, were
already in private hands. "Already in feudal landownership the ownership of the earth appears as an
alien power ruling over men. The serf is the product of the land." (Writings, 133). Yet the transition
is not complete. The land is still something more than a commodity, it trails a few traces of its
earlier condition, it is a source of prestige, military strength etc. for those who own it. It is not yet
regarded neutrally as something out of which the maximum amount should be squeezed. It is only
after the "transformation of land into a commodity" (Writings, 132), or perhaps we should say into
only a commodity, which occurred during the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries that modern
capitalism emerged.

It seems clear that the social and economic structure of the Germanic peoples which directly
shaped feudalism (or, as Hobsbawm argues, 'was' the social formation of feudalism), permitted the
rise of modern capitalism. It is indeed a crucial factor - the 'crucible' to use Maine's metaphor, which
caused the temperatures to rise high enough to launch certain parts of the world on a totally new
enterprise.

The final triumph of capitalism built on this foundation, and merely changed the means of
appropriation. As Hobsbawm summarizes it, "The fourth stage is that in which the proletarian
arises; that is to say in which exploitation is no longer conducted in the crude form of the
appropriation of men - as slaves or serfs - but in the appropriation of 'labour'" (Pre-Capitalist, 37).
This is put by Marx as follows. "For Capital the worker does not constitute a condition of
production, but only labour. If this can be performed by machinery, or even by water or air, so much
the better. And what capital appropriates is not the labourer but his labour - and not directly, but by
means of exchange" (Pre-Capitalist, 99). The modern totally propertyless, but 'free', individual has
emerged. There are complex private rights in property - land, machinery, labour and so on, which
may be transferred to others.

**Marx on the nature of the Germanic and feudal system.**

There are several critical passages in which Marx expounds his view of the Germanic system. In
his descriptions of the Ancient and Asiatic modes (e.g. Writings, 123), the community is more than
the sum of the parts. It exists outside and beyond them: "the whole does not consist of its separate
parts. It is a form of independent organism". (Pre-Capitalist, 78). This is something very akin to
what Dumont means by holism. On the other hand, the Germanic system, out of which developed
feudalism and capitalism, is basically individualistic, that is to say, the whole is merely a sum of the
This individualistic nature of Germanic or feudal society is described by Marx as follows:

"Among the Germans, where single heads of families settle in the forests, separated by long distances, even on an external view the community exists merely by virtue of every act of union of its members, although their unit existing in itself is embodied in descent, language, common past and history etc. The community appears as an association, not as a union, as an agreement, whose independent subjects are the landowners, and not as a unit...If the community is to enter upon real existence, the free landowners must hold an assembly..." (Pre-Cap., 78). It is worth noting here the echoes of themes which were taken up by Tonnies; this is Gesellschaft, not Gemeinschaft (Association not Community). It also reminds one of Maine; this is 'an agreement', i.e. a contract, rather than a status relationship. We are across the great bridge into 'modern' society.

The basic change has been to the concepts of property. Marx recognizes that private property has emerged, individual rights directly in land and other resources, which are not mediated through some larger unity. He writes that public land "appears as a mere supplement to individual property among the Germans, and figures as property only in so far as it is defended against hostile tribes as the common property of one tribe. The property of the individual does not appear mediate through the community, but the existence of the community and of communal property as mediated through - i.e. as a mutual relation of - the independent subjects."

He then contrasts this situation with that in other, different, modest of production. "At bottom every individual household contains an entire economy...In classical antiquity the city with its attached territory formed the economic whole, in the Germanic world, the individual home...there is no concentration of multiplicity of proprietors, but the family as an independent unit. In the Asiatic form ( are at least predominantly so) there is no property, but only individual possession; the community is properly speaking the real proprietor..." (Pre- Cap, 79). In the Germanic system "The community exists only in the mutual relation of the individual landowners as such...The Community is neither the substance, of which the individual appears merely as the accident, or is it the general, which exists and has being in men's minds, and in the reality of the city and its urban requirements, distinct from the separate economic being of its members." (Pre-Capitalist, 80). Thus the community is nothing more than the sum of its parts.

Marx admits that there may be some elements in common in this situation - as there would be in a nation state today. "It is rather on the one hand, the common element in language, blood, etc. which the premise of the individual proprietor; but on the other hand it has real being only in its actual assembly for communal purposes". (Pre-Capitalist, 80). Thus community for Marx means more than identity of interests, more than common descent (blood), common language, common race, common customs etc. It means communal ownership and the presence of something over and above the individual elements. Hence, in his argument, while there may have been a true 'Germanic community' somewhere between the first and fifth century, by the time the Germanic tribes conquered Italy, Gaul, Spain etc. it no longer functioned. (Pre-Capitalist, 144). There have thus been
no real 'communities' or 'Community' in Tonnies sense, for at least fifteen hundred years. This was true in the countryside and also in the towns. In the case of artisans, for example, "the community on which this form of property is based already appears as something produced, secondary, something which has come into being, a community produced by the labourer himself." (Pre-Capitalist, 100). These are that paradoxical institution, the 'artificial community', the constructed or willed community, which is a key to the peculiarity of both the West and Japan.

Thus Marx saw that the social structures of 'Asian' or 'Ancient' societies were 'holistic' and Gemeinschaft, while from the very start Germanic/feudal society was individualistic and Gesellschaft. The decisive difference is thus not caused by the transition from feudalism to capitalism, but the transition from whatever it was that preceded to feudalism to feudalism. This is where the paths diverged, though it was not necessary that they should remain totally separate - in the West, for instance, a number of 'feudal' societies went back to almost join the 'Asiatic' pattern under the Ancien Regime. What is important to remember is that Marx, unlike most of his followers, did not see feudalism and capitalism as antithetical; capitalism was a social formation which built on, refined, exaggerated, evolved out of, but by means cast off feudalism. This makes sense in the English and Japanese cases, the most 'feudal' of societies in some ways, yet also very capitalistic - and until the nineteenth century in both cases blending the two in a curious way that should warn us that they are not antithetical in nature, but complementary.

**Perry Anderson on necessity for feudalism before capitalism.**

Anderson (largely basing himself on Marx), accepts that feudalism 'proved the gateway to capitalism', it was 'the economic dynamic of the feudal mode of production in Europe which released the elements for primitive accumulation of capital...and it was the social order of the Middle Ages which preceded and prepared the ascent of the bourgeois class that accomplished it.' (c. p.410). How did this happen? Much in the way that Marx and Weber had suggested - the creation of a landless labour force, the development of full and absolute private property, or, as Marx put it, "In this Western movement the point in question is the transformation of one form of private property into another form of private property." (425).

Where Anderson goes wrong is then to stress two things which he gets out of proportion - the importance of Roman Law, and of the growth of the 'Absolutist State'. No wonder he is puzzled by the most dazzling example of early capitalism, England, in which both are conspicuous by their absence!

**Japanese feudalism, according to Jacobs.**

The two era of feudalism in Japan and Europe:

"In Japan, as in western Europe, true feudalism, was historically a later development of the so-called
'age of feudalism', and was preceded by a structure comparable to the manorial system of Europe."

(Jacobs, 22n)

The Japanese estate owners escape from Imperial control.

"By the middle of the twelfth century, the landed estates of the provincial governors were outside the Imperial control...(Much earlier there were independent estates called 'sho')...This term is an equivalent, rather than a coincident, to the European manor; the shoe, in contrast to the manor, was not a community, did not contain pasture, and used a sporadic labour force in cultivation..." (Jacobs, p.25)

Full-blown feudalism in Japan in the thirteenth century

"The Kamakura Epoch brought the full establishment of the warrior as the protector class, the alienation of land (in 1270) and the granting of land as reward for service, whereby the 'sho' became a fief, and the basis for pure feudalism was established. In the ensuing Ashikaga Epoch, pure feudalism developed fully, as constant warfare enlarged the role of protection and diminished further the power of the peasant producer." (Jacobs, 25)

the creation of an independent peasantry in Japan

(In contrast to China)."In Japan in contrast, as in western Europe, there was the gradual development of an independent peasantry, able to protect individual economic interests against larger and more aggressive landlords." (Jacobs, 27)

In Japan "Year by year the labour service was lightened, and finally it disappeared. It was revived, however, in the Tokugawa Epoch." (Jacobs, 29)

Japanese tenure rights

"In accord with feudal principles, the Japanese peasant surrendering rights to tenure gained in return protection of his own, and his successors' right to productive exploitation. By the time of the Tokugawa Epoch, however, the right to tenure also was in effect re-secured. The peasant, moreover, was able to obtain the right of disposal of his holdings...Although the right of full tenure came late in Japan as in all feudal societies, the principle was that there should be no interferences into tenure-rights by a ruling authority. This is in marked / contrast to the individual-peasant ownership system of China where full tenure-rights existed from the start but the ruler maintained rights of interference on his property which was theoretically 'leased'. "

(Jacobs, 29)

**Individual rights, political pluralism in Japan: Jacobs.**
The systems of diffused power in Japanese feudalism

"This in turn was replaced in the Ashikaga Epoch by a true feudal authority, with total
decentralization...Later still the Tokugawas were able to consolidate much of the political power,
coming closest of any in the feudal period to fully centralized authority....(but) the legitimacy of
independent political concentration of power being accepted, the former rivals were not destroyed." 
(Jacobs, 92)

absence of totalitarian system a central feature of Japan

"The modern centralized authority of the industrial era inherited the principle established under
feudalism, that authority is based on coordination and co-operation of independent power in
diffused responsibility..." (Jacobs, 92)

one law for all in Japanese feudalism

While in China, the administrators claimed "exemption for themselves from the criticisms and
sanctions applied to others. In Japan (as in western Europe) in contrast, there arose a system legally
establishing and defining the rights, privileges and obligations of all, by feudal contract and the
dispensation of feudal justice. As feudalism waned, this was replaced by a well-defined system of
courts with civil and criminal codes." (Jacobs, 97)

Japan's first legal code in the twelfth century

"Japan's first legal code, the Taiho Edicts, soon came to be ignored. Later there arose both a
warrior code and a common law code, combined and re-codified in 1232 as the 'joei shikimoku'." 
(Jacobs, 99)

the lord's right to have a law court in Japan

"Special law courts were maintained as part of a lord's feudal obligation to ensure that justice was
carried out among vassals, with the right of redress directed to the ruling authority...a body of clear
and consistent rules, statutes and binding precedents did develop. " (Jacobs, 100)

individual legal rights in Japan

"Legal protection of the individual, and acceptance of the legitimacy of private litigation, first
appeared in the code of 1721." (Jacobs, 100)

the right of protest and redress in Europe and Japan

"In China, there was never an effective aristocracy to challenge either the ruler or the Confucians,
after the Han Dynasty..." - hence no independent political power. (Jacobs, 104) On the other hand,
"In Japan, authority was not ethical, only legitimate. Consequently, in Japan, unlike China, the right to political protest against a ruling authority might be opposed by that authority but never challenged as morally evil." (Jacobs, 105)

**Feudalism and capitalism not totally opposite: Jacobs.**

Jacobs realized that "feudalism...decidedly dissimilar to capitalistic society, cannot always be interpreted...to be the polar opposite of capitalism, as a form of social organization." (Jacobs, x)

no necessary clash of feudalism and capitalism in Japan

Jacobs stressed "...the persistence of some feudal patterns in modern capitalism is not necessarily detrimental to its operation. Nor need these features necessarily be considered to be in / the process of disappearance in the new industrial structure. Japan is a particularly good example of the persistence of feudal features in a modern industrial order." (the other, of course, is England - cf. Maitland et al). (Jacobs, 74-5)

He also note that "The exchange and property system of modern, industrial Japan contains many feudal features, among which the following may be listed: (a) persistence of a large domestic-type industry; (b) atomization of land holdings; (c) stagnant village population; (d) large element of unskilled labour, composed of women and children, in industry; and (e) narrow home market."

" (Jacobs, 75)

dichotomy of feudalism and capitalism, is wrong

"We also maintain that there are common features in Japanese feudalism and industrial capitalism which are absent from the social system of China. Consequently it is questionable whether the all too familiar dichotomy of capitalist-industrial society versus pre-capitalist society, in the light of the Chinese and Japanese cases, is the sole or the best point of departure for the analysis of the origins and development of modern capitalism." (Jacobs, 75)

feudalism and capitalism in Japan - blend into each other

Jacobs argued that "...feudalism contained the seeds of its own destruction. Some of the principles which served feudalism so well served simultaneously to protect incipient capitalism from feudalism, in Japan's case. These principles were totally absent in Chinese society, in which existed functionally equivalent but positively contradictory principles." (Jacobs, 110)

capitalism emerges from within the shell of feudalism

"In Japan, the merchants and capitalists emerged, in the late Tokugawa Epoch, from within the
very shell of feudalism. It is this possibility of the emergence of a novel occupational grouping, seeking its own occupational ends according to its own conceptions, that is the strategically important point for the emergence of capitalism from feudalism." (Jacobs, 126)

(note Jacobs' metaphor - the seed within the shell, very different from the usual oppositional metaphors - yet it accords with a re-interpretation of what Marx said, Alan)
Capitalism did not break feudalism, but emerged out of it

**Capitalism did not break feudalism, but emerged out of it**

"Historically, Japan did not break with traditionalism in the development of modern capitalism. Rather capitalism fitted into the traditional social structure, breaking that pattern only in so far as was necessary to carry out the functions of capitalism..." (Jacobs, 214)

feudalism and capitalism fit together, not opposed

"The present study also shows that, contrary to the usual analysis, feudalism is not the arch enemy of capitalism, but happens (speaking historically, not out of logical necessity), actually to be the earlier phase of those societies which do develop capitalism. From the standpoint of the origins of the possibility of capitalism, as developed above, the underlying generalized value systems of both feudalism and capitalism were identical, ad contrasted with those of the societies which do not develop capitalism." (Jacobs, 215)

the relation of feudalism and capitalism - compatible

"It is not maintained, logically or empirically, that feudalism is inevitably a prior 'state' of capitalism, or that capitalism needs feudalism in order to establish itself. Historically it was rather that the elements which were to give rise to capitalism were able to utilize certain very useful generalized values concerning rights and privileges established under feudalism 'for other purposes', to institutionalize their own position...." (Jacobs, 215)

**Political pluralism and opposition, Jacobs on**

the fragmentation of power in Japan - no monopoly of power

"In Japan (as in western Europe) in contrast (to China - AM), there was no 'a priori' and constant source of political power, nor had any one element or interest a monopoly of it; power was fragmented among a number of independent or semi-autonomous groupings, with a continuing struggle to assert control and authority." (Jacobs, 76)

clashes of power in Japan
In Japan, Jacobs argued, powerful clans "invaded the prerogatives of the central authority", while "both imperial and clan claims to authority were challenged by religious orders, Buddhist, Christian and Shinto." (Jacobs, 81)

importance of religious orders in Japan

"With the appearance of true feudalism in the Ashikaga Epoch, the temples established great castles and openly challenged the greatest of the secular lords on even terms." (Jacobs, 81)

political devolution and local autonomy in Japan

"In Japan (as in western Europe)...the institutional independence of individual concentrations of political power articulated with the localization of that power. Local semi-autonomous political authority was accepted, especially political independence of the urban centres." (Jacobs, 84)

local power and delegation under Japanese feudalism

"In Japan, from the earliest days of feudalism, local responsibility and autonomy were guiding assumptions....Local rural government began in the sixteenth century...rural elders...were in effect mayors...they soon came to be elected by the farmers on a fixed salary; and, most significantly, were not identified politically with the central administration..." (Jacobs, 87)

The origins of feudalism: Maine.

Maine believed that while it was the legal orthodoxy of his time that all that was important in feudalism dated from after the Norman invasion, much that was characteristic of the fully developed feudal system was already present in Anglo-Saxon England. The court leet, he argued, arose from the old township assemblies rather than from royal (Norman or Angevin) grants, as lawyers had argued. (Communities, 139). The common-field and three-field systems were present in German societies: "the three-field system was therefore brought by our own Teutonic ancestors from some drier region of the Continent." (Communities, 200-1). The whole manorial system was pre-Norman, both the concept of the manor and of copyhold tenure. (Law and Custom, pp.300, 302ff). Thus while "the ordinary text-books...practically trace our land-law to the customs of the Manor, and assume the Manor to have been a complete novelty introduced...during...feudalization (Communities, 11), in fact, he argued, the Germanic landholding systems did not just die out at the Conquest, but very greatly influenced subsequent land-law. (Communities, 83,11).

He argues that "the primitive Teutonic proprietary system had everywhere a tendency...to modify itself in the direction of feudalism..." (Communities, 21). This tendency was particularly marked in England because Germanic customs were not destroyed by the re-introduction of Roman law: "English institutions have never been so much broken as the institutions of other Germanic societies... by Roman law..." (Early, 167). Yet there was some grace of Romanism, an essential
ingredient, for the ground in England had been prepared by a previous Romanized population. (Communities, 147).

The origins of feudalism: Maitland.

Of course, a lot of this material on early origins, with some modification, has been substantiated by Maitland's Domesday Book and Beyond.

Much of what Maitland has to say is done implicitly. He argues that already there are many of the major ingredients of feudalism - the manor, private jurisdictions etc, are present in the almost purely Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of England in the ninth century. For example, "that personal relation between lord and man which is one ingredient of feudalism....can be traced to the relation between the German princeps and his comites described by Tacitus.' (Constit. Hist, 146). He then traces the system of sub-attachment, exactly similar to sub-infatuation. What is vital here is that the central principle which sets feudal systems off from kinship or caste systems, the contractual, artificial, mutually agreed tie that is built up has been introduced through the Germanic system. Maitland continues that this "relation of man and lord we find in all parts of the social structure". (Constit. Hist, 148). The same, of course, could be said of Japan from about the eighth century.

Maitland is the last person to argue for historical necessity. But it is clear that he thought that while the brushwood may have been present in the Roman world, the spark that lit it was the peculiar legal and social structure of the Germans, with its emphasis on contract rather than kinship.

The actual mechanism for replacement of kinship by fief: Maine.

Maine's hints here are a clue, a start. The model of the central principle of feudalism, the 'Benefice or Feud', was, he argued, "mainly taken from that which the men of primitive Aryan race had considered as appropriate to chiefships or sovereignties." (Law and Custom, 349). The origins of private property thus arose from "the ever-increasing authority of Chief, first over his own domain and 'booked' land, and secondarily over the tribe lands", a process which was beginning long before the Norman conquest. (Instits, 115). The chiefs or kings then granted benefices, or permanent, indivisible blocks of land to others. (Law and Custom, 345). Thus, in some strange way, feudalism "had somehow been introduced into the Western world by the barbarous conquerors of Roman Imperial territories..." (Law and Custom, 149). This sounds somewhat similar to what happened in Japan - conquest, the giving of gifts to retainers etc.

Marc Bloch: explanation of origin of feudalism.

His speculations are particularly intriguing and attractive for anthropologists because they are basically a functional explanation of feudalism. In his view, as we have seen, feudalism is a whole social system, at the same level as caste, kinship-dominated, capitalism etc. (Here he is in line with Marx, who also thought of this as one of his 'modes of production'). His view of the reasons for the
origins of feudalism is also a structural one - in the same way as Weber. He sees feudalism in relation to the other parts. It is, like Weber, a vacuum theory.

The argument basically is that where the normal integrating mechanisms for some reason are weak and there is nothing to hold society together, there feudalism will emerge. Where the State is strong (as in Rome) there is no need for it. Where there is no State and kinship cannot replace it, there feudalism emerges.

If kinship ties remain strong, feudalism did not develop. This explains the absences on the map of Europe - Celtic societies, the marshes of northern Germany et. "Where men of all ranks were able to rely for support on other forms of strength and solidarity than personal protection - kindred groups especially among the Frisians, the people of Ditchmarschen and the Celts...neither the relationships of dependence peculiar to territorial lordship, nor vassalage and the fief invaded the whole of social life." (Feudal, i,248).

Bloch explicitly suggests that a bilateral kinship system, which was the one dominant in most of the Germanic areas of Europe, was too vague and flexible to act as the political system. It was only where unilineal principles (as he thought them to be , though probably it was ancestor-focused kindreds, Alan), that kinship was strong enough to replace feudalism. His views on this vital matter are quite clear. He wrote, "to the individual, threatened by the numerous dangers bred by an atmosphere of violence, the kinship group did not seem to offer adequate protection, even in the first feudal age. In the form in which it then existed, it was too vague and too variable in its outlines, too deeply undermined by the duality of descent by male and female lines. That is why men were obliged to seek or accept other ties...On this point history is decisive, for the only regions in which powerful agnatic groups survived - German lands on the shores of the North Sea, Celtic districts of the British Isles - knew nothing of vassalage, the fief and the manor." (It may also be related to the nature of conquest - feudalism seems very much to be a hasty response to the problem of rewarding followers after rapid conquest - which was not, perhaps, a problem in either of these areas - which were also too inhospitable to make manors much of an attraction? Alan)

In a memorable sentence, Bloch sums up his argument: the tie of kinship was one of the essential elements of feudal society; its relative weakness explains why there was feudalism at all." (i, 142), or again "feudal ties proper were developed when those of kinship proved inadequate" (ii,443?). Putting it in another way, feudalism is based on contract and is the complete opposite of ties based on kinship or status. One began to replace the other.

A second theme is related to the conquest element. Bloch was aware that feudalism was an alternative and indeed challenge to the despotistic state. It could not exist if the State was all-powerful. He wrote, "despite the persistence of the idea of a public authority superimposed on the multitude of petty powers, feudalism coincided with a profound weakening of the State, particularly in its protective capacity..." (ii, 443). This weakening, he believed, was the result of the 'great upheaval of the Germanic invasions'. In that situation, when "neither the state nor even the family provided an adequate bond of unity" (i, 214), then homage was fully developed. Thus the small farmers
submitted to the large, to the master or chief "only on account of the inadequacy of the other social arrangements - the kinship groups or the authority of the State." (Bloch, i,247)

This argument led him to argue that where the State had not been destroyed, or put in other way, where public law was strong and enforced, feudalism would not develop. Where men could rely on kinship and "also institutions of public law of the type common to the Germanic peoples", the proper feudal system was not developed.

This type of functional explanation provides a very suggestive hypothesis. Feudalism emerged, probably both in parts of northern Europe and in Japan, out of crisis. In the West, it destroyed the State, and the kinship systems which came in with the Germans could not supply an alternative. In Japan, there was no State to destroy - just battles by the incoming 'Japanese' overcoming the equivalent of the Celts, the Ainu. But again the kinship system did not provide a strong enough framework for order. This explains the similarity of the context of the origins.

The real curiosity to be explained however, is how, in England and Japan (and to a certain extend Holland and Scandinavia), this original feudalism did not gravitate towards absolutism - as it did on much of the Continent. Here the explanation needs to be of a different kind - the protection and elaboration of a trend, rather than its origins. Here it would seem that the island nature of the two places was crucial. England, for instance, being a small island under increasingly strong rulers and relatively united into one kingdom with defined borders and common laws, developed out of feudalism into centralized feudalism very early (Alfred, reinforced by Normans and Angevins etc.) But the central principle of political devolution wa curiously maintained, the balance of powers.

Likewise in Japan, the curious central features of 'feudalism' were maintained. Basically, this was the abandonment of status (kinship), and the espousing of contract in economics (the market), politics (the State) and in religion (Protestant individualism). This is what gives Japan and England their peculiarly similar feel.

Their differences arise from several factors. One is the nature of their basic crop - communal wet rice cultivation as opposed to dry crops in the West. Secondly, the background influence of their Continents was very different - a Graeco- Roman pressure from Europe in one case, a Confucian- Buddhist pressure from China in the other. It is not surprising that their surfaces seem so very different, and that even the solutions they took to the problem of dealing with the early transition and preservation of 'modernity' were different. But they had both early chosen that road, and neither, for the peculiar geographical reasons noted above, were thrown off it, as others were.

The necessity for disentangling politics from economics.

Gellner has written extensively on this. For instance, in tribal societies there is no distinction between economic and political: "in acephalous or near-acephalous segmentary society, what you own and what you can effectively defend can hardly be distinguished." (Muslim, 37) But "under capitalism, this unity disappears; productive units cease to be political and social ones. Economic
activities become autonomous.." This separation of the economic from the political and social is one of the important features of western industrial capitalism. "The really fundamental trait of classical capitalism is that it is a very special kind of order in that the economic and the political seem to be separated, to a greater degree than in any other historically known social form." (Spectacles, 285). In this situation "Predation replaces predation as the central theme and value of life". (Plough, 158)

**Feudalism and the relationship of politics and economics.**

There is something odd here. If the final necessity is to separate politics and economics, how do we fit in Maine's insight concerning feudalism, namely that the central feature is the mixing of political and economic power? As he wrote, feudalism "mixed up or confounded property and sovereignty" (Law, 148), every lord of a manor having both economic and judicial rights. Political power and economic power were both delegated down the same hierarchical chain.

One resolution of this problem might be that there are two stages. Feudalism by mixing the two, has the important function of breaking the more normal connection of kinship, politics and economics. It eliminates one term from the 'package'. Then feudalism itself becomes split - as Maitland shows - so that with growing wealth, economic and political split apart and work in different directions. There is thus a process of splitting and then further splitting, double fragmentation or division.

**The central thesis.**

The restraint of centralized feudalism.

There is again a curious feature in that NWEurope and Japan are the only two major agrarian societies which are known to have had 'feudalism'. But even more significant was the similarity between England and Japan, which each had a peculiar form of feudalism - what one might call 'centralized feudalism'.

Its major feature is that it provides order, without choking society by developing into despotism. Of course, such a feudalism may, as Bloch observed, be related to the peculiar family system.

**Political institutions and hegemony**

'Politics' or the political structure, of course, only comes into its own after the institutionalization of politics in the State, in other words about 8000 B.C. with the founding of 'State' societies. Thereafter the tendency is towards absolutism, that is towards making the State the infrastructure, encompassing everything. Manifestations of this are widespread in history, for instance the Inca/Aztec in South America; Rome in certain phases; the Ancien Regime states in Europe; China
Off-hand, I can only think of four exceptions, in other words developed political systems where the State has refrained from absolutism, or been forced to refrain from it, by counter-veiling powers of certain kinds. These are Greece, Rome (in certain phases), feudal states, modern democracies.

One of the most interesting of these is feudalism, since it seems to be a way of ruling a country, binding together the parts, without falling into complete absolutism. Within feudalism, we have to separate sharply two kinds or types: the 'dissolution of the state' type which Bloch described, where power is lost to the periphery, or that curious 'centralized feudalism' of which England is the best example, where the State is fairly, but not too powerful. In this latter type there is a mixture of centralism and diffusion of responsibility, a balance of powers. In this situation, the benefits of unity, peace and centralism are achieved without the stifling costs of absolutism.

The puzzle of feudalism

How is it that feudalism, which supposedly entailed fragmentation and the 'dissolution of the State' (Bloch), as well as the confounding or intermixing of politics and economics, could lead in Japan and England to capitalism and industrialism which require a) a unified and quite powerful and centralized State, and b) the strict separation of politics and economics? There is a strange paradox here.

It may be that the explanation lies in both cases in the fact that England and Japan (being islands) departed from the 'normal' model of feudalism. Instead of being a very devolved system, basically with power flowing downwards, the delegation of military might, it was rather a system which faced upwards, with the link to the centre most emphasized. Thus feudalism did not represent a 'dissolution of the state', nor was power and economy totally intermixed. The King and his law and his servants keep much power. As Weber noted, England was a strange mixed case, partly patrimonial, partly feudal, a hybrid which allowed freedom under the law to flourish. Indeed, as Maitland shows, by the thirteenth century at least, feudal lords were only landlords and holders of courts. Military power was a separate thing. Politics and economics had become separated.

Early thoughts on political similarities.

In terms of power and politics, both countries have a curiously centralized and integrated political system. In the case of England it is based on an idea of downward devolution of power and responsibility, combined with a looking upwards to the apex, namely the King and State. In Japan, the focus is somewhat more upwards, with emphasis on loyalty to the Emperor etc. But there is also devolution.

The important fact is that in both cases, the two extreme threats to traditional politics are avoided.
Neither has had the over-governed, absolutist State at the centre with little love or respect for the locality which one associates with the idea of dictatorship. On the other hand, the tendency of traditional feudal societies to collapse into anarchy, through the activities of over-mighty warlords, is contained. England had its Wars of the Roses in the fifteenth century, and Japan had its own time of troubles a century later. But in each case, this was sandwiched by long periods of stability and peace where a measurable balance was held between the power of the centre and the periphery, the State and the individual.

This similarity, of course, is linked to the fact that both England and Japan are taken as examples of feudalism, but in each case of a feudalism of a peculiar kind, not the extreme 'dissolution of the State' feudalism of Marc Bloch, but the 'centralized feudalism' of Maitland.

The associations of feudalism and capitalism are well known, but we may draw attention to two statements about them. Barrington Moore (Dictatorship...) wrote that Japan and China were different. "The Japanese version of feudalism, on the other hand, remained vigorous well into the nineteenth century. Since Japan is also the only Asiatic country that has become a substantial industrial power by the third decade of the twentieth century, the hypothesis, that feudalism provides the key becomes very attractive..." According to Bendix on Weber, (p.364), "In western Europe and Japan the specifically feudal combinations of loyalty and status honour was made the basic outlook on life that affected all social relationships..."

Perhaps because of the fact that both Japan and England were fairly small islands, perhaps because neither was conquered from outside for very long periods, perhaps because of the uniformity of language and law (related to feudalism), both England and Japan early had a uniformity within themselves. The marked regionalism which one finds in all continental states - whether France, Germany, India or China, was absent. One language, one law, one 'religion and relatively easy communications set these two islands off from their respective continents.

**Some political similarities of England and Japan.**

It is well known that capitalism requires a certain kind of political underpinning; the "free" market will not operate unless there is stability, predictability and certainty. As Weber long ago noted (my 'Culture', p.174), the 'state' of some kind is essential to capitalism. he thought the "the State, in the sense of the rational state has existed only in the western world" and that in contrast to the arbitrary state systems of traditional China, India and Islam, "very different is the rational state in which alone modern capitalism can flourish".

By the "rational" state he meant many things, but among them is the idea of a State which will support and encourage economic activity, or at least not prey upon it too much. Such a political system is unusual. With the founding of political systems from about 8000 B.C., there has always been a tendency towards the State becoming too powerful and crushing the economy - in my notes I mention some examples. The one situation in which the State has been forced to refrain from
becoming too powerful and predatory seems to have been within feudalism.

At its extreme, of course, feudalism takes the tendency too far in the opposite direction. But a modified form of feudalism, combining delegation with centralism provides a way of holding a country together without any complete absolutism. This modified form of feudalism, which one might call "centralized feudalism", is the kind that developed in England by at least the twelfth century. As Bloch and, even, more, Maitland noted, English feudalism in its political aspects made loyalty to the centre, the King, the supreme loyalty. For example, in England, "military service is due to none but the king; this it is which makes English feudalism a very different thing from French feudalism". (Maitland ?) The royal, national, law prevailed over the whole country. It was only in the land law, where every piece of land was held by feudal tenures until the seventeenth century, that feudalism prevailed. This peculiar form of feudalism seems to have been an ideal seed-bed for capitalism.

Many great social thinkers have noted the connection between feudalism and capitalism. Maine saw the momentous change from status (kinship) to contract having been effected within feudalism. He wrote "the notion of common kinship has been entirely lost. the link between Lord and Vassal produced by Commendation is of quite a different kind from that produced by Consanguinity." He traced the origins of private property of a modern kind to the new feudal ties. It gave us the idea of indivisible, impartible, property. Again, Marx saw the connection. In the feudal system (as opposed to the Asiatic and primitive), the essential divorce which is a precondition of private property of the few had taken place. "Feudal landed property is already essentially land which has been disposed of, alienated from men."

Thus, not only in terms of providing a political system that is powerful, but not too powerful, but in leading to the destruction of kinship links and the institution of private property, the feudal state is essential. Weber noted the ideological shifts. No longer was the kinship sentiment dominant; loyalty to the family based on status was changed to a bond based ultimately, on contract, the political decision to serve a lord. It is for this and other reasons that most recent theorists, Perry Anderson, Brenner, Barrington-Moore etc., have seen feudalism as a vital transitory stage.

It is in this context that it becomes particularly intriguing to note that only in one civilization outside Europe has there been anything that one can reasonably call feudalism, namely in Japan. The consensus of opinion is overwhelming. Weber wrote that in western Europe and Japan the specifically feudal combination of loyalty and status honour was made the basic outlook of life that affected all social relationships." (quoted in Culture,179). Marc Bloch saw feudalism as highly unusual, but the one example, he puts in the same class as Japan. "Like Europe, though with inevitable and deep-seated differences - Japan went through this phase". More recently, Perry Anderson provides a detailed analysis of Japanese feudalism and concludes that "modern research has only discovered one major region of the world where a feudal mode of production comparable to that of Europe indisputably prevailed", and that was Japan. "In this century, scholarly opinion has overwhelmingly concurred in considering Japan to have been the historical site of an authentic
feudalism". He outlines the similarities for us: "the fusion of vassalage, benefice and immunity into a fief system which constituted the basic politico-legal framework in which surplus labour was extracted from the direct producer. The links between military service, conditional landownership and seigneurial jurisdiction were faithfully reproduced in Japan. The graded hierarchy between lord, vassal, and rear-vassal, to form a chain of suzerainty and dependence, was equally present. An aristocracy of mounted knights formed a hereditary ruling class: the peasantry was juridically bound to the soil in a close replica of glebe serfdom" (Lineages, 413). There were, of course, "second order" differences, for example "the feudal compact was less contractual and specific than in Europe". etc.

Anderson also links this unique similarity to the emergence of capitalism. "European feudalism, as we have seen, proved the gateway to capitalism...Today, in the second half of the twentieth century, only one major region outside Europe, or its overseas settlements, has achieved and advanced industrial capitalism; Japan". Anderson in describing Japanese feudalism, is mainly speaking of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. The Tokugawa period added "commercialisation of the countryside, a certain type of urbanisation, and high levels of literacy" which were the further necessary ingredients.

There are two arguments here; firstly that European and Japanese feudalism are structurally similar, secondly that feudalism is a necessary pre-condition for capitalism.

A recent expert on Japanese feudalism, Peter Duus seems to agree with the former, but not the latter. As he points out a number of times, "it seems clear...that the political institutions of Japan between 1300 and 1600 closely resembled those of feudal Europe...feudalism was not the unique invention of Europe, but had been developed by Japan as well." On the other hand, as to the question of the roots of capitalism and industrialism, he argues "If anything prepared the way for Japan's modernization, it was not a feudal heritage, but the erosion of that heritage through the bureaucratization of the warrior class and the commercialization of the economy during Tokugawa times." (p.113).

One can see what he means; no one would argue that a "modern" society will leap straight from the chaos of tenth century France or fifteenth century Japan. The Tokugawa stabilization was necessary as a stage. But his argument goes too far in the opposite direction.

The feudal period looks as if it was a necessary intervening stage, a fire through which Japan like Europe had to pass. The reason it had to do so was long ago noted by Maine; feudalism separated out politics from kinship, changed the society from a status (kinship) bound one, to a contractual one. This did not happen in India or China. That it did happen, and its nature, is indicated in a passage by Bellah. He writes that in Japan, "polity overrides family; and in case of conflict of loyalty the first duty is to one's lord rather than to one's family" (Tokugawa, 18). He quotes Nichiren, "when a father opposes the sovereign, dutiful children desert their parents and follow the sovereign. This is filial piety at its highest." (p.82). This is what feudalism does.
If one uses the metaphor of growing rice, feudalism is like the ploughing or hoeing that breaks up the ground. Without this breaking-up of the previous systems, it would have been impossible to plant the land effectively. But one then needs the time for the rice to grow. This was provided in England by the long era of peace from the twelfth century (with only minor disturbances), and in Japan, the Tokugawa era. These periods bore out the truth of Adam Smith's remark, reported by Dugald Stewart that "little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural order of things." (quoted in Culture, 189). Of course, a lot else is needed, but certainly both Japan and England, on the basis of a new contractual, political and social system, were able to provide these things, and grow opulent.

One intriguing fact is the way in which Japan went through two forms of "feudalism". In the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries it went through the classical "dissolution of the State" kind of feudalism of which Bloch and others have written. But with the Tokugawa re-unification, there was something different. Theorists have found it difficult to characterise this. On the one hand, it looks like feudalism. As Duus puts it, it "was constructed out of feudal materials and mortared with feudal cement". The daimyo, or feudal lords were "the essential building blocks". On the other hand, Japan can hardly be said to fit Duus' definition of feudalism as "a highly fragmented political system, lacking a strong central administrative structure..." As the same author writes, "By the end of the seventeenth century, Japan was probably one of the most thoroughly governed countries in the world." (p.99)

What does one call it? Duus rejects the suggested term "centralized feudalism" because this is "a contradiction in terms". But it is only a contradiction if one accepts the French (M.Bloch) model of feudalism. the English of just this kind of "centralized feudalism" is much more relevant. In both Japan and England, the tension between too much power at the centre, or too much power at the periphery has been solved, though in slightly different ways. In Japan one had a model of a powerful relation between the top two layers, and then a lot of independence (see diagram). In England, the system was much more diffused all the way down, with the King's law penetrating right down to the bottom. On the other hand, with strong centralism and little in the way of intervening power blocks, went a great deal of delegation of power.

These were alternative solutions, in both cases they are hybrid types, and in the English case Weber recognized this by describing it as a cross between patrimonialism and feudalism. In Japan, building on the much earlier traditions of a unified society, there was also a cross between patrimonial and feudal forms. This compromise has considerable advantages. There can be peace and predictability, a "rational" political order. But the delegation downwards of power prevents too great an expansion of the power of the stage: any over-extension of power leads to a stifling and costly bureaucratic absolutism of the kind that developed in China or Spain or France. This compromise may be one of the secrets behind the "miracle". The "night watchman" state was present in both, though the night watchman was pretty well armed and observant.
This leaves several problems unresolved, however. Among these are the following:

1. what is it that led in the first place to feudalism in Japan and England?

2. then, why did it emerge into a specific and curious variant - centralized feudalism?

3. then why was it preserved and did it not, as on the mainland in each case, develop into centralized absolutism?

A first answer to these might be:

1. cognatic kinship, warriors, conquest states etc. (as conventional wisdom of Bloch et al.); society and warfare

The relation between feudalism and kinship

After reading Peter Duus' book on Feudalism in Japan, it is clear that as far back as records go, the Japanese case illustrates well the M.Bloch theory that feudalism occurs when kinship is weak (bilateral). Again and again through Japanese history it would have been possible for the society to break down into clanship groupings. If there had been a principle of agnatic descent, or even non-unilineal kindreds as in Scotland, they would have formed into blocks. But there was not, so that, as in north-western Europe, feudalism was related to the weakness of kinship and bilaterality.

The Ainu and predatory feudalism

The Japanese expansion over Japan and destruction of aboriginal peoples (e.g. the Ainu), seems to parallel the Anglo-Saxon expansion over Britain and the destruction of the aboriginal peoples (Celts). Indeed the Celts and Ainu have certain common features (a rich mythical life, matrilineal tendency, high status of women), etc.

Patrons and clients.

One might get the impression from the intrinsic nature of patron-client ties etc. that Japan is rife with patron-client ties. Yet this is not quite right. There is, indeed, that element of the exchange of benefits in an asymmetrical relationship. And yet Japan does not feel like a patron-client society. Why? Is it less opportunistic, less temporary or what?

The introduction of pure feudalism into Japan

p.208 "The Ashikaga introduced true feudalism into Japan. Central administration was completely
abandoned, and replaced by loose control over feudal lords, under oaths of fealty in return for the control of independent fiefs. Land was parceled out continuously in a hierarchy of authority. The local representatives of the central authority became personal retainers, owing feudal service to the Ashikaga; civil office was converted into true military, feudal office. ..."

Feudalism destroys family property and paves the way for private property.

Maine's argument is that feudalism introduced the new notion of indivisibility, and the collapse of feudalism set the individual free to dispose of all objects on the market as his own. Without the collapse of feudalism, "we should never have had the conception of land as an exchangeable commodity." (Instits, 86-7). Why and how did feudalism do this?

Maine saw a number of threads coming together to endow feudalism with this new arrangement. Partly it was the unrestrained power of manorial lords over their own demesne land. The "emancipation of the lord within his own domains from the fetters of obligatory agricultural custom" suggested "a plausible conjecture that our absolute form of property is really descended from the proprietorship of the lord in the domain..." Other powerful forces were the development of written wills, encouraged by the Church, and the granting of land by 'book' to religious bodies. Gradually rights to land came to be looked on as a personal commodity, which could be sold or exchanged just like any other commodity. He pointed out that in England titles to manorial estates, and to the copyholds within those estates, were conceived of as having been originally purchased or acquired (Early Law, 325). Hence, they could be sold on to others. Primogeniture was linked to "the crucible of feudalism", for instance "the Feudal law of land practically disinherited all the children in favour of one." (Anc. Law, 237, 225). This made it possible that "the equal distribution even of those sorts of property which might have been equally divided ceased to be considered as a duty." (Anc. Law, 225).

His account of how primogeniture was adopted is intriguing. "It (i.e. primogeniture) spread over Europe with remarkable rapidity, the principal instrument of diffusion being Family Settlements...which universally stipulated that lands held by kingly service should descend to the eldest son. Ultimately the law resigned itself to follow inveterate practice, and we find that in all the bodies of Customary Law, which were gradually built up, the eldest son and stock are preferred in the succession of estates of which the tenure is free and military..." (Anc. Law, 231).

The problem of younger brothers under primogeniture.

Commenting on the development of primogeniture, Maine noted that "it was only by insensible degrees that the younger brother, from participating on equal terms in all the dangers and enjoyments of his kinsman, sank into the priest, the soldier of fortune, or the hanger-on of the mansion." (Anc.Law, 238) Their fate was constantly lamented. For instance, in seventeenth century England, Fynes Moryson commented that "the unequal Law of England, giving all to the elder brother, lying sluggishly at home, and thrusting the younger brothers into the warres and all desperate hazards, and
that in penury" was very unfair. (Itinerary, iv, 61 and see also p.39). The problem seems to have been widespread in nineteenth century Japan also, where primogeniture was normal. (Dore, Japanese Fertility, pp. 77, 66).

**Feudalism and new concepts of layers of ownership.**

A second feature of feudalism which Maine noted was the ability to conceive of different layers of ownership or possession within feudal tenures: "the leading characteristic of the feudal conception is its recognition of a double proprietorship, the superior ownership of the lord of the fief co-existing with the inferior property or estate of the tenant." (Anc. Law, 295).

**Feudalism and the movement from status to contract.**

A third feature of feudalism noted by Maine is that the whole system was based not on inherited relations of 'status', but on acts of will or 'contract'. In feudalism, the famous bridge from societies based on status to those based on contract was crossed. This was a unique event - except that curiously it also happened in one other civilization, namely Japan.

The importance of this transition was memorably emphasized by Maitland. "The master who taught us that 'the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract', was quick to add that feudal society was governed by the law of contract. There is no paradox here. In the really feudal centuries men could by a contract of vassalage or commendation, many things that can not be done now-a-days...These were the golden days of 'free', if 'formal', contract." (Hist. Law, ii, 232-3).

**The instability of Japanese polity**

Jacobs argues that "no one political authority had an automatic monopoly.../ Authority in Japan, as in European parallels, was ambiguous and unsettled. This inevitably led to constant rivalry and rapid changes." (Jacobs, 195) (see the graphic account of how this happens, in detail, pp.202ff)

political instability in Japan as opposed to China

"Nevertheless each novel structure was, in time, replaced by another, and the cycle of aspiration, consummation, and destruction began anew." (Jacobs, 206)

**The Emperor as a black box in Japan**

The Emperor says nothing, a black box, a sounding board for other people; but sensitive people can guess each other's intentions, and need to anticipate those of the Emperor - who loves one and one loves. The Emperor absorbs all expectations without saying anything, all people project their deepest desire onto him.
Law and kinship

Since kinship usually provides the principle upon which politics is usually based, we may wonder how order could be maintained in its absence. Part of the answer seems to lie in the legal structures of England - though a different solution was used in Japan (through concepts of group and loyalty).

It is well known that for centuries England has had a special and curious legal system; in contrast to the rest of Europe with its revived Roman Law, England preserved an almost purely Germanic system of customary or Common Law. This was developed as an alternative to kinship. In most societies, local custom and kinship controls and guides life, so that there is little need for the development of a complex set of formally instituted courts, of bureaucracies to control individuals and to adjudicate between them. Social control is enforced through kinship and through mystical channels. Disputes are settled by force and feud, often based on the kin group. One of the extraordinary things about England is the complex and sophisticated system of law that had developed very early, precisely to do the things which kinship does in other societies.

The individual was deeply enmeshed in a whole set of legal system, in fact. In the frankpledge and court leet, his everyday behaviour was controlled and many minor village disputes were settled not on the basis of kinship and marital alliances, but by juries and by peers. In the church courts, his moral life was again regulated by unrelated persons. In the Sessions of the Peace and the Assizes, the law of the realm, the national, non-kinship, law intruded down to the village level. In the central courts of Common Law, and later in the Equity and Prerogative courts, the numerous disputes and conflicts which were generated in the society were adjudicated and settled. The immense paraphernalia of law provided the machinery which was essential as a background to both capitalism and individualistic manoeuvre.

One of the basic premises of the system seem to have been from very early on that legal rights and citizenship were independent of kinship position, that such rights inhered in people as individuals and not as sons, daughters, aunts, cousins. Though the rights of children and adults, women and men, servants and masters, might be different, each had rights. None of them were rightless, merely appendages of a family. No inhabitant was without rights by virtue of his status; thus an infant could sue and be sued, thought being unable to speak, he had to do so through guardians or procurators, women could take their husbands to court in equity, bondsmen could sue all men but their own masters. The liberties were the liberties of the individual, and no-one could take these away. The most inviolable of these rights, after the right to life and liberty, was the right to own property. This right could not be taken away from a person, and there was no category of person who could not in some shape or form, in theory, have property.

The need for a system of law that protected poverty and resolved the numerous disputes between transacting individuals in a market-based society, is very apparent. It is especially important when kinship is weakly developed as an effective system of social control and adjudication. If we look at the litigation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for instance, we find that wider
kinship played only a minor part. Litigation often took place between close kin; those chosen to support a person at law, pledges and sureties, witnesses and compurgators, were in the majority of cases not kin. All attempts to show that wider kinship ties determined patterns of crime or litigation have been unsuccessful.

This legal system, at least in its essential, was well established by the later thirteenth century, if not well before. As contemporaries such as Bracton, Fortescue, Coke and Blackstone, or later writers such as Stubbs, Maine and Maitland, were fully aware, the deepest structures of English Common Law remained largely unchanged between about 1250 and 1800. New acts clarified the principles, and there was re-organization and modification. But the concepts of rights, actions, the person, property, remained fundamentally unchanged. It is difficult, as Maitland pointed out, to differentiate a "feudal" and a "post-feudal" period. England was in many ways as "feudal", or for that matter non-feudal, in the thirteenth century as sit was in the eighteenth. In both centuries and in the intervening period, the ultimate basis of the law was the individual, and the ultimate relations that the law considered were contractual.

While kinship and descent and marriage were, of course, recognized, they were merely part of the substantive sphere of law. There was a law of family relations, just as there was a law concerned with trade or with forestry. What was absent was that overlapping between law and kinship, and in a wider way between politics and kinship, which is usually to be found outside a rather small circle of modern democracies. The rights and liberties of the freeborn Englishman was not merely an empty rhetorical statement.

In England there is no record of anything equivalent to the situation referred to by Meyer Fortes where childless men cannot hold political office. Ultimately, it was through willed associations - through clubs, cabals, confederacies, parties, that people achieved power. It was through the manufacture of contractual alliances with largely non-kin that people moved to the top, rather than through automatic support from kin.
CHAPTER 7. THE FLEXIBLE FAMILY

The central feature; kinship no longer infrastructure

The central and principal feature of the modern family is that it does not act as infrastructure, that it does not organize politics, economics, religion etc. Somehow the family and society have become separated. Put in the words of sociologists, it has lost many of its functions - it is just stripped down to what is primarily a socializing agent, and nowadays not even that. This has very considerable consequences, for it is the fact that economics, politics, religion and kinship all intersect within the realm of the family which gives that peculiar 'embedded' quality to 'traditional' societies. In such a situation, relationships can never be single-stranded and it is impossible to conceive of the purely economic, the purely religious etc.

The essence of 'modern' society is that each of these spheres has become separate, hence the end of the religious household, the domestic mode of production etc. Instead of the group being primary, whether a family, caste or community group, the individual becomes a microcosm of the society as a whole, with individual rights and duties. He or she becomes a legal, political, religious and economic entity in his or her own right, not merely in so far as he or she is a member of a wider group. This is basically similar to the argument of Dumont concerning the difference between holistic cultures like India, and individualistic cultures like England.

This atomistic system is one where all wider ties of blood and territory are weak and integration is through money, citizenship, paper, law etc. People, in Marx's ironic word, have been 'set free', not only in relation to the market, but also in relation to God, the State etc. This setting free can best be illustrated by contrasting the 'modern' situation with that in an ideal-type, 'traditional', society.

In an ideal-type 'peasant' society, the household acts as a joint economic, social, religious, and political unit. The head of the household is a patriarchal head - simultaneously a mediator with the ancestors, the political head, the economic boss etc. The children have to be 'emancipated' or freed and the woman is subservient, first to her father, then to her husband, then, as a widow, to her son. The individual has no political, economic or other rights as an individual. The ritual, economic and other worlds overlap for a person in the household. Hence a political act is also a religious one. Hence, for example, in the field of demography, to expand a family's reproduction is also to expand its production. It is impossible to conceive of individuals apart from the groups of which they are members, they are only parts with meanings in relation to a whole. It is as impossible to conceive of a 'free-floating individual' as it is to think of a foot or a hand cut off from the body. It is the relationship of the parts that gives each part a meaning. In a very real sense the family organization is the basic organization of society; through the family an individual reaches redemption, wealth, power etc. One may call this a familistic society. This kind of society finds its archetype in eastern Europe, India and China.
An even more extreme form of the blending, where institutions have not been separated at all, can be found in what anthropologists call 'tribal societies'. Here the group, the tribe, is the political, religious, social and economic world - and the tribe is composed of a set of kinship groups (descent groups). Descent or kin relatedness determines marriage, production, distribution, warfare and politics, dispute settlement and so on. All relationships are determined by birth or 'status' as Maine called it, and not an 'contract' or achieved roles. All relationships within the tribe are multiplex. It is impossible for an individual to separate the social from the economic and religious and political. The individual has no meaning on his or her own. Kinship is king.

This is a general characterization of the connectedness. It seems to fit the two extremes quite well. The puzzle that has emerged since I first wrote this is Japan, which fits at neither end. It does not seem to be 'embedded' in the same way as the normal peasantry - much action is quite 'free' and achievement has for long counted for much. On the other hand, the individual is also still very largely dependent for his meaning on his relationships. A single Japanese is as meaningless in terms of rights and mentality etc. as a single Indian or Chinese. The group, in other words, still largely encompasses and gives meaning to the individual. Yet this is combined in a curious way with quite a considerable separation of religion from politics, economics from kinship etc. etc. At the moment, we can say nothing more than that the two ideal types set out about merge or intersect in the Japanese case - and that this seems a very old feature of that country.

The tendency to family domination - and exceptions.

In the majority of simpler societies, it is kinship and marriage which bring together the separate spheres. In Fortes' terms, the kinship group and kinship sentiments bridge the 'domestic domain' and the 'juridico-political' domain. In other words, kinship is the infrastructure (as Godelier puts it), which determines everything else.

The situation is totally different now. As David Schneider recognizes in his account of modern American kinship, kinship is no longer king. "The kinship system of modern, western societies are relatively highly differentiated as compared with the kinship systems found in many primitive and peasant societies. By 'differentiated' I mean simply that kinship is clearly and sharply distinguished from all other kinds of social institutions and relationships. In many primitive and peasant societies a large number of different kinds of institutions are organized and built as parts of the kinship system itself....In the United States one is supposed to earn political office by free elections.. One owns property in one's own right and enters into economic relations where one chooses and according to rules which are supposed to be quite free from the constraints of kinship, religion, or politics. And one goes to a church of one's own choosing..." (American Kinship).

The argument: the modesty of the family system.

Why was the family system unable to provide hegemonic control? The solution seems to lie in the curious fact that NW Europe and Japan are the only two agrarian civilizations based on cognatic
rather than agnatic kinship. Structurally they are very similar, and this has the devastating effect of breaking the ties of status (in Maine's sense).

**Some preliminary thoughts on Japanese and English kinship.**

England and Japan shared a bilateral, network, ego-centred kinship system. This has certain essential consequences arising from the fact that it cannot form the basis of permanent groups. Descent is traced back only a little way. Kinship is 'constructed' to fit the actual pattern on the ground, rather than the other way round (the pattern on the ground is derived from kinship rules). Thus, for instance, many non-relatives were incorporated into the Japanese system. This means that as in England the kinship system itself did not underpin, or create, economic or political groupings, but rather reflected them. Kinship, as Leach wrote of another bilateral system (Sri Lanka), was a way of talking about property. Although more powerful than English kinship, Japan could still not be called a 'familistic' society.

The Japanese system is based on having a powerful group for production (and consumption) purposes, which was originally the household (ie). But composition of this group, as a number of authors show, is not limited to real, blood, kin. All sorts of other people can be recruited to it. This combined the power of kinship loyalty with the flexibility of contractual relations. It was very effective in agriculture and then was transformed in the nineteenth century into the business world. When the locus of economic activity was no longer the biological family, the trick of defining the family as all those who worked together was extended to the firm. The firm now became a 'family'. This did not happen in the same way in England, though there had been some overlap in the idea of 'X and sons', 'Y Brothers'.

**Kinship as a hegemonic institution**

It is, of course, difficult for kinship to be hegemonic once one has passed to literate/class societies except at the 'peasant' level, but since that level includes nine tenths of the population of most countries, it is still quite important. The really significant feature is whether the descent system and terminology can form people into effective groups, in other words provide the political and economic, as well as the reproductive, infrastructure of the society. Without this potential, then kinship cannot be 'king' in any sense.

There are, in fact, three major forms of kinship system known to anthropologists: unilineal systems which form groups; non-unilineal ancestor focused systems, as the Scots, which can, slightly less efficiently, form groups; non-unilineal, ego-focused systems, which cannot form into groups.

It is interesting that the two major civilizations which are the last of these - namely Europe (especially England) and Japan, should have evolved into 'modern' capitalist society. This may well be strongly connected with the fact that they never became 'familistic' societies. Japan did try to
move as far as possible in this direction with its emphasis on filial piety, loyalty, hierarchy etc. But there is only a certain way one can push this before it collapses. The 'glue', in the absence of a proper agnatic system, is not strong enough. China, with agnatic groups, or India, did not suffer from this problem.

**The family system in Japan.**

Talked to Chie Nakane, who asked about the similarities of England and Japan. She seemed to agree with my assessment of the Japanese family system and the absence of joint families etc.

She asked why "X and Son" or "X Brothers" was common in England. Apparently the latter is unknown in Japan; perhaps, I wonder, linked to the maxim "the brother is the beginning of the stranger".

**Marriage and in-laws.**

According to Chie Nakane, many eldest sons are not able to find a wife, as girls do not want to take on the parents in law in old age. The only chance is 'love marriage'; ironically, therefore, the parents in this case are very keen on the idea of love marriage!

**Thoughts on the family and industrialization**

There are a number of formal similarities of the English (European) family system and the Japanese. Descent is bilateral; inheritance is by one heir, terminology is almost identical except for age terms for siblings in Japan; household structure is small and fairly simple; spiritual kinship is unimportant in both, though adoption is important in Japan and not so in England. The replacement of kin by servants is common in both.

In neither case is the family the basic unit in religion. It is more so in Japan, with the oldest male in the ie in charge of the ancestor shrine, but the other kin are probably excluded. The political unit only necessarily involves one (usually the eldest) male; the economic system is not founded on the family, there is no automatic inheritance or 'restrait lignager' by all the children, just the restricted line.

Thus the Japanese are a curious half-case, neither fully peasantry with all children (as China, India, and Eastern Europe), nor full individualism (as England). What can one call this; 'restricted familism', 'enlarged individualism'?

Whatever it is called, it is a curious hybrid, perhaps partly caused by heavy pressure within an island setting and hence a need to conserve resources. The consequences are immense.
It might be interesting, therefore, to set up a simple model of the two extreme types - which might be called 'Individualist' (Anglo-American) and 'Peasant' (India, China), and then hazard a guess at where Japan would fit in, and what a few of the implications of this for our understanding of both might be.

As far as the curious pattern of kinship in Japan is concerned, a preliminary speculation might be as follows. One might isolate three types of pressure. There seems to have been a bilateral or 'Eskimo' type of kinship system, perhaps stemming from a similar type of northern Hunter Gatherer society on the edges of the Arctic. This was combined with a weakish political system, which went through a period of 'feudalism'. On top of this, what differed between the two, was the agriculture. In Japan, there was bilateral kinship and rice, with all the co-operative and joint work that such cultivation entails. In Europe there was pastoralism and wheat cultivation, neither of which (in the absence of complex irrigation), require such co-operation. Thus one sees in Japan an odd mixture, what one might call a 'submerged' bilateral system.

In England the bilateral system never went underground because of two factors. The political system was strong enough to integrate society, and so did not call on kinship to do so. Secondly, the centralized feudalism of the long period from the eighth to sixteenth centuries was strong enough to integrate the economy. Thus, although there is a tendency towards primogeniture, there is also what one might call a system of 'private' property, which cuts through the nexus that normally holds together kinship and economy.

**Primogeniture in Europe and Japan.**

Jordan (Geography) notices the link between Germanic, northern, areas of primogeniture, and Roman southern equal inheritance. "For Europe was divided traditionally into two major zones on the basis of legal systems. In the south, in areas one part of the Roman Empire, the practice of divided inheritance...(sub-division).....In contrast, Germanic law and its English common law offspring support the principle of primogeniture or some other means of undivided inheritance...The over-all impact of Germanic law was to hold down rural population growth..."

Eric Wolf (Peasant, 75), also notes this contrast. "Patterns of partible inheritance predominate in China, in India, in the Near East, in Mediterranean Europe, and in Latin America...In contrast, impartible single-heir inheritance has been favoured in the manor-dominated areas of Europe and in Japan..."

**The effects of primogeniture on capital accumulation.**

It has often been argued that where assets are shared out, whether between all sons, all daughters, or all children, there will be a break on capital accumulation, less stratification and inequality, and hence less likelihood of industrialization. This was argued long ago by Malthus, for instance in reference to China where partible inheritance meant that a family's fortune seldom lasted beyond
three generations. (Malthus, i, 130). It is an idea that has been constantly repeated by modern anthropologists and economists. (e.g. Epstein, Economic pp.92, 82, 180); Bailey, Caste, pp.85ff; Barnes, Class and Committees, p.48; Stirling, Turkish, 136; Fox, Kinship in Tory Island, 12) As Barrington Moore puts it, "In the absence of primogeniture a wealthy family might find itself reduced to penury in a few generations through equal division at inheritance". (Dictatorship, 170). Thus, in areas and times where there was partible inheritance, as in Kent under gavelkind, families tried to prevent the breaking up of the estate, as Weber noticed when writing of "entails, which arose, like modern capitalist monopolies, in a constant struggle with legislation". (From Max Weber, 381).

**Disinheritance in Japan.**

I asked Yoh about the possibility of disinheritance in the Japanese past. He said a father could, for a reason, disinherit, literally cut off, a son. This is called 'kando'. It is just done by words; and there is no appeal to a court that can be made against this.

**China and Japan and primogeniture and industrialization.**

"Several differences between the Japanese and Chinese family systems contributed to their varying successes in coping with the problems of industrialization. One was the pattern of inheritance. Under the Chinese family system, all sons inherited equally, so that family capital could not usually be kept intact. In Japan one son (usually the oldest) inherited all the property. Thus wealth could be accumulated, and one person could more easily make a decision to invest it." (Smith in Past and Present 60, p.150).

**Inheritance by all sons and by one son (primogeniture) in Japan**

"In China, the mandatory institutional pattern for the inheritance of all strategic (i.e. landed) property was equal division between all the legitimate heirs: normally the sons....In Japan (as in western Europe), in contrast, strategic property is inherited by a single person: normally the eldest male. this is termed primogeniture. As in Europe, primogeniture appeared relatively late in Japan's age of feudalism; in connection specifically with the replacement of the manorial system 'sho' by pure feudalism." (Jacobs, 148)

**bundle of rights in property very early in Japan**

"The inheritance system in the proto-manorial period of Japanese history denoted an inheritance of rights to landed property ('shiki') but not necessarily of ownership. There was a complex overlapping of many types of rights to any one piece of property;.../ Property rights could be inherited by any number of heirs..." (Jacobs, 150-1)

**the growth of primogeniture in Japan**
"The Ashikaga Epoch introduced true feudalism and primogeniture. There was interest in consolidating holdings, resulting from constant sub-infeudation...to divide property among all heirs was to invite political and economic disaster..." (Jacobs, 151)

the rights to disinherit heirs in Japan very early

"In Japan, the right to override the interests of the eldest, for the sake of the continuity of the family line, dates from the Taiho code of A.D. 701, which was concerned solely with succession. The Joei code of 1232 provided for others, besides the eldest male, also to inherit, if necessary; and it established the right of the family-clan to withdraw both the status and inheritance from the eldest son and transfer both to a younger son, if the eldest were unable to fulfil his obligations to the clan's satisfaction. the right of adoption, for a house-master without male issue, was established in the same context." (Jacobs, 152)

a new concept of private property developed with feudalism in Japan

"In Japan (as in western Europe) the conceptual rights and privileges of ownership and transfer developed concomitantly with the practical demands of the development of true feudalism, so that a new concept of private property holding and descent was created, namely, primogeniture." (Jacobs, 153)

the linking of inheritance and succession in Japan

Jacobs argues that from very early on (Taikwa-Taiho period), an emphasis "on lineage, on perpetuation of the privileged clan-name. With the conceptual linking of the two aspects of inheritance and succession, there arose the demand that a single house or clan heir ('katoku') should administer the family's property, as well as perpetuating its name. Adoption was liberally interpreted, to the point of affiliating any kinsman able to carry on both these important responsibilities." (Jacobs, 154)

Growth of free adoption in Japan

"In addition, a house-master without male issue might adopt a man betrothed to his daughter ('muko-yoshi') Such an adopted son was invested with all the rights and responsibility of a natural heir. In case of divorce, however, these rights immediately reverted to the original household." (Jacobs, 154)

The system of adoption in Japan (Kenichi & Minamoto)

This is called 'yoshi', and is not found in China or Korea. A person can adopt even if he or she has a son.
Consequences of primogeniture for capitalist growth in Japan

"In Japan (as in western Europe) in contrast, primogeniture ensured the transmission of independent landed power over time, assuring the possibility of its further concentration in each generation. Landed power, historically, is but the forerunner of monetary power. Consequently, monetary power, so necessary for commercial and industrial developments, could also be transmitted over time. Specie could be concentrated, pending the time when other factors made the appearance of industrial capitalism possible." (Jacobs, 155)

inheritance by all males a pressure against capitalism

"Thus the system of descent has positively functioned in favour of the anti-capitalist forces in China...since economic position and status are provided for each male who desires them, men need not leave the traditional agrarian role, except in times of economic dislocation." (Jacobs, 156)

The early roots of English alienability of property.

Sir Henry Maine recognized that there was something odd about Anglo-Saxon kinship, writing that in the important area of joint property "the general usage of the old Germanic peoples - it is remarkable that the Anglo-Saxon customs seem to have been an exception - forbade alienation without the consent of the male children." (Ancient Law, 280).

Early Anglo-Saxon kinship as cognatic.

As Vinogradoff stressed (Hist. Jurisprudence, i, 147-8), "Maitland lays stress on the difficulty arising from the fact that Anglo-Saxon and Germanic law recognized relationship on the female as well as the male side. In his view, there can therefore be no question of grouping the corresponding societies into patriarchal clans, which stand or fall with the conception of agnatic relationship." Maitland's elegant demonstration that Anglo-Saxon kinship was in fact cognatic and not agnatic (Hist. Eng.Law, ii, 240-260), has been supported by anthropological research (see Lancaster 1958; Fox, 1969).

Strangeness of a non-blood bond in early England and Japan.

As Maine argued, "The history of political ideas begins, in fact, with the assumption that kinship in blood is the sole possible ground of community in political functions..." (Anc. Law, 129). Thus "the idea that a number of persons should exercise political rights in common simply because they happened to live within the same topographical limits was utterly strange and monstrous to primitive antiquity." (Anc. Law, 131). Yet, by the eighth century in both England and Japan, blood had been largely replaced by forms of contractual, semi-feudal ties. How and why?
Curious absence of community or family ownership in early England.

Maitland demolished the notion of the 'village community' and the original communal ownership in his section on 'The Manor and the Township' in the *History of English Law*, showing, for instance, that the rights in the supposed common land "is not communalism; it is individualism in excelsis." (Hist Eng Law, i, 623). On the question of corporate property, "England affords but few materials for an answer to this important question, for anything that even by a stretch of language could be called a communal ownership of land, if it had ever existed, had become rare and anomalous before the stream of accurate documents begins to flow." (Ibid, i,630). Maitland thus shows that the Mainean argument, that there must be a stage between tribalism (kinship) and modern individual property, of 'village property' is not necessarily true. If there had to be such a stage, we are left with the problem of how the curious privatized property of parts of western Europe emerged. Maitland leaves open the question - communal ownership of land "if it had ever existed."

The new concept of indivisible property.

The revolutionary change which heralded the birth of a new order of things occurred with the arrival of the belief that land was indivisible, that it was an unit which could and should be preserved undivided over long periods. This was the basis of the 'feu' or 'fee', in other words one of the basic features of feudalism. The crucial exposition of this change occurs in Maine's *Early Law and Custom* (pp.34-6). He believed that this momentous change occurred in England between the later twelfth and later thirteenth centuries. It was then that the old view of land changed into "the feudal view of land, which is that, when held in individual enjoyment, it is primarily impartible or indivisible." (p.341). The change, he believed, was momentous. "Nothing can be more singularly unlike than the legal aspect of allodial land, or, as the Romans would have called it, land held in dominium, and the legal aspect of feudal land. In passing from one to the other, you find yourself among a new order of legal ideas." (p.342). The basis of this new world was the concept of the impartible, individually owned, estate - the basis of modern individualism and the western industrial world as both Marx and Maine would have argued. Curiously, as Maine did not realise, this happened twice, once in Europe, and once, entirely independently, in Japan.

The nature of this change needs to be understood. There is, Maine says, "no symptom that a Roman lawyer could conceive what we call a series of estates - that is, a number of owners entitled to enjoy the same piece of land in succession, and capable of being contemplated together...if a Roman lawyer had been asked to take into his mental view a number of persons having rights together over the same property, he would have contemplated them not as enjoying it in turn, but as dividing it at once between them...a...long succession of partial ownerships, making up together one complete ownership, the feodum or fee - could not have been dreamed of till a wholly new conception of landed property had arisen. " (Early law, 343-4)

The basic change was, therefore, from a system in which the land was infinitely divisible between
a number of individuals, each of which held identical rights in it, to a system where the estate was indivisible, but different kinds of right, stretching over a long period of time, were shared out between different people. This was one of the essential ingredients for modern individualistic property systems. It is a feature which we only find in NW Europe and Japan.

The importance of the rule of primogeniture; England and Japan.

As far as I know, these are the only two countries in the world which have tried to stick to this odd rule, hence the speculations on the origins and effects of this, mainly in the European context, are worth following up.

Maine pointed out that if we add to the rule that property is indivisible, the rule that it should be assigned to one individual in each generation, the eldest male, we then have the makings of modern estate property. Maine devotes considerable space to the peculiarity and uniqueness of primogeniture, originally, he thought, found nowhere outside north-western-Europe, and developed quite late. But he is very puzzled as to its origins: this is "one of the most difficult problems of historical jurisprudence." (Anc. Law, 227).

He was puzzled because he could not find its antecedents. He believed that no trace of primogeniture could be found in Roman Law, in Hindu law, or in the ancient German law (Anc Law, 228). "No sooner, however, has the feudal system prevailed throughout the West, than it became evident that Primogeniture has some great advantage over every other mode of succession." (Anc. Law, 231).

Where, then, had it come from? Here he provides an intriguing hint. At first he seems to rule out a connection with the customs of the Germanic invaders: "Primogeniture did not belong to the Customs which the barbarians practised on their first establishment within the Roman Empire." (Anc. Law, 229). But soon after this, Maine muses: the "examples of succession by Primogeniture which were found among the Benefices may, therefore, have been imitated from a system of family-government known to the invading races, though not in general use. Some ruder tribes may have still practised it..." (Anc. Law, 235). It does seem likely that male primogeniture was related to earlier forms of inheritance and succession; for instance, the prevalence of gavelkind in certain parts of England shows that the various Anglo-Saxon tribes that invaded England had different customs, some primogeniture, others ultimogeniture.

In the case of Japan, further investigation of the claim that it sprang out of a blue sky as an answer to the problems of feudalism need to be investigated. Clearly it is structurally associated with a certain kind of feudalism in each case - and a special kind. But did it again have some kind of links to an earlier kinship system in Japan, as it may have done in England? A great deal hangs on an answer to this.

The will, adoption and mechanisms for re-directing succession.
If we graft onto indivisible estates and succession by one child some device for altering who that child should be, we have a formidable new property system. In England, this device was the will. In Japan it was the curious system of adoption - whereby one could adopt either younger sons and turn them into the oldest, or even non-relatives. This functioned in many ways exactly like the will - but did so in some ways more effectively, since the switch was done during the owner's life, and not afterwards.

Returning to the will, Maine thought that "next to the Contract" it has "exercised the greatest influence in transforming human society." (Anc. Law, 194). He saw how the written will was breaking up tribal and peasant societies in India, as he believed it had done in the European past. "Testaments were the principal instruments employed in producing inequality..." (Anc. Law, 225). But their power (as with adoption, A.M.) was only unshackled when it became possible to use them to direct inheritances away from the automatic rights of heirs.

Where then did the strange device of the will come from? On the one hand, Maine was convinced that the Romans invented the device; "to the Romans belongs pre-eminently the credit of inventing the Will...", while the "barbarians were confessedly strangers to any such conception as that of a Will." (Anc.Law, 172,194). And yet the Roman will lacked the essential power of free disposal. "It is remarkable that a Will never seems to have been regarded by the Romans as a means of disinheriting a Family, or of affecting the unequal distribution of a patrimony."

The same could be said of adoption in Japan. Adoption is a widespread device, used in China, India etc. What made it special in Japan was that it could be used to destroy blood succession, whereas in those other instances it was used to strengthen it. Adoption in Japan is a perfect example of the curious hybrid nature of Japanese kinship. On the one hand, like India and China, adoption is very important; it is necessary to maintain strategic kinship groups. In this respect, it is very different from England where there is no adoption. On the other hand, in other cases adoption reinforces and builds on kinship. One adopts a brother's son or some other close relative and hence reinforces kinship and heirship. In Japan, however, adoption is used to break natural descent and to turn a blood group into an association, one can adopt anyone and does so. Hence adoption is a contract that creates status (like marriage). Thus adoption is a vital device used, like marriage, to recruit people to a group - or like fictive kinship. It combines Status and Contract, the East and the West, in a very curious way.

So what caused the deviation in Europe? Two suggestions can be made in a preliminary way. One part lies in Christianity. If we apply Jack Goody's argument about the Church destroying the family in order to allow itself to expand in this area, then the Anglo-Saxon church, as E. John has shown in his work on 'Bookland', supported those who wished to dispose of their wealth away from their kin. (Goody 1983; John, 1960). To this we need to add the insight of Maine that there was something peculiar in Anglo-Saxon kinship; namely that "it is remarkable that the Anglo-Saxon customs seem to have been an exception" to the general customs of the "old Germanic peoples" that "forbade
alienations". (Anc. Law, 280).

**Some similarities in the family system.**

See the separate sections on this; a striking similarity of descent, terminology, inheritance, household structure, servanthood and ancestor worship. This all encourages capital accumulation, flexibility etc.

Thus the usual break placed on increasing production caused by the inflexible links of the kinship group, leading to periodic shortage and surplus labour of a fixed group, was broken. The economy was no longer 'embedded' in the family, as Polanyi would describe it. The 'free; labour which Marx singled out as a characteristic of capitalism had already been created. Yet, on the other hand, the system of impartible estates, held in the line, also gave continuity, allowing farms and associated business to be built up from generation to generation. It was an ideal combination of freedom and restraint.

**The two parallel family systems in Japan.**

There were, in fact, two, parallel, family systems in Japan. There was the 'ie' or main family, with a stem organization, which was patrilocal, patrilineal, patrinomial, and with male primogeniture. It could also be maintained through the fiction of adoption. This is unlike England and very like India and China and traditional agrarian societies. But it is restricted to one child, one son. All the other children are shed and have to fend for themselves, through servanthood, moving to cities, out-marriage etc. They set up nuclear families, either independently, or as 'branches'. They are far more nuclear (not looking after parents), and have many of the features of the English family system, namely freedom, mobility, vulnerability etc. They are the ones who are recruited into cities etc.

This double system is thus exactly half-way between the English and Peasant models. the 'stem' part behaves like peasants, with co-ownership, the domestic mode of producing etc. But the non-stem part behaves like individualistic family systems.

The flexibility is created by the fact that this is anti-Chayanovian. Instead of fluctuating kin groups within fixed territories, as in Chayanov, there are fixed kin groups within fluctuating territories. But through the 'legal fiction' of the 'ie', it is relatively easy to bring in extra labour as needed if an enterprise expands (servants of various kind, distant kin, labourers etc.). Thus the usual break on production created by inflexible links of the kinship group which curtails the economy is broken. Already Weber's link between economy and society has been broken, the economy is no longer embedded and people can act as 'free' individuals, though half constrained by the central identification of the 'stem' family with the land.

**Obstacles to linking the family system to industrial growth**
Two obstacles in the way of thinking that the family system could have been an important factor in explaining these two miracles, a sort of common factor, are as follows. Firstly there is the chronology. In the English case it has long been assumed that the "modern" family (that is nuclear, flexible and so on) was the product of industrialism, capitalism and urbanism. It was believed that the family system changed dramatically in the nineteenth century with the 'invention' of nuclear family and affective relationships. If it is a consequence of industrialization, it may indeed be linked, but hardly as a cause. Thus, for instance, many sociologists and demographers believed that this was the case (Smelser, Econ & Soc, 108; Notestein, Economics, 16; Fletcher, Family 45,47,69,166), as did anthropologists (Lowie, Soc. Organ, 22o; Leach, Env. Solution, 104; Radcliffe Brown, African Systems, 45; Firth, Two Studies, pp.19,21). The consensus was that the pre-industrial system was based on large, extended, families, early arranged marriages etc., a view which social historians largely shared and continued to propagate. Industrialization and urbanization were believed to have shattered the older patterns and reduced the functional role of kinship. Thus the family pattern is merely seen as an epiphenomenon of the mode of production, which changes with it. The view seemed to confirm Leach's assertion that "I want to insist that kinship systems have no 'reality' at all except in relation to land and property. What the social anthropologist calls kinship structure is just a way of talking about property relations which can also be talked about in other ways". (Pul Eliya, 305).

Several major findings during the 1960's and 1970's shook this view. The first concerns the structure of the household. It was previously assumed that some form of 'extended' family or household system operated, as in other peasant civilizations such as China or India. If this were so, our modern small 'nuclear' families would be a consequence of industrialization; before the eighteenth century northern Europe was no different in this respect from other major civilizations. Now, thanks to the work of Laslett and his colleagues, we know that since at least the sixteenth century, the English and north west European household pattern has been one of small, elementary households. If anything, mean household size increased slightly during the nineteenth century. The essential point is that what Goode (check) has called the "basic sociological division of the world" into joint and conjugal family systems was already present in northern Europe at least two centuries before the industrial revolution occurred.

The second feature concerns marriage. It was again assumed that marriage was characteristically a similar institution to that in other peasant civilizations, where is almost universally occurs after puberty, at between 15 and 18. It was not until 1965, with Hajnal's major article (ref: ) that it was realized that from at least the sixteenth century parts of north-west Europe had what he termed a "unique marriage pattern", which combined large proportions never marrying with a very high age at marriage (25-30 for both men an women). Again, the pattern pre-dated industrialization and might, through its effect on the demographic regime, be seen as a cause, rather than consequence, of industrial growth.

These two findings were particularly important since they made it possible to consider whether
other features of the family pattern were not only unique to northern Europe, but also very old. If it could be shown that a number of really basic features which would influence geographical mobility, childrearing, individual property holding, accumulative desires, fertility rates etc. were not only part of a "unique north west European pattern" of kinship and marriage, but also stretched back, for example in England to the medieval period, then it might be possible to add another dimension to the theories which we have considered above. And all this would then be immensely strengthened if it were to be found that the only other area in the world which is known also to have autonomously industrialized, Japan, has a similar kinship and marriage pattern to that in north-western Europe.

There is the same objection in Japan. The family went through a revolution, but it occurred during and after industrialization. Thus it is difficult to see how it could be a cause of industrialization.

Even if this temporal difficulty were to be overcome, there is a second difficulty, namely that the pre-nineteenth century family system of Japan appears to be so different from the English one. Consequently, nothing useful can be said about the English and Japanese cases together.

In order for there to be much point in pursuing the idea that the family systems of the two societies could be a contributory cause to explain the twin miracle, we would need to establish two things. Firstly that a certain family form existed in both England and Japan and had some structural features in common, secondly that this family form had certain features which were likely to be conducive to industrial-capitalism and thirdly that this system existed, at least in essence, before the industrial revolutions in both countries.

A model of the English family system and its updating.

(see accompanying diagram in the original)

It should be stressed that this is a very high level model, ironing out for the moment, differences of time, space and social class, ideal and practice, male and female etc.

Until the mid 1960's it was assumed that the English family system was recent, the product of the industrial revolution. As the anthropologist Edmund Leach put it in 1972, the nuclear family system "is a most unusual kind of organization, and I would predict that it is only a transient phase in our society". "Transient" here has the meaning of short-lived, temporary, and implies that "in our society", in other words England, it had arisen recently, and would soon disappear. Let us look to see who true this is, using a set of pattern variables which we could also apply to Japan.

The descent system.

The majority of societies are unilineal, tracing their ancestors through one side alone, usually male, but sometimes female. This allows them to form into descent groups of relatives. This is the case, for instance, in most of China or India. The English records show that, unusually, England has
had what is known as an 'ego-focused' bilateral or cognatic system, where an individual traces his or her descent through both lines. This is part of a European-wide system (with a few variations). In England, it has remained practically unchanged since at least the seventh century. It already predisposes a society towards flexibility, networks and so on.

**The terminological system.**

The majority of societies have terminologies which merge their direct line and "collaterals", for instance classifying father and father's brother by the same term of address and making a sharp distinction between paternal and maternal kin. This reinforces the groups created by the descent system, forming them into linguistic as well as social blocks. The English (and Americans and Europeans) are again odd in having a kinship terminology which strongly differentiates out the nuclear family with special terms, but then calls other relatives, on either side, by "classificatory" terms - uncle, aunt, niece, nephew, cousin etc. This is technically known as an "Eskimo" kinship terminology, and it reinforces the independence of the nuclear family against the wider group. This system of terminology has been in existence, with very little change, from at least the eighth century in England.

**The inheritance system.**

The majority of societies conceive of the transmission of goods to the next generation as an automatic process. All children (or at least all males), are born as "heirs" who co-share the property with their parents. There is no concept of singling out one heir as opposed to others, or of "disinheriting" children. The parents and children can be seen as c-partners; there is no "private property", no choice. The English system since at least the thirteenth century, and possibly much earlier, is different. As Bracton in the thirteenth century put it, "Nemo est heres viventis", no-one is the heir of a living man. Children do not have a right by birth. Although they may expect to inherit, and although there is a preference for the oldest male child (male primogeniture), a person may sell or dispose of property as he wishes. There is no "family property", no restraint of the line ("restrait lignager"). Inheritance is based on an optional and flexible system. This is again both unusual and old, dating back to the Middle Ages.

The impact of these three structural features can be seen in material ways in the realm of kinship behaviour and belief. We can see this in several further features.

**Household structure and size.**

In the majority of peasantries, the household is "complex", that is to say, several married couples (parents and brothers) live together as "extended" households, or at least act as "extended" units. This means that the household size tends to be quite large. In England, the study of listings of inhabitants by Laslett and others, since at least the sixteenth century when such listings began, shows that households were predominantly "simple" or "elementary" and very small. Despite a
slight up-swing in the nineteenth century, there has really been no change in the last 500 years.

Servants.

In the majority of societies, family labour provides the basis of the productive unit. Non-family labour, except on slave plantations, is rare. In particular, as John Hajnal has shown, outside western Europe, servants who are employed on a "contract" are very rare. Again, England and parts of northern Europe are exceptional. From at least the fourteenth century, farm and domestic servants were very widespread in England, up to a third or more households had servants. In 1380-1, it has been estimated that between fifty and seventy per cent of males in East Anglian villages, for instance, were employees designated as servants or labourers. (cited in Individualism, 148). This non-family labour continued as essential throughout the centuries leading up into the industrial revolution.

Ancestors.

In societies which stress the lineage and the line, there is usually a great stress on ancestor worship. There are shrines where all the ancestors of the group are propitiated and reverenced. Children are necessary to worship one as an ancestor. The ancestor halls of China and the shrines of West Africa are notable examples. With the absence of groups and the uncertainty of inheritance in England, there has never been any real trace of an ancestor cult of any kind. Of course, Christianity would be hostile to it, but the kinship system does not produce it. This seems to be an absence that goes back for many centuries.

Kinship as infrastructure.

The absence of kinship as infrastructure: these various features of the kinship system mean that for hundreds of years before the industrial revolution the family system was flexible and ego-centred. It did not solidify into groups. This means that it could not provide the basis for other institutions. The kinship group was not the basic ritual group - which was the Church; it was not the basic economic group, which was the estate, business or individual; it was not the basic political legal group, which was the 'centralized feudal' state. The most important thing about the English kinship system was its unimportance. In its weakness lay its strength as a factor in encouraging capitalism and industrialism.

Conclusion on the English pattern.

Most of the major features of the kinship and family system in England were present long before industrialism and urbanism, and may therefore have contributed to its development. They placed no inhibitions on capitalist growth, and indeed through setting the individual free, giving him little
assurance or certainty, encouraged each man to build up his wealth. Already the essential pre-condition which Weber had set, the breaking of the link between society and economy through the family had occurred. Already the major move from a society based on status, or family, in Maine's formulation, to one based on contract, had occurred. This was made possible by the peculiar nature of the family system.

**Japan and its family system.**

At first sight the English model would appear to have little applicability to Japan. The usual picture given in text books of the Japanese family system could be briefly summarized as similar to the older English model, this time the movement happening about a century later, from about 1880. There is thought to be a movement from: patrilineal, patriarchal, patrinomial, patrilocal and very extended and powerful family systems, to a modern nuclear family system, under the institutional and ideological "atomizing" pressure of the West etc. If this is true, then the family system cannot be a cause of the Japanese miracle, but a consequence. But before we accept this, with the experience of the English discovery that all the myths and stereotypes were wrong, look a little more closely at the same indices in the case of Japan.

**The descent system**

Although many non-anthropologists often refer to the Japanese family system as "patrilineal", as tracing descent through the male line, this appears to be wrong. As Chie Nakane puts it in her article on 'kinship' in the Kodansha Dictionary, "The basic pattern of the Japanese kinship system is bilateral". As she writes, "The Japanese kinship system is often labelled 'patrilineal' in sociological literature. This erroneous description derives from the tendency toward dominance of the male side accompanying virilocal marriage (in which wives come to live with husbands families after marriage), which became a dominant pattern in the feudal age and after..." On the other hand, "As the Japanese never had a patrilineal descent system with its pattern of exogamous marriage as did China or Korea, the adoption of a son-in-law was widely practised... In the presence of such a widespread custom, therefore, the Japanese kinship system should not be called patrilineal in the usage of current social anthropology." Recent tendencies, with the decline of virilocal marriage, "disclose the latent importance of women in the Japanese kinship system and strengthen the interpretation of its essential nature as bilateral."

Another piece of evidence lies in actual practice: for instance, Dore (p.145) reports that "of the fifty-two families in Shitayamu-cho who during the war, were evacuated from Tokyo, sixteen went to the husband's main family, but twenty-eight went to the wife's home..." (p.154). This is hardly what one would predict with a patrilineal grouping.

Yet we may ask, what about the famed 'ie', which at first sight looks like a 'patrilineage', a group of people related through the male blood line, as in China or India? In fact, when one looks closer one finds that this is an illusion: the 'ie' is an artificial, limited, non-biological corporation, which
easily recruits in non-kin and turns them into kin temporarily, while shedding real kin with great ease. It is not much more of a biological kin group than Mitsubishi or Honda. Let us document this contention.

Let us first look at Harumi Befu's "Corporate Emphasis and Patterns of Descent in the Japanese Family". He writes that "It is proposed here that the primary emphasis in the Japanese family system is not so much on the continuity of the 'blood' from father to oldest son as on the perpetuation of the family as a corporate group through its name and occupation..." Thus he cites a study in South-West Japan by Beardsley which showed that "Of the thirty successions investigated, seven were solved by adoption, six by junior sons, and the remaining seventeen, or a little over half, by oldest sons." He writes that "we note a significant lack of concern over actual genetic continuity from father to oldest son...This, incidentally, is in marked contrast to the Chinese practice. In China, too, family continuity through patrilineal descent is imperative. But the emphasis among the Chinese is not so much a perpetuation of the family as a corporate group as on perpetuation of the patrilineal blood line. If a man, therefore, has no son, he invariably adopts the next kin, the father's brother's son (whereas the Japanese soften adopt non-kin). The same lack of concern is shown in the well known 'dozuku' system (stem-branch families). "What is significant for us about this dozuku system is that a large number of families incorporated in it are not related to the main family. " Or, as Thomas Smith wrote, "the main-branch relations being a genealogical rather than a blood relationship...Many other instances of main-branch relations without benefit of blood relationship might be cited." (p.31).

The fact that we are talking about something very different here, different not only from China, but also India, is explained by Chie Nakane. In the 'ie' system, "A brother, when he has built a separate house, is thought of as belonging to another unit or household; on the other hand, the son-in-law, who was once a complete outsider, takes the position of a household member and becomes more important than the brother living in another household. This is remarkably different from societies such as that of India, where the weighty factor of sibling relationship (a relationship based on commonality of attribute, that of being born of the same parents) continues paramount until death, regardless of residential circumstances..." It is a very flexible system constantly denying patrilineal or other links to near kin and making strangers into kin. The latter process is described by Nakane. "Not only may outsiders with not the remotest kinship tie be invited to be heirs and successors but servants and clerks are usually incorporated as members of the household and treated as members of the household and treated as family members by the head of the household." (p.5)

The reverse process, the turning of kin into strangers, is widely documented; the saying that "the sibling is the beginning of the stranger" (Nakane, p.6) sums it up. We find it in the concepts of filial piety. As Ruth Benedict (p.96) puts it, "The fact that in Japan duties to even such close relatives (e.g. aunts, nephews, nieces) do not rank as filial piety ('ko') is one of the great differences in family relations between Japan and China. In China, many such relatives and much more distant ones would share pooled resources, but in Japan they are 'girl' or 'contractual' relatives."

Or again, we find it in the rapid way in which kin who do not live together lose touch. Whereas
in China or India, a migrant to another country will keep closely in touch with his kin group, this does not happen with Japanese migrants (hence, perhaps, part of the anxiety about Japanese going abroad). As Dore (p.149) put it, "main and branch status are mutually recognised and visiting is continued only so long as there are personal affective links between members of two families...." Thus, "by the time of the second generation of the households...relations are already somewhat attenuated...By the next generation these ritual links have almost completely disappeared."

The artificial nature of the 'ie' is well summarized by the anthropologist Norbeck (Kodansha, p.242), as follows: "The ie was therefore not a perpetual grouping of all descendants and their spouses but rather a highly selective unit from which many offspring were eventually eliminated. The nature of this family group was largely determined by economic considerations; the custom of recruiting kind and non kin becomes easily comprehensible when the stem family is regarded as an economic unit which needed to be complete in all its components."

The result of all this can be seen in the very limited sphere of kinship recognition in Japan, so contrasted to China or India, but so familiar in England. As Dore says (p.150), "...the range of kin recognised by urban Japanese today is now little, if all, wider than in England". Or again, Chie Nakane writes, "Japan gives less weight to kinship than do other societies, even England; in fact, the function of kinship is comparatively weak outside the household....Society...gives prime importance to the individual household rather than to the kin group as a whole."

These features leads us to the following conclusion. The Japanese have a bilateral descent system, tracing descent through both lines. This has, as far as we know, always been the case. It leads to a weak kinship system, stressing the nuclear family. It also leads, in Japan, to a stress on the household corporation or 'ie', but this is not like the 'kinship group' or patrilineage familiar to those who have worked in Africa, India or China. As far as I know, Western Europe and Japan are the only two large agrarian civilizations which have been based on such a concept of descent (though possibly Sri Lank, Thailand and Korea as well?). If this conclusion is correct, we would expect that the bilateral pattern be supported and reflected in the kinship terminology.

(some observations from fieldwork in Hokkaido)

I asked about descent. People have to decide their line - which line to trace up through, it could be through male or female. One can only go back two or three generations, to those one personally knew. Kenichi said that "my father did not talk about his father or grand-father". Even in the powerful upper peasant and farmer families, there was a very shallow knowledge of kin. Nowadays, there is very little knowledge of forefathers. The four people with whom we were having dinner did not even really know much about their grand-parents.

I asked where 'blood' came from and they answered, entirely from the mother. Perhaps some of the physiognomy ("skeleton") came from the father sometimes. "The mother's side is stronger". In the aristocracy, the mother controlled the children. The Emperor was brought up by the Empress's father.
I asked two guests which side of the family (mother or father) they knew more about. One said his father's side, another the mother's side.

**Kinship terminology.**

The bilateral descent structure is strikingly confirmed by studies of Japanese kinship terminology. R.J. Smith is the leading scholar in this field, and has made an extensive study of kinship terminology over the last 1200 years. He concludes as following. "The most striking finding is, of course, that for approximately one thousand years (the kinship terminology) has been essentially a 'yankee' system, differing crucially from contemporary terminology in the United States only in that it makes an age distinction among siblings." (p.30)

The terminology is very different from the classificatory kinship terminologies of other agrarian societies. "Throughout the period, parents are distinguished from uncles and aunts, siblings from cousins, grandparents from their siblings...In these and other features, the Japanese system is very different from the Chinese..." (p.??)

Thus we find not only is the kinship terminology a bilateral one, more or less identical to that in Western Europe, but that it has been so as far back as records go. "There is no evidence to suggest that the Japanese have, within the last twelve hundred years, had any but an Eskimo kinship nomenclature...They have retained this system with little alteration, through centuries of religious, social, political, economic and legal change..."(p.??)

Interestingly Smith links this long-enduring feature to the success and smoothness of the Japanese transition to industrialization. The bilateral kinship terminology was "a kin terminology associated with modern urbanized industrial societies....(which) greatly facilitated the adjustment of the family to the changes required at the start of Japan's emergence as a modern state", in the early eighteenth century. (in Laslett ed., p.442).

Kin terms in Japan were very flexible. Not only did they differentiate the nuclear family from other kin, but the wider kin terms might be used for non-kin. As Norbeck writes, "Commonly also, kin terms were employed for all people of the small community, related or unrelated, as long as they were not members of households markedly different in social status." (p.5)

Smith's work built upon and fully supported Toda's earlier work. This was summarized by Dore and showed that while, when written down, Japanese used Chinese kinship terms, which differentiated maternal from paternal grandparents, a differentiation which is essential in a patrilineal system, "no differentiating terms have ever developed in popular speech." (p.153).

(some observations with Kenichi etc: )
There are classificatory terms for 'uncle', 'aunt', 'cousin' etc, as in England. But guests said that they could distinguish uncle from grand-father and also grand-father from great-grandfather etc. This suggests that Smith's description may be too simple.

**Inheritance and succession.**

If we turn to inheritance (property) and succession (of family headship), the Japanese system is again surprising when compared to India, China etc. Yet when we examine these features more closely, they are radically different from those other civilizations. Firstly, in Japan, there was no automatic right of the children in their parent's property. An heir was chosen (or not, as the case may be), by the household head and the younger children were often, in effect, disinherited. Even the oldest son could be passed over if he was thought not to be effective. The over-riding principle was single-heir inheritance, but not necessarily by a blood relative. As Smith (???) puts it, "it was the custom to select one child as successor to the name and property, and custodian of the ancestral tablets in the house".

This selective mechanism, which changes inheritance and succession from a natural to an artificial, or shall we say from status to contract, is also a central feature among the English middling groups for many centuries (see Individualism). In both Japan and England it has been an important principle in preventing too much sub-splitting of property among all the heirs. Such a system of single-heir inheritance is very uncommon. Maine thought that this system of indivisible, impartible, property through male primogeniture was unique to England, arising in the twelfth century. But now we find another example in Japan.

In effect, the rules in England and Japan were roughly the same. The main estate should be kept intact and undivided; one should choose one heir; that heir should preferably be the oldest son, failing that, another son, failing that another person was brought in (in England there was no formal adoption, so other devices were used.). All this is at the opposite extreme to what one finds with true agnatic lineages, were all the sons are co-owners. The Japanese, like the English, could say that "no-one is the heir of a living man". As far as I know, this central principle is present in England and Japan for many centuries.

**Household structure.**

Given the structural similarity of the central features of the kinship system, we might well expect to find a similarity in the other variables which have been described for England. To start with household structure, there is indeed a striking similarity between Japanese and English households, but also a different.
The Japanese household structure, from the time when it can be investigated through listings of inhabitants in the seventeenth century, has been fairly simple and small. As Nakane (in ed Laslett, p.518) writes, "In Japan, the extended or joint household in which married brothers or sisters lived together was a rarity in all periods covered by known numerical records." There has been little change in household size or structure as between 1663 and 1959. Thus we are told that the "Transition to an industrial economy seems to have had little immediate influence on mean household size". On average, the size of the Japanese households "has been consistently larger by 0.3 to 0.4 than that of England for a comparable period." This is because the rules of succession and adoption in Japan led to something similar to Le Play's "stem household", in other words, there were frequently one or both grand-parents living in the house of one child and their grand-children. "The effect of the rules of succession and adoption was, therefore, that the Japanese household almost always included members of successive generations." (Nakane in Laslett, p.552). This is the major difference from England, where different generations, after childhood, tended to live apart. With this qualification, the Japanese household structure and size was very similar to the north-western European pattern.

Servants.

The other group which expanded the household size was servants. In this characteristic England and Japan were again curiously alike. In a community listing made in 1698, cited by Nakane (?), 68/121 of the households had servants. Thomas Smith's book on "The Agrarian Origins of Japan" cites plenty of evidence on the prevalence of servants. Indeed the whole chapter two of his book concerns servants. In ascribing great importance to servanthood and apprenticeship, western Europe (and particularly England) and Japan are again apparently unique in terms of large agrarian civilizations. The major difference, as we have seen, was the way in which servants were treated. In Japan, the servants were absorbed into the family system, being treated to some extent as kin, while in Europe they always remained separate.

The great importance of servants and apprentices in Japan.

As far as one knows, according to John Hajnal, the only two civilizations that have allowed the incorporation of large numbers of non-kin into the labour force are north western Europe and Japan. Servanthood is a very important mechanism for the exchange of labour, providing labour where it is needed.

Likewise apprenticehood is very important in both areas. In Europe it allowed the exchange of children, siphoning off children from labour-surplus households to those where there was a shortage. But a contractual relationship in the heart of a status group (the family) is peculiar. Status and contract do not usually mix like this. In India, Eastern Europe, China, servanthood is little developed and instead family labour is used.
Among the effects of this situation are features of the attitude to reproduction. In Japan and north western Europe, labour deficits can be corrected later through post facto hiring in of servants. In situations where there is not this mechanism, a family has to forward plan, and perhaps over-produce if it is dependent on children, to ensure there is no short-fall. The hiring of labour is thus allowed through servants.

Yet Japanese servants seem to be a little different from their European counterparts. They seem to be more deeply incorporated into the families in which they work. Becoming part of the household, they become part of the family. This does not happen as much in England, though it is more so with the case of apprenticeship, marriage to the daughter of the master, adoption as heir etc.

Ancestors.

In the full ancestor cult of China or West Africa, there are certain central features. Firstly, there is worship of the ancestors, in other words rituals are done to them to appease and satisfy them. Ancestors are dangerous and may harm or help their descendants. As far as I know there is not this idea of ritually appeasing ancestors in Japan. In Japan the ancestors are remembered, commemorated, honoured, but not ritually invoked. There is no sacrifice, no proper ritual. In England, as we have stated, there is no ancestor worship at all.

Secondly, in unilineal systems, ancestors form a very large group, since they are all the remembered male deceased, and this group tends to grow in size. In Japan, however the range of ancestors is small and is constantly being kept narrow. It is a tapered system, whereby, unlike China, the ancestors taper off (see diagram). This is noted, for instance, by Ruth Benedict who wrote "But in Japan there is no cult of veneration of remote ancestors...Even in the cemetery the markers on the graves of great-grandparents are no longer re-lettered and the identity of the third ancestral generation sinks rapidly into oblivion. Family ties in Japan are whittled down almost to Occidental proportions and the French family is perhaps the nearest equivalent." (p.35).

In Japan, the ancestors are only necessarily commemorated by the main line; not by all the patrilineage, as in China. For instance, if a younger son goes off to the city and sets up house, he will no longer have an ancestor shrine or need to commemorate the family ancestors. Ezra Vogel wrote that with the separation of the city branch from the country branch, for example, "the branch family in the city did not have to engage in ritual and religious observances for the dead..."

In sum, then, the Japanese system appears to be half way between the full ancestor worship of China and West Africa on the one hand and the complete absence in England. Perhaps the nearest equivalent are the portraits that hang in Oxbridge Colleges (or the Faculty of Law Board Room in Hokkaido University), of previous notable heads of the institution, plus a commemorative services, as in the Founder's Obit service and feast at King's College Cambridge. The very limited range and
partial obligations are certainly what one would expect of a society which was trying to combine filial piety (and hence remembrance of the "line") with a bilateral descent system and the 'losing' of many children. There is no hint of 'group worship'. In England, without filial piety and the importance of the line, only among the higher gentry or aristocracy, or in corporate institutions, for instance Regiments or Colleges, is there any sign of this. Again, the peculiar nature of Japanese ancestor worship is probably an old feature.

Ancestors and their power in Japan

There is no idea of avenging ancestors, I was told. There are 'peaceful relations with ancestors', no punishment and no particular blessings. Only unfortunate deaths should be 'worshipped'. In other words, there is no idea of ancestor worship, ancestor ritual, per se. Those who had died an unfortunate death were an "unhappy hero" and it is necessary to silence their spirits which are vengeful and grudging to the government and people in general. (This sounds more like ghost beliefs than conventional ancestor worship.) Such 'ancestors' can also help with an eye-illness. Ancestors are thought to give a general blessing, but no special gift, no sign of the continuity of the family.

Curiosity of the ancestor system of Japan.

The weakness or flexibility of the patrilineal system and the fact that it is half-way between the two extremes of China and of England is shown in the treatment of ancestors. In the full ancestor cult of China there are certain obvious features. There is ancestor worship, in other words elaborates ritual to commemorate, placate, honour etc. the ancestors. This is in complete contrast to the mere remembrance of the ancestors in Japan; as deep a difference as between the Catholic and Protestant attitude to the Eucharist. Secondly, ancestors accumulate and are long honoured in Japan, though long dead. On the other hand, in Japan, where the ancestors are few and are constantly being trimmed as they fade away into the past, the numbers of ancestors is limited and situationally specific. It is limited to those who are remembered and relevant to the main line. The difference might be characterised as follows: Japan is based on the individual, who has above him a pyramid of an inverted V shape. In China, the ancestors fan out behind the group, in a real V shape, become more and more as one travels into the past. In England, there are none.

The Japanese model is a combination of strong filial loyalty and hence remembrance of certain ancestors, with a bilateral system of tracing descent which would create too many ancestors, and also creates different ancestors for each individual. Hence there can be no group worship. It is very difficult to have true ancestor cults without unilineal descent groups. England with neither filial piety, nor unilineal descent, has no ancestor cult, though there is some interest in genealogy.
Hierarchy in the Japanese family.

The deferential, order-based, kinship terminology within the Japanese family, differentiating the order of brothers and sisters, fits with single-heir succession. It makes it very clear that younger children are inferior. In England, despite theoretical primogeniture, 'brother' and 'sister' are not differentiated, and there are no special terms for younger and older siblings.

Relation of main and junior brothers in Japan

"Under the Hyakka-jo code of 1790, succession and inheritance were definitely to the eldest son; the younger brothers became his wards, and were debarred also from establishing a new household." (Jacobs, 159)

possibility of adopting any person as a son

"The clans refused to submit to the edict of 1615, which limited adoption of male heirs to the same class, on pain of state confiscation of the property, and this edict was repealed in 1651. When an heir could be set aside on grounds of incompetence, it became in fact possible to exclude the natural heir and adopt any other male." (Jacobs, 159)

use of adoption to recruit wealth from commerce into land

"The increasingly impoverished warriors sought solvency by setting aside their own heirs and adopting the sons of rich merchants in their stead. Thus merchants were able both to corrupt and undermined the feudal authority, and to make an ally of the lesser discontented warrior class." (Jacobs, 159)

the principle of adopting a non-heir even at level of Shogun

"Nobunaga died. He left an heir; but a former aide Hideyoshi, usurped power, under the significant claim that he alone, and not the heir, was able to solve the practical problem of order...(after H's death...) Again an old ally, Ieyasu, disputed the right of the heir, maintain once again that his party alone was able to solve the problem of order..." (Jacobs, 203)

Absence of amoral familism.

In Japan there is no element of amoral familism. the family is not a closed unit against the world. Indeed the links within it are rather weak (hence the threat which is posed by close husband-wife links of the European kind). This is related to the fact that the hierarchical or vertical nature of the family means that there are a series of parallel vertical links:
These are homologous hierarchies, but they are different and none is over-whelming.

**Kinship as infrastructure.**

While it is obviously the case that "the family" has traditionally been more important in Japan than England, it is really the House, or 'ie', which has been important. Kinship as a biological or blood relationship was less important. The 'ie' was the foundation of the religious, political and economic system up to a point, it was already a "contractual" and flexible group, rather than the "status" group which is to be found in most societies. As in England, Japan seems to have broken the close link of family and economy, family and religion, family and politics which elsewhere tends to dominate most traditional agrarian societies, and this had happened well before the nineteenth century, and perhaps before the fifteenth.

**Some consequences of the family system.**

If this is correct, then in Japan, as in England, it can be seen how the family system, through its flexibility and inherent "weakness" made the emergence of the modern industrial economy possible. Some specific links have been suggested. For instance, Vogel has shown how the custom of training and placing the younger children, and sending them off to the city, helped the building up of an orderly labour force. R.J.Smith has suggested that three features of the family system pre-disposed Japan to industrialization. Single-heir inheritance encouraged the accumulation of capital and successful small businesses by preventing the fragmentation that occurs with partible inheritance. "Second, the small size of the residential unit appears to have facilitated, or least not to have inhibited it" (as Vogel argued). Thirdly, the Japanese kinship terminology "greatly facilitated the adjustment of the family to the changes required at the start of Japan's emergence as a modern state".

One could pursue many other intriguing correlations. But for now it is perhaps enough to suggest the following. Europe (and particularly England) and Japan, each had an unusual family and kinship system. In both cases this unusual system preceded industrialization. Consequently, it seems likely that this is one part of the explanation for that "miracle" which occurred in both cases.

**Contract and status in the Japanese family**

I suggested the curious nature of the artificial corporations of Japanese families; Kenichi stressed that this was only true of the 'ie', which was a sort of kin organization which was confined to merchants and rich farmers. Most people lived in smaller households, where it was not true. (Hence adoption dying out in Japan now).
The importance of the 'name' in Japan

The continuity of the larger families is expressed in the idea of the name, 'na', in Japan. This is the basis of the samurai ethic, the pride of the name, the honour of my name, keeping my name etc. etc. There is no God to remember my name, thus I need to remember it myself. There is a warring society; I am just a man but I have a name, a survival strategy. The origins of Japanese 'ie', Kenichi thought, was in the warrior clans (plus bilateral kinship - Alan), but later turned into business management succession.
CHAPTER 8. THE MODEST RELIGION

The necessity for religious diffidence.

Gellner approvingly quotes De Tocqueville on the fact that "Islam is the religion which has most completely confounded and intermixed the two powers...so that all the acts of civil and political life are regulated more or less by religious law." (Muslim, 1). Islam makes Gellner deeply aware that the mixing of religion and politics is the normal state of mankind; their separation is a recent peculiarity. In the modern West, perhaps partly because of a "kind of potential for political modesty has stayed with it (Christianity) ever since those humble beginnings" (Muslim, 2), politics is not embedded in religion.

Nor is economics embedded in religion. The famous Weber-Tawney thesis concerning the separation of the market from religion is endorsed by Gellner: "the separation of the economic from other aspects of life, in other words the untrammeled market, is highly eccentric, historically and sociologically speaking." (Spectacles, 286).

The thesis; the diffidence of religion.

In different ways, the religious systems of Japan and England were sufficiently, but not too demanding. There are, of course, as Bellah and others have pointed out, some curious and interesting parallels between Tokugawa religion and puritanism. But the similarities go deeper than this. In essence, for accidental reasons, the form of bland Anglican/Puritan religion that developed in England, and the tolerant, pluralistic mix that developed in Japan, left the individual and group relatively free to act unconstrained by too many ethical constraints.

Curious absence of religion in Japan

Another fact that emerges is the curiosity of Japanese religion, which can hardly be called religion. Professor Nakanishi in fact said that "there is no religion in Japan". What he probably meant was there is no formal religion; no holy book, no proper priesthood, no extensive dogma, little interest in the after-life. Japan is a society where aesthetics and etiquette have taken the place of religion. The 'tea ceremony', a purely 'secular ritual' without God or priest is the epitome of the curious this-worldly religion of Japan.

As regards the priesthood, it is very strange that in Japan there is no formal order or estate of the priests. Unlike the other agrarian societies which are broken into four great estates warriors, priests, townsmen, peasants (as in the caste varna), Japan alone is broken into warriors (nobles), peasants,
merchants, artisans. It has no priestly caste, but replaces them, significantly and uniquely by splitting
townsmen into two groups, merchants and artisans. To a certain extent the samurai have to perform
the role of both religious and warrior leaders. Perhaps this partly explains their curiously ethical
code, Bushido?

The absence of religion at a formal level in Japan makes this-worldly ethics and etiquette far
more important. They become the glue that holds society and people together. The strength of any
one religion is mitigated by the fact that in Japan, as in England, there are three major conflicting
'religions' (Buddhism, Shinto, Confucian); it is like England a land of many sects. Shinto is also
simple and more ascetic and avoids the 'magic' of certain forms of Buddhism. For Buddhism, like
Christianity, is quite elastic, with an ability to range in its various manifestations from the ritualistic
to the ascetic.

I asked Chie Nakane about religion; is it present and strong etc.? She agreed that ritual is hardly
present, and where it is, it often a recent invention. She seemed to imply that it had been strong in
the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, with the high point of Buddhism, but had declined since then.
Now there was very little beyond a superficial magic, talismans etc. She put forward no hint of a
theory as to why this should be the case.

Is Shinto a religion?

I discussed this with Kowato, a University academic and fully trained Shinto priest. When I said
that many people did not think of Shinto as a religion, he agreed that it was not, for it has no dogma,
nor does it have any particular ethics. Thus, when he went on a one-month course, which is all one
needs to become a Shinto priest, the 'ethics' part consisted of chunks of Immanuel Kant. In fact,
Shinto consists solely of what he described as "the manners of the ceremonies", that is various
ceremonies to call down numerous godlings, the ancestors etc. These are nature gods, spirits of
famous dead person, who are worshipped at the numerous shrines. Before the Meiji restoration,
many of them had no particular names. They were gods of the village etc. There is little difference
between the graves and the shrines. Old people, he said, of his father's generation, often kept a
Buddhist shrine, but this is not so common now. Before the Meiji restoration, there was an amalgam
of Buddhism and Shinto. Since then, they have been separated and Buddhism was down-graded.

The aim of the ceremonies does not seem to be deeply ritualistic; nothing is sacrificed, and no
particular good is aimed for. It is a general ceremony, to 'clear the mind', to make people feel better,
to create well-being and order in a generalized way. For instance, if one's child is ill or animal sick
or business venture is precarious, one would not go to a Shinto shrine for solace. It is merely a place
to draw strength and power (like the metal 'cadmium', he said, it emanates power). Thus a Shinto
ceremony is done before building a house or factory to create a generalized good fortune. If it were
not done, the workers would be anxious that some form of disaster might befall.
It is thus a very 'intellectual', non-manipulative and generalized form of ceremonial: it is a sort of 'tea-ceremony with the spirits'. Through orderly ceremonial, one maintains with the spirits the sort of orderly and respectful relations that a man tries to maintain with his family. It is a very Durkheimian relationship - though the 'effervescence' of religion is strictly kept in check.

**Religion as a hegemonic institution**

It is obvious that religion, per se, cannot act as the 'infrastructure', except where it enters into alliance with some other institution, for example with kinship (India), ending as caste, with kinship (China), ending up as Confucian solidarity, with politics (Ancien regime Europe or Inca/Aztecs or Islam or Thailand) where it ends up as the 'inquisitorial State'. In its modern form as secularized ideology (Marxism) it can do so again as in Stalinist Russia, Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge, or modern China.

This seems to be an almost natural tendency: a state-religious 'concordat' is formed, whey they ally to divide the spoils. Thus to rebel against the church is to rebel against the State and vice versa. This is pretty apparent in the Confucian ethic, in Communism, in Islam and in Roman Catholicism.

To my knowledge, there is only one religious tradition which has departed from this - and this is Christianity, and particularly the Protestant tradition within it. For whatever reason, from very early on it tried to divide politics and religion ("Render unto Caesar, that which is Caesar's..."), and its early years saw a stormy contest between religion and politics (with its founder and many followers being persecuted by the State). This followed an earlier history of tension, perhaps arising from the historical fact that the Jews were a religious and radical minority within a non-Jewish State?

This tension continued up through the history of Christianity within the Roman Empire, the Puritans etc. It gave a certain brand of Christianity an heretical and radical tendency within the State. (An interesting side-issue of this is the Manichean heresy, which carried this tendency to its extreme, separating entirely this material world and another, spiritual world, into a stark dichotomy. Indeed, Manichean thought, which re-emerges in Protestantism, is an important element in the final disenchantment of the world, driving a wedge between matter and spirit at the religious level in a way analogous to Cartesian logic at the philosophical level).

How can one explain this "peculiar modesty" (Gellner) which meant that religion (Protestant) did not enter into a conspiracy with the State, but acted instead as a countervailing force?

The closest analogy again seems to be in Japan. Although Buddhism, Shinto, Confucianism leant some support to the State, and Christianity, as a threat to the Tokugawa, was quickly stamped out as too subversive, their power was rather slight (having little hold over the Japanese mind) and hence when they set up their banner alongside the State they did not bring in much support. Furthermore, they were rather tolerant and passive and loving religions - not a very good basis for draconian
measures unlike Catholicism or Islam, which are proselytizing and see the world in black and white terms.

The other element concerns the content of the religion. Christianity is an ethicized religion, with plenty of advice on living, but little emphasis (at least in its New Testament version) on ritual and miracles. It is here unlike Hinduism, which is much more ritualistic, and much more like Buddhism of an abstract (e.g. New Religions, and Zen) flavour - though forms of Tantric Buddhism become quite ritualistic and can support powerful kingdoms (as Tambiah on Thailand).

**England and Japan compared**

The two societies shared a religious tendency which one might call simplicity or asceticism. Certainly in the nonconformist and Quaker tradition of English art and culture and religion, a hatred of icons, for heavy art forms, for rituals, for show and ostentation, for display, for conspicuous consumption, for baroque over-elaboration was developed. Trinity College, Cambridge, and a Shinto shrine have much in common in their simplicity and geometrical shapes, just as the lifestyle of the Puritans and later Benjamin Franklin would have much appeal for the Japanese.

**Comparing English and Japanese religion**

There is a curious similarity in religion. Bellah has argued that the Confucian/Buddhist/Shinto blend in Japan was rather similar to western Protestant Christianity, emphasizing the calling, hard work, asceticism etc. Important though this is, probably more important than the specific content of religion itself, is the attitude to religion as a whole.

Most commentators agree that religion in Japan is very opportunistic or pragmatic; that people use it without really believing in it. Put in another way, it is, unlike say Catholic or Hindu cultures, surprisingly 'religion-free'. Religion does not strongly determine politics, kinship or economics. For instance, economic activities are not circumscribed by notions of purity, or attitudes to usurious borrowing. This is in a peculiar way parallel to the Protestant attitude, which is anti-ritualistic, anti-authoritarian. In both cases, the separation between religion and other spheres has occurred. Put in another way, in both cases the 'disenchantment of the world' in Weber's sense has occurred (though in the Japanese case, there is a pantheism which means that, in certain respects, it is still an enchanted universe).

Perhaps the best known attempt to see similarities is that of Robert Bellah in his 'Tokugawa Religion'. He extends the Weber thesis, namely that the inner-worldly asceticism of Protestant Christianity had an "elective affinity" to the development of capitalism, to the Japanese case. He notes that the values of hard work, duty, saving etc, which are strikingly like the Puritan attitudes which Weber describes, are also to be found in Japan, particularly in the new sects of Buddhism which emerged in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Zen, Nichiren, and Jodo. Other analogies he
sees are between the Christian concept of original sin, which drives the individual onwards to "redeem" himself, and the Japanese concept of the debt that can never be repaid (on).

More generally, Bellah sees Japanese religion as supporting the value system of loyalty which we have discussed in the context of feudalism, and hence helping to integrate the society. He also suggests, again following Weber, that Japanese religion is more "rational" than many. Although it does not go as far as Protestantism, it helps to lead to the "disenchantment of the world" but eradicating 'magic' from it. The religious believer mediates, examines his or her inner light. She does not engage in elaborate external magical rituals. Zen Buddhism and Quakerism have a great deal in common; guided by the inner light the calm believer performs his duty with integrity and energy.

All this is suggestive and indeed it does seem more than a coincidence that the mixture of Buddhism, Shinto and Confucianism which has dominated Japan in the last thousand years not only looks different from the more ritualistic systems of China and India, but has many characteristics in common with Puritanism. Perhaps we can extend this argument, however, in several other ways, in guessing the influence of religion in both civilizations.

Starting with the West, there can be little doubt, as Weber realized, that there was a strand within Christianity which was very important for the development of capitalism. Briefly, this might be said to be its desire to cut out a separate territory for itself and not to enter into alliances with other institutions. In relation to the family, Jesus urged his followers to forsake their fathers and mothers and to follow him. The large monastic organizations, which are only to be found in Christianity and Buddhism, are an alternative to the family - and highly productive economically (cf. Collins on Weber). In the conflict between family bonds of a wider kind and Christianity, Christ must come first. The de-familization of society was one of its consequences. The conflict is not so great in Japanese religion, but it is probably there.

Secondly, Christianity is an anti-authoritarian and anti-political religion. Christ may have suggested that his followers render to Caesar that which is Caesar's, but he was crucified because his opponents saw him as a political threat. Partly from its inception, then through long years when it was persecuted by the State, Christianity developed a theology which put the calling of God as higher than the duty to the State. Christians called for "liberty". This was particularly strongly manifested in Protestantism, where the "Saints" stood up against the might of the ruling powers - whether in Holland, England or German.

Though religion did not oppose the political power to this extent in Japan (and the only one which did, Christianity, was brutally extinguished), yet it kept its distance from political power. The strong concordat that existed between the religious power and the secular in China, India, Muslim States or Catholic Europe, was much more muted in Japan. The divided loyalty between the God-Emperor, who was the focus of the religious system, and the secular Shogunate, helped to maintain the separation, as Fukuzawa noted long ago.
Finally, we may note the "rationalism" of religion in both areas, following Bellah's point. One of the striking features of English society since well before the Reformation, and certainly after it, has been the systematic elimination of ritual, "magic" and icons. As Keith Thomas has documented, a magical world view was eliminated. It was replaced by forms of action which do not imply a mixing of realms. There was much preaching of ethics and morality, but very little proper "ritual" or "religion". There was no sacrifice, no turning of wine into blood, no "miracles". God was in the heart of the believer, but otherwise the world was subject to natural laws. This formed the basis for modern science, and it helped to eliminate obstacles to economic growth. The same may well be true of Japan.

In a nutshell, if religion and ritual pervade all aspects of life and dominate them, one has a magical world in which "rational", that is means and ends related actions, are impossible. An example is in the debate in the West over mediaeval usury. Lending money is essential for capitalist growth but it has often been argued that the Catholic formal ban on lending at interest put a break on growth. Once this religious obstacle was overcome, 'free' and rational activity could take place. (Though compare Sombart, who disagrees with Tawney, and argues (in his 'Quintessence') that the Catholic Church encouraged lending at interest - but only for productive uses.) Weber saw the 'disenchantment' of the separation of spheres as one of the essential steps in the growth of modern society. It occurred in England very early, and it seems likely that it did so in Japan as well.

A very simple example of this lies in the attitude towards sacrifice. Sacrifice, and usually blood sacrifice, is the central feature of many religions. Sacrifices are a way to communicate with the spirits, to mediate between the material and supernatural worlds, to release the power that is in natural things. this is expressed graphically, for instance, in Japan, in the Ainu bear ceremony, where the bear is really a God, covered in the flesh of a bear. Once killed, its power is released to the benefit of the community. Sacrifice also is a way of forcing the spirits to reciprocate, to bring blessings. Sacrifice is a central part of most religious systems, Hindu, Chinese etc. What is odd is that it is totally absent in the Protestant version of Christianity, and likewise, as far as I know, in the Pure Land sects of Buddhism (Zen etc.). It also would seem to be absent in Shinto and is certainly absent in Confucianism in Japan. Thus there is no sacrifice in Japanese ancestor cults - unlike those of other parts of the world.

Indeed, one might say that ritual and even "religion", strictly defined, is very markedly absent in Japan as it is in England. There is plenty of ceremonial, plenty of formal behaviour and etiquette. But those rituals which the Puritans defined as "magical", i.e. attempting to force the hands of the God or gods, seem conspicuously absent. This would merit further investigation. If it is true, it would mean that Japan, like England, had escaped into a 'disenchanted' world remarkably early. This would make "rational" economic activity possible. Freed from the constraints of the family and of institutionalized religion, the individual could pursue his individual self-interests. Indeed, it was his "calling" and duty to do so.

Again, there are the questions as to why Japanese and English religion should have developed in a
peculiar fashion and also maintained itself. Again, one is thrown back onto rather geographical explanations as a first approximation.

In both cases the first wave of religious conquest was made by monastic organizations of a celibate sort (rather unusual) - i.e. Buddhist and Christian. This provided a wealthy and religious dimension to feudalism, and a counter-force to the family and the State. Religion was not subservient to the family or state, as it usually is (as China and India). On the other hand, the particular brand of religion - ascetic and ethical and other-worldly in some respects in each case - gave it a specific flavour; non-ritualistic and anti-magical. In each case religion left people to their private salvation and consciences.

Thus the formal institutions (as Collins argues) were propitious, but so also were the ethical doctrines.

On top of this is the curious sectarianism of both situations, an endless religious bickering and lack of uniformity, widespread nonconformity. It is probable that such challenges to orthodoxy would soon have been stamped out by some form of Inquisition, if the protection of islandhood had not given England and Japan a certain shield against larger religious organizations.

**Punishment, suffering, the devil and sin.**

We discussed the attitude to punishment by spirits or gods. There is apparently no idea of such punishment. The Japanese 'devil' is always characterized as rather ridiculous, half-funny and far from diabolical. The little spirits which are expelled in the February house-cleansing rites are mischievous (stealing food and drink) rather than dangerous or evil. (There is a curious similarity here also to English concepts of the Devil - see my article on the origins of Evil.)

One question in Japan is why misfortune/suffering occurs to a person. One explanation is 'batchi-gata', the punishment which falls on a person for some earlier uncharitable or unethical act. For instance, one's child might suffer because one had earlier in life done something bad. But I did not get the sense that this explanation was often invoked, and they had no idea of how or who the punishing force was.

**Absence of ritual in Japan.**

We discussed ritual and I explained what anthropologists meant by it. They could think of no rituals, in the proper sense, in Japanese society. They partly put this down to the absence of a duality between natural and supernatural. All humans are potential gods, so there is no break between man and nature. Hence there is no need to break through to a spiritual dimension, using ritual. (This has the same effect, but is perhaps at the opposite pole, to the situation in England, where the separation
of man and nature is complete - and again, therefore, ritual is not used).

**Evil eye and witches.**

There is no concept of the evil eye. The guests had only heard of it recently in comic books. It was obviously imported from outside. There is no concept of witches or witchcraft either, though they had heard of the idea and made a joke of Toshiko being a witch and flying on her vacuum cleaner. The only thing they had were balls of fire that flashed through the night, frightening people.

**Sacrifice in Japan**

The idea of sacrifice seems to be more or less absent in Japan; certainly blood sacrifice is absent. The nearest to sacrifice is the sacrifice of the Emperor, who symbolically commits suicide for his people (very similar to Jesus). Thus in both Japan, there is a once-for-all sacrifice. The word for sacrifice is something like idenie deana - often means gifts of food, rice, saki etc. to the spirit. The Emperor's secret ritual of installation, includes an element of symbolic suicide for the people, and the myth of father killing (as Frazer). As with God/Jesus, the Emperor is both the sacrificer and the sacrificed.

**Pollution**

Apart from the pollution of death (dealt with by salt), and the pollution of power (e.g. sumo wrestlers - again cleansing with salt), and some residual pollution of bodily fluids (menstruation), there is really very little idea of pollution in Japan - as in Europe. Another curious similarity.

**Shrines and pacifying of danger**

If there are natural disturbances (earth-quakes etc.), then it is assumed that it would be sensible to deal with by finding a cause - often a tragic death etc., and then to build a shrine to calm down the dead person. Dealing with the unquiet dead.

**Religion in the Genji**

In the Genji, religion is, in Kenichi's words, a 'black box' - a nothingness. There is no motivation of liberation. Buddhism is a protection against fear - a teaching of man to accept the fact of mortality and death. The Genji gradually comes to terms and accepts death. It chronicles the movement from
the temporal and moral world to the eternal world of nothingness, of dying before death.

**Aim of Japanese Buddhism**

A very special form of Buddhism, in which the aim is nothingness; in the training, if one thinks of anything, one is hit etc. It is the casting away, or emptying of everything. People become the living dead, shedding all desire and vanity. Only the stripped man is left - makes a person very strong. A person is no longer strong in himself, but becomes the tool of something stronger - you do not fire the arrow, the arrow fires you etc.

**Absence of religion in Japan**

There is no functional equivalent to western religion because there is no individual soul and no external God; there is no theodicy, no idea of original sin, no after-life, no theoretical system. Those who need a salvation religion adopt Christianity.

**The tea ceremony**

It is an anti-ritualistic ceremony, a curious contradiction. There is ceremonial, but not ritual, etiquette but not ethics. It acts as a functional equivalent to religion, but without the theological system. It is a chance to meet people whom one would normally not be able to meet. It may (before a battle), be the only occasion on which one can meet a person; before fighting to the death.

**The tea ceremony; both revelation and concealment**

This provides the ultimate in both revelation and concealment, the final mystified protection, declaring oneself to be empty, but also that one has a symbolic existence. The goal is zero or nothingness, the extreme for the Samurai, the road or way ('michi'), the unending road. This sets an unattainable goal or God from within, hence the never-ending striving which is taken to be one of the key's to western restlessness and success. It is functionally equivalent to the Protestant ethic - an ever-moving goal, which keeps one striving for ever.

**Tea house and its origins and function**

The tea house is the outside world (as opposed to the inside), but it is nevertheless safe and neutral and allows the kind of deep intimacy of communication which normally could only occur in the home. It is thus a place where all class and caste barriers are temporarily suspended. It is a neutral,
empty space, an arena where you communicate by the language of movement and gesture, where you share space.

If there is a gap between people (e.g. class), difficult to talk directly; the tea house provides through gestures, a possibility of communicating indirectly. It was invented to allow deep communication, to deduce the other person's goodness and intentions. It is half-way between games and ritual, partaking of a little of each but also different from each.

**Games, ritual and the way of tea**

Tea house ritual is a third way. Games assume equality and create divisions, ritual assumes inequality and creates equality, the tea ceremony assumes nothing and creates nothing. It is formalized, yet not religious (cf. judo, which seems similar). It is half ritual and half game, but more than both.

**Theory of political origins of tea ceremony (Prof. Minamoto)**

In the tea ceremony anyone can meet anyone equally, do the same thing. In the sixteenth century time of war, the meeting at the tea house was possibly the last chance to meet on neutral ground and avoid war. It functioned to allow political alliances, negotiations. It was also an anticipation of death - 'Ichiko ichie' - political empty ground (cf. Saints of the Atlas). It is a neutral stadium, an isolated space and a very shortened or compressed time. It is the crystallisation of the sense of eternity (as created in drama), in the midst of chaos and war. The floor plan of the tea house is very elaborate to create this separate space (cf. masons), to make a sanctuary. Since there is no God to help man resolve his tensions, the tea house makes a very special here and now situation - an aesthetic religion. In form it is a ritual, in content a joint game.

**Change in the tea ceremony**

It changed very much after Rikyu, becoming narrower and narrower, until only two people came together. The reason why the cup is so rough and simple is to force people to concentrate on the taste of the tea, and not to get distracted.

**Absence of astrology.**

There is no astrological system or interest. This is in sharp contrast with China. In China, heaven is the world of the Gods and there is a great deal of astrology, which appears to be absent in Japan.
The skies, in Japan, are empty; 'just space'. Astrology in the popular press is just a recent fashion. One wonders whether this could this be related to a lack of fatalism in Japan as opposed to India, China etc? Nothing is 'written in the stars', and hence all is possible. There is, however, geomancy, probably from China.

Weakness of taboo in Japan.

I asked about taboo. In each village there is a mound with a few trees, rocks and perhaps a lake that is sacred. If this is defiled, then the community or individual will be punished. This is called the 'mori', the protector of the village. If it is insulted or destroyed, then there is catastrophe. But in cities (e.g. Sapporo), there are no taboos in the strict sense of any kind. Everything is ambiguous, relative, context-dependent. If one does something wrong, a punishment may or may not occur. It all depends...

The 'night watchman God'.

Kenichi said that "Gods in Japan are quite idle", sleeping and drinking sake, and taking little interest in human beings. Even the sun-goddess, founder of Japan and incorporated into the Emperor tradition, is also lazy.

Separation of religion and society in Japan and not China

"Chinese religion is a social religion, seeking to solve the problems of social interest, not individual interests...Religion is essentially a force of impersonal social adjustment and control... In contrast, Japanese religion (just as western European religion) is concerned with man's individual other-world orientation. It may or may not have any interest in co-operating with the existing social order or political authority...the problem of may ...may even be in opposition to the existing social order..." (Jacobs, 161)

social religion of China not a religion at all

"Technically, a social religion is not a religion but a sacred philosophical system of social ethics..." (Jacobs, 162)

Religion as radical and separate in Japan

"Ryobu-Shinto is concerned with man's personal adjustment in his social relationships...Religion was thus willing to challenge the social order...The religious orientation of man was thus definitely
transcendental.../ Morality is related to an abstract divide force; opposition to the existing social order is not opposition to the divinity." (Jacobs, 165)

Japanese religion very similar in essence to Christianity - anti-ritualistic and personal salvation religion

"In Japan (as in western Europe) in contrast, religion is emotionally appreciated although at the same time it may be intellectually understood. Religious practice, though oriented in part to the fulfilment of ritual (especially prayer) relies rather on faith in abstract deities....Although this order may be mediated by religious specialists, it can be approached without their intervention." (Jacobs, 167)

Japanese ethics based on spirit and emotion

"In the Japanese religion of Shinto, spirit ('sishin') is a central concept. Spirit is a transcendental abstraction which unifies the other world with this world...the nature of this divine spirit is not intellectually learned but rather obtained through emotional spontaneity...Ethics are not founded on rational morality but rather upon a more abstract force, namely the spirit. " (Jacobs, 171)

Spirits and deities in material objects in Japan

"A 'deity body' (shintai) entering a sacred object is a manifestation, not merely a symbolic representation, of some abstract non-intellectual principle. " (Jacobs, 171)

understanding of divine based on heart, not head, in Japan

"Understanding of the divine is attained through love, heart and compassion, rather than through the intellect.../ In order to obtain these favours, man must approach the deity through love. Love articulates with sincerity." (Jacobs, 171)

The interest in inner purity in Japanese religion

"The Japanese concept is one of inner purity, in contrast to outer, or ritual purity...in 'feudal' Shinto there developed, however, a distinction between inner and out purity. Outer purity was restricted to such matters as taboos on food; inner purity, on the other hand, connoted inner reverence and personal reaction to temptation. Inner purity became just as essential as out purity to man's perfection..." (Jacobs, 172)

Importance of prayer in Japanese religion

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"Prayer is as important as ritual in Shinto. Significantly, Shinto does not stop at ritual...Prayer was conceived as the expression of the heart." (Jacobs, 172)

The non-necessity for priests in Japanese religion

Jacobs argues that among the reasons "why the priesthood in Japan could not establish itself in such a privileged role as in China", was that "priests were not the exclusive repository of divine wisdom, which was shared by all the people." (Jacobs, 173)

Sectarianism and conflict in Japan; a religion of sects

"Confucian doctrine, both at court and elsewhere, became sectarian; unlike the Chinese 'schools', the sects in Japan were internecine rivals, fragmenting their forces and falling victim to political dissension." (Jacobs, 174)

the orthodoxy of China and the different religious sects of Japan

"In China, Confucianism and its successors strongly emphasized dogmatic orthodoxy. Orthodoxy implies both control over doctrine within the religion, and anti-heretical campaigns against other dogmas. In Japan (as in western Europe) in contrast, concern with the problem of man's personal adjustment evoked a number of different solutions. supporters of these solutions were organized into rival and competing sects, even within a religious order. The power of any sect was measured by its membership, which was partly a function of the attractiveness of the particular solution propagated by the sect." (Jacobs, 175)

the numerous sects and rivalries in Japanese religion

"In Japan, in contrast, positive sectarianism was the rule rather than the exception. Buddhism, for example, comprised six major sects, each split into many sub-sects with characteristic doctrines..." (Jacobs, 178)

Buddhist sects very like the Puritans in England

"The Pure Land sect, formed by Honen (1133-1212), had as its basic dogma pure faith....the old Monto sect of Buddhism, which espoused full faith, rejecting penance, good works, and metaphysics. " (178)

numerous sects in Shinto

Jacobs remarks that "there are at present thirteen sects..." (Jacobs, 178)
Religious orders and political order not identical in Japan

"In Japan (as in western Europe), religious orders were only concentrations of independent power, competing like others for secular privilege and status, especially political prerogatives. In spite of the religious prestige enjoyed by both Shinto and Buddhisms under feudalism, they were not thereby entitled to any preferment. (Jacobs, 179)

no concordat between religion and politics in Japan in past

"Emperors of Japan are not crowned by Shinto priests: it is the Emperor, not the priest, who is divine...ritual is not equated with political action and carried no right or claim to political authority." (Jacobs, 183)

the absence of orthodoxy and politico-religious identity in Japan

"In China, the interrelationship of political authority with orthodox religion equated heterodoxy with political error. The orthodox religion was particularly active in persecuting and destroying heterodox sects; in this it was backed by the secular power. In Japan (as in western Europe) in contrast, there were frequent and violent sectarian battles. The State did not attempt to mediate theological quarrels by supporting one side and enforcing a doctrine as orthodox civil policy..." (Jacobs, 185)

Buddhism and its similarity to Christianity

Confucianism took issue with Buddhism for its "non-social orientation, its monasticism (which removed its participants from the actual society) and its doctrine of celibacy..." (Jacobs, 186)

absence of heresy under Shinto

"Shinto....does not admit an exclusive dogma, hence no heresy...." (Jacobs, 189)

Jacobs disagrees with Weber's Protestant ethic thesis

"Neither in China nor in Japan did a dogma arise to direct the religious interests of the people positively into channels conducive to the emergence of capitalism or capitalistic behaviour. Yet capitalism developed in Japan and not in China. the reason is that in feudal Japan no specifically anti-capitalist doctrine could be institutionalized which could ethically prevent the rise of capitalistic interests; so that capitalism could and did appear without benefit of a dogma having specific
religious interests oriented to capitalism. In contrast, an anti-capitalist religious doctrine could and did exist in China. In the entire (?) social system was there a specific doctrine espousing the capitalist cause, in the terms conceived by Max Weber..." (Jacobs, 191)

Religion as a help and hindrance in rise of capitalism

"In China there was a dogma with the positive function of preventing the rise of capitalism; in Japan there was no such dogma, so that capitalism could and did arise without benefit of a specific religious dogma." (Jacobs, 192)

capitalism not outcast in Japan, as it was in China

"In China...capitalism had to fight not only its own particular battle but also the struggle against the ethical ban on attempting to introduce unethical elements into the existing social order...In Japan, and in western Europe, because sectarianism was legitimate, capitalism was ethically (at this critical stage of its emergence) just another novel solution to a new problem whose efficacy was to be tested in practical contest." (Jacobs, 193)

Breaking the link of politics and religion in Japan and Europe

"By linking the religious order automatically with the political order, the Chinese religion made religious support to be political support, and religious opposition automatically political opposition. Capitalism, as an alien doctrine, was the enemy of both the existing religious ideas and political-social order. Where this link was not established, as in Japan and western Europe, it is possible (that is all we wish to state) for novel (e.g. capitalist) ideas and behaviour to arise, without being attached 'a priori' by the political authority at a critical period of development. the significance of this implication cannot be overestimated. " (Jacobs, 193)

necessity for legitimacy in early capitalism

"It is necessary throughout to emphasize the necessity and problem of aligning 'legitimate' forces on the side of incipient capitalism. One should never lose sight of this variable..." (Jacobs, 193)

The functional equivalence of Christianity and Japanese religion

Jacobs argues "...the functional (though hardly the formal) equivalence between Japanese religion and western Christianity. Please note that we do not say, between Japanese religion and ascetic Protestantism......we wish to suggest the antithesis of western Christianity (Protestant and Catholic)
plus Japanese religion versus Confucianism (etc.) (Jacobs, 194)

**Kinship, religion and ritual**

It is hardly surprising that where kinship provides the basic method of organizing economics, politics and society, as in the majority of societies, there we should find that religion and ritual is also founded on the family. Kinship and marriage are deeply bound up with relations with the spiritual world in a two-way relationship, each reinforcing the other. The most obvious identification is in those religious systems in China, India and Africa, for example, where the spirits of the dead ancestors among the most important inhabitants of the spirit world.

Even in the Christian tradition which has formally set its face against ancestor worship, the family system and the religious system are often closely interwoven. In the devout Catholic family, there is God the father, Mary the mother interceding with him, the saints as spiritual patrons in the afterworld, the father of the household as spiritual head of the household. In the afterworld, the ritual status of the deceased is still dependent on the prayers and memories of the living. The family is the centre of prayer and religious instruction. The major family *rites de passages* are occasions of family ritual.

In other words, in southern Catholicism, and to an even greater extent in most other religious systems, the individual is spiritually absorbed into a larger group. As in economics, politics and society, he or she has little meaning either in this life or the next without family links. Religion and ritual reinforce the family, and the family system reinforces religion. Put in another way, the religious and kinship worlds have not been separated; there has not occurred a dissociation of spheres which likewise has not happened as between family, economics and politics. Thus to differ in religious views is also to challenge the family and hence economics and political power.

If we set this general model against what we know of English religion from at least the sixteenth century, we realize that we are in a different world. Nothing could be more different from the above, for example, than the Quakers. Though they called themselves "the family of love", and termed each other brother and sister, theirs was an egalitarian, ultimately contractual and heavily individualistic society. It is a form of association, for religious purposes, which is created by the will of each member, who can join or leave as he or she wills. Membership is not given by birth or family position. Each member consults his or her own inner light and cannot be dictated to by others. There is no intermediary with god - there may be brothers and sisters, but there are no fathers.

The Quakers and the other sects can be seen as an extreme manifestation of a general tendency in English religious life, namely a strong divorce from familism. Just as politics was founded on power-structures other than the kin and the market coped with economic organization, so an abstract ethical religion, served by professional priests and based on individual conscience, brought down the influence of the family to about as low a level as it was possible to do.
From the assembled evidence, it appears that the basic religious groupings and organization was founded on principles other than kinship. The central locus of religious activity from the middle ages was the "parish church", not a family shrine of any kind. People worshipped with neighbours, those selected by geographical criteria, most of whom were not kin. The people taking communion together, those who celebrated the calendar rituals together were fellow Christians, fellow villagers, not kinsfolk. This is reflected in the graveyards attached to English churches. Usually there are a few tombs with family names overlapping, but they are scattered in among many other names. The ritual and worship of the Christian year was not tied in any obvious way to the organization of kinship.

The absence of overlap between ritual and kinship groupings is particularly marked on those occasions when what was being marked was in fact central to the existence to the family itself, namely the three rites de passages, baptism, marriage and burial. With marriage, most of the guests normally seem to have been non-kin, and it was by no means essential that kin attended. They were principally occasions for celebrating with friends and neighbours. The same seems to have been the case with English funerals, which would be attended by one or two close relatives, while the majority of the mourners were fellow villagers. The same was true of baptismal ceremonies and the churging of women after childbirth.

Turning to questions of belief and worship, we may look at two indices. In most societies, when a person is damaged in some way he or she will assume that just as all good things come through the manipulation of kinship ties, so will most evil ones. Thus the damage will either have been done by a living member of the family who bears a grudge - a sorcerer or witch - or by a dead member of the family who has been insulted or neglected, an ancestor. In England from very early on, the witchcraft beliefs were of a different nature. Up to the middle of the sixteenth century, there is very little evidence of widespread attribution of misfortune to witches at all. When they did become more common, they had an unusually e-familistic nature. Whereas in Africa and elsewhere the relations between witch and victim and accuser are usually based on kinship, this is notably not the case in England. Scarcely ever, for instance, do we hear of a person being suspected of bewitching an uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, cousin, grandchild etc. Like most transaction and relationships, witchcraft was about contractual ties, not status ties. Its major function, to relieve the guilt felt by people who were unable to satisfy demands upon them, was played in relation to neighbours. It was not kin demands, but neighbourly demands that were insufferable.

The other explanation is ancestors. "Ancestor-worship" is the most universal of religious systems. Its presence reflects the importance of kinship in all spheres of life. Thus, one of the most curious features of English religion, certainly from the sixteenth century onwards, is the complete absence of any traces of ancestor worship. A Japanese asked why ancestor worship persists in modern Japan said "That is not an interesting question. The real question is why it died out in the West." (Smith, Japanese, 152). If he had known more about England, he would rather have asked - why did it never occur there. Even before the Reformation, the concern with the dead that there was - prayers for the dead, obits, the recitation of the names of the dead - was of a different nature to 'proper' ancestor worship. But above all, there is no evidence at all, apart from a few wandering
ghosts who haunted particular places, and could thus attack non-kin as easily as kin, that the dead were believed to be concerned with the living. There is, as far as I know, no evidence in letters, sermons, poems of the period before the Reformation that the dead kin were propitiated, consulted or flattered, that the world of the dead kin and the living overlapped. Thus it would seem that for many centuries, England has been completely without ancestor worship.

It is certainly tempting to link this to the kinship system. Most kinship systems are 'ancestor-focused', whether an individual looks upwards through one line or through two. In such systems there is a heavy emphasis on whom one is descended from and on the superior generations. Furthermore, a number of living individuals will recognize in common a particular set of dead individuals as "their", as opposed to other people's ancestors. Thus the map of ancestors provides a map of the alignments now existing on the ground. The ego-centred English system of kinship, however, which started with the individual and moved outwards, meant that no two people, apart from siblings, would have the same set of ancestors. Nor is there such a stress on common descent. In such a situation, it is not surprising that there was very little stress on the continued importance of the dead to the living.

Of course, there was and still is private remembrance of particular dead persons - flowers on the grave, remembrance services, private grief and mourning. But there is no actual "worship" of the dead, that is to say, no attempt by groups of living kin to manipulate the dead ancestors who are still believed to be able to exert an enormous influence on the living. This absence of ancestor worship seems to be a very central and very early feature of the social system of the tribes that conquered England in the centres after the collapse of Rome (cf. Tacitus, Germania, 123 etc.). This absence was bolstered by Christianity, which systematically sets itself against all other Gods but Jehovah. Yet we know that world religions can be bent at the village and practical level to enable people to worship their ancestors if they wish to. In England this was not done, though in Scotland and Ireland (and Brittany), there was a hint of ancestral cults.

In a world which was not mapped out by kinship, the idea of individual responsibility and of inner conscience was stressed. Economically, politically, socially, the individual had to make his own way, make his own marriage and his own career. It is not surprising that likewise he or she was expected to find his own way, become responsible, in religion. If Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress had been set in many societies, if Pilgrim had set out at all, he would have set out with a group of his kin. On the way he would not have met unrelated guides and deceivers, but the landscape would have been scattered with 'uncles', 'aunts' and 'godparents'. As it was, Pilgrim moved alone, taking counsel, but ultimately testing everything against the inner light. In the religious world, each individual is alone with his God. God does not speak through the father to the children, or through the ancestors, or through kinship at all. The intersection of the world, the constituent religious unit is the individual.

The extreme stress on the central features of this system became more apparent when the mantle of Rome was cast off. But well before that, it was apparent to the keen-eyed, for instance the future
Pope was visited England in the later fifteenth, noted the variety and independence of English opinions on religion. (ref. ). The curious feature of England which made one eighteenth century Frenchman describe it as a county with one sauce and a thousand sects (ref. ), seems to have been prevent very early. It found manifestation in the Lollards in the later fourteenth century, but was undoubtedly spread more widely than that. The religious world portrayed by Chaucer is not a familistic one. The pilgrims, after all, went as single individuals, without their kin (as they would probably have done on pilgrimages elsewhere). The more we learn about popular, pragmatic, religion, the more we find that it was based on an ethical and ritual system surprisingly similar to that of the later sixteenth century.

It would be tempting to take this argument further. The early absence of any strong overlap between family and religion helped to make possible that emergence of a Protestant and sectarian tradition which is so clearly related to capitalism and "modern" society. Rephrasing Weber, it would seem that both protestantism and capitalism are bi-products, or rather different expressions of the same fact - namely the absence of a strong integration between kinship, politics, economics and religion. When Freeman long ago noted the exact correlation between areas which would later be Protestant and those areas of Teutonic kinship, he hit on a causal connection which has become obscured by later historiography. "As a rule the Teutonic nations are Protestant, the Normanic(?) nations are Catholic".(Freeman, Essays, 4, 292). The origins of religious toleration, of the idea that each individual is his own priest with direct access to God, not mediated through father, ancestors or others of a senior kind, is one manifestation of a general theme.

There are no corporate religious groups, except those set up by individual decisions, such as religious brotherhoods. The victory of the 'open', contractual society was very ancient. For, ultimately, the lonely and separate individual, as Milton saw, chose God - who had to justify his ways to man, just as he chose one partner. Every relationship, including the religious one, was one of contract and decision. There was a 'calling' - but man could refuse to be called.
CHAPTER 9. THE DISEMBEDDED ECONOMY

Economics and kinship

In Individualism it was shown that the disassociation of family and economy had occurred in England by at least the thirteenth century. Ownership, labour and so on were individualized and the whole idea of the 'domestic mode of production', of an 'embedded economy', with the family organizing production, consumption and so on is a myth as far as England is concerned.

One might go further and suggest that once this separation had occurred, or rather, one expression of it, was that contracts and money became the basis of almost all relationships, even with kin. The separation of household and economy had occurred very early, allowing a free market for labour and land, with the possibility of the 'rational' pursuit of wealth and accumulation very early on. The usual constraints - familial, ritual, social - which occur in traditional societies elsewhere, the 'image of limited good', the need to distribute wealth to kin, the need to lend freely to kin, the pursuit of social rather than economic goals (Chayanov), all these seem to be absent. Money, not blood, was the cement of the society.

If this is correct, then it would help to explain all sorts of curious facts; why Englishmen and Anglicized Scots were the first accurately to describe how a capitalist economy worked, why England was so early industrialized and so wealthy, why the peculiar concepts of ownership in England were so widespread, why England's coinage was so advanced and widespread, why England was such a successful trading nation, why the economies of town and country were so interblended so early in England, why there was an accumulative rather than a distributive ethic in England, why England was so successful as an Imperial power.

Economics was not household management. The individual was alone in the market, not a member of a family firm. Each man made his or her own way. There were not hereditary economic and occupational groupings as in caste or peasant societies. There were no insurmountable occupational barriers. Families did not move socially as blocks. There was a massive amount of exchange of goods and services and commodities. Wealth was widely distributed and spent on consumables such as clothing and luxury items by a large 'middling' group. Though there was some nepotism, it was on a limited scale; family ties could not ensure economic success. Merit and hard work were the primary keys to success. It was a nation of shop-keepers from the very start and most people changed occupations, or dabbled in many different occupations, from mediaeval times.

Thus the 'Great Transformation' which Polanyi believed occurred in the late eighteenth century had occurred by the thirteenth century at least. The world was not changed, as Weber implied, by the Protestants out of their anguish and Benjamin Franklin was a late representative of the entrepreneurial and rational man. For many centuries, each person had been a relatively free economic agent. The view of Locke that a son has no automatic right to his father's goods and
likewise a father no automatic right to those of his son who is of age, that women have separate property and rights, is deeply embedded in English customary law - both in manorial law and in Common Law. In contrast to Roman Law, it treats the individual as a separate, freely-transacting individual, set loose in the world. The constraints on the individual are slight, as are his obligation - which are mainly to the State and friends rather than to kin.

The individual is the economic centre of his or her world, and not merely an epiphenomenon or part of some larger group. Thus the family does not articulate the economy, but rather the institutions of servanthood, education, apprenticeship and so on act as means whereby the individual is sucked out of the family of birth and fitted into the market. The rest is cash, contracts, credit, accumulation, budgeting. The vision of Mandeville, that private vice (i.e. accumulation and competition and transactions) is public virtue (is cumulatively good for the society) accurately reflects the basic nature of English society. For instance, the belief that Calvinists made usury permissible and broke down the organic, interest-free, Catholic world, is a fiction created and endorsed by the Weber-Tawney thesis. As Adam Smith points out, interest rates actually dropped and became more and more controlled after the Reformation.

(from thoughts in 1984, not used in Marriage book)

In the majority of human societies property has not been held by the individual but by the family, either the lineage of tribal societies or the household of peasant societies. In such a situation kinship and economics are necessarily blended; access to wealth is through family relationships, marriage is as much an economic as a psychological affair. The separation of reproduction from production, of kinship from economics, is one of the most significant features of 'modern' society.

As argued in Individualism, it appears that there was a fully developed concept of separate, individual, property in England back into the Middle Ages. One of the outstanding features of English law from before the Norman Conquest had always been that it protects individual property rights against group rights. Inheritance, for instance, is from one individual to another, not from an individual to a group. Even in the Anglo-Saxon period, when we might, if at any time, have expected there to be some kind of automatic, kinship-based, family property, such a phenomenon seems to have been absent. After a detailed summing up of the evidence, Maitland concluded that (Eng. Law, ii,251) "Now as regards the Anglo-Saxons we can find no proof of the theory that among them there prevailed anything that ought to be called 'family ownership'. No law, no charter, nor record of litigation has been discovered which speaks of land as being owned by a moego, a family, a household, or any similar group of kinsmen. This is the more noticeable because we often read of familiae which have rights in land; these familiae, however, are not groups of kinsmen but convents of monks or clerks". In relation to birth right, Maitland argues (p.254), "No one word is there to show that a son at birth was deemed to acquire a share of the land that his father held. Need we say that there is not one word to show that the law treated the father as a trustee for his children, or as the attorney or procurator of his family?"
It is quite clear that in the centuries following the treatise called Bracton, *On the Laws and Customs of England*, which is ascribed to the early thirteenth century, the concept of individual property in land was enshrined in relation to freehold land. There was no need for an heir's consent before alienation. The holder could buy and sell land, or lease it. He could effectively disinherit his blood kin and by the fifteenth century he could do this by will. A re-analysis of manorial customs and legal text-books has shown that even customary land held of manors was not held by groups or communities, but by individuals. Such individuals had strong, alienable, rights.

Taken together, it is clear that the reason why no lawyer or legal historian, either living at the time or subsequently, ever noticed that revolution in concepts of property which is supposed to have accompanied the transition from feudal/peasant to capitalist/individualist in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries is that it never occurred. It was an invention of the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Parents did not "own" jointly with their children, brothers and sisters did not form a single property unit. Thus from very early on there was already present "our modern law, which allows the father to leave his children penniless" (Pollock and Maitland, ii, 355). If the individual cared to form a larger he could do so, of course - but by an act of will, by a contract. Hence he or she could join or set up some kind of corporation, a college, a company, a business, a monastery.

The separation of the social (family) and the economic can be seen, for instance, in the attitude towards land. Although England was a nation whose wealth was still largely based on agriculture and related activities, it would seem that land was no longer deeply intertwined with individual or family psychology. Land had become a 'commodity', an object to be dealt with, alongside such other objects as animals, preferments, money. Land was a means to an end, like money, and not an end in itself. This is a very different attitude to that in most agrarian societies where land and the family are interblended and land consequently has a very great emotional and symbolic value for individuals. The physical map, in such societies, is also a social map; to "keep the name on the land" is a powerful ideal. Yet in the English context, there is scarcely a hint in the multitudinous wills, court cases, land transfers or other documents of anything but an utilitarian attitude towards land. It was mortgaged, bought and sold, rented out, with apparent disregard for its symbolic or emotional value. The major exception was in the very highest nobility in the concept of "ancestral estates", but even there, if we examine the practice rather than the statements, we would probably find a much more practical, non-sentimental, attitude towards land than we expected.

The extreme elaboration and flexibility of property rights as developed in England by the thirteenth century at the latest, made it possible to separate a whole bundle of rights in an object and to assign them to different people. In the majority of societies the rights have to be treated as belonging to a group - the lineage or family, hence the difficulty of leasing, mortgaging and splitting up assets. In England, there were infinite levels of differentiation between types of ownership. This was clearly linked to the nested levels of tenancy which are such a marked feature of a society in which, developing out of the complex feudal land law, all land was held in various different ways of different people.
The 'ownership' of a particular house or field in the parish of Earls Colne might, for example, follow this chain, with each having separate rights, each disposable: King - Lord of Manor - Copyholder - Sub-tenant - Sub-subtenant. It might well be only the last of these who was resident in the house. Most of the surviving documents deal with the three top layers who had little more than a financial interest in the land, regarding the house or fields merely as a source of rent and perhaps services. The situation was very similar to that which we find today where most of the houses and lands are co-owned by the people who live and operate in them on the one hand, and the banks, building societies and council, which have lent money, given mortgaged or who ultimately "own" them.

This series of levels of ownership, each one exploiting a resource and in return funneling rent and services upwards, led to a very instrumental attitude towards the world. Rights could be bought and sold in almost anything - a school, church, trading company, wood, a house. People's wealth came from holding many of these. It was like a giant game of "Monopoly". In this game, the players were individuals, not families.

A second central feature of the society was the breaking of the normal link between the unit of reproduction and the unit of economic production. It is almost always found to be the case that in agricultural societies, co-operation in labour and the command over labour is obtained through real or manufactured kinship links. Those who work together are linked by kinship; very little labour is brought in, almost all of it is family labour. Those who herd the animals, work the farm, run the estate, are recruited on the basis of kin ties.

In such a system, to increase the level of production, the central mechanism is to increase the family labour force, either by marriage strategies which over the long period bring in wives and children, or through the creation of fictive kinship ties such as godparenthood or adoption. There is little incentive to devise 'labour-saving' devices. This overlap between the unit of reproduction and production continued in much of Europe until quite recently. "The decline of the family as a productive unit....reached the European peasant and working classes only during the nineteenth century, and, in some areas like Southern Italy, rural Ireland, and rural France, not until the twentieth century" (in ed. Rosenberg, 176). It is easy to assume that this was also the case in England. Yet what is very striking is that from at least the fourteenth century, the family does not seem to have been the basic unit of production.

What emerges from the detailed study of manorial and taxation documents is that we are not dealing with a familistic, subsistence, economy, but with one where most of the labour that is recruited above the level of the individual is contractual labour, that is work provided by servants, apprentices, day-labourers and full-time labourers. Hired labour and labour for immediate or delayed payment were no oddity in the system, but rather central features of it. Whether we look at the large mediaeval estates or the small single copyholdings, we find that they were not, on the whole, run by groups of parents and children, but by people who have a non-family relationship.
The same is true in the villages we have investigated for the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries. There is scarcely any reference to either artisans, agriculturalists or others employing kin, and very many indeed of the hiring of labour. When Ralph Josselin needed help to run his farm, it was not to his sons and daughters that he turned, but to non-kin. Of course, it was possible for small family firms and partnerships to develop; but this was a matter of conscious choice, not of automatic organization. Only husband and wife acted as a joint unit.

The gap which had emerged between people and the land, the flexibility of property concepts, the non-familistic use of labour, all of this was only made possibly various symbolic instruments, the most important of which was money. Monetized values, whether in the form of actual currency or credit, are usually held outside or on the fringe of most traditional societies. Tribal societies keep money right outside the system, only engaging in exchange on the boundaries. Peasant societies are linked to the market and to money but also refuse to allow the medium of money to penetrate too deeply into the local community and into the operation of daily life. Money and all its stands for, it is realized, will destroy that interblending of social and economic which is of their essence. While money is essential in such societies, principally to pay taxes, rents and to purchase some luxuries and perhaps even necessities from the outside world, it is something which will be kept out of most daily relationships.

The situation which is evident to any historian who has contemplated the English records from the fourteenth century at least is very different. The penetration of cash and money values appears almost complete and spectacular from the earliest records. The detailed account rolls, manor court rolls, rentals and other documents would not make sense unless we realize the importance of monetary values in all ways of life. Almost everything was given a monetary value, and almost everything could be bought and sold for cash. Ultimately, all could be bought with money - property, labour, services.

The centrality or otherwise of kinship is often best indicated when people need help. In most societies, it is to kin that an individual will turn in sickness, in old age, in flood or fire. When money is needed for a wedding or a funeral, it is kin who are asked first. What is therefore very significant about the impression from the English documents is that it was ultimately not kin who were a person's main resource for help. When people borrowed, as we can see from lists in inventories and from account books and diaries, the majority of the loans were not from kin. Josselin, for instance, borrowed extensively in his early years, but it was from "friends" and neighbours that he mainly did so, and other diaries confirm the same pattern. The very extensive web of debt and credit that existed from the earliest relevant documents was not, in essence, based on kinship ties.

At times of poverty, resulting from accident, old age, unemployment or other calamity, it does not seem to have been the wider kin group that acted as the insurance group. Poor relief was based on residence, not on kinship; it was fundamentally institutions other than kin - the church, the manor, the parish, which had taken on the problems of poverty, disaster and old age, and it is out of this tradition that England developed the first Welfare State. Just as there was, ultimately, no legal right
of the children in their parent's or sibling's property, so, reciprocally, the parents had no legal right in their children's good fortune.

This is not to say that the family would never help out in emergences. Just as today, it is probably the case that a good deal of informal help went between close kin. But the difference between the past in England and in much of the rest of the world is one of degree. A situation where kin are the only people one can trust, the only people who help, who carry all the burden of sickness, accident and old age, where elder siblings will automatically help their younger ones, and where the young automatically look after the older family members, is one from which the English long ago seem to have moved.

Common law regarded the individual as a separate, freely-transacting individual, male or female, with control over his own body and able to own and dispose of property. The constraints on him or her are slight, his obligations diffuse. There are obligations to kin, but also to the community, to friends, to neighbours and to the State. He or she is, basically, the economic centre of his or her world, not merely the epiphenomenon of some larger group. Thus the family does not articulate and hold together the economy.

The rules of the game which make economic activity possible

"We wish to consider the 'rules of the game' within which certain types of economic activity were considered 'possible' in Japan and western Europe but not in China."

(Jacobs, 17)

The free towns and cities of Japan

In China the market was interfered with, "Thus the free township, with a corporate charter and independent activity, did not arise in China. In Japan however, as in western Europe, the freedom of the market and the formation of independent corporate towns were distinctive features of feudal economic life. Throughout the feudal period, merchants in Japan were able to assert their economic, political, and even fiscal, independence of any ruling authority." (Jacobs, 30)

"Free markets were the forerunners of the free city. Although they were controlled fiscally by some ruling authority, there was practically no political interference into economic activity; because the ruling authority in Japan was motivated by fiscal considerations, and hence willing to permit political freedom if it meant profit." (Jacobs, 32)

"The creation of free cities or free ports was a strategic step in the development of independent commercial power.../ For example, Nobunaga eliminated land barriers onerous to the secular and temple lords, and all road monopolies, thus extending the range of the ports' operations."

At the start of the Tokugawa, "Under this protective policy, the ports grew into great trading
centres; e.g. Hakata, which quickly gained a commanding share of the trade with China. The trading centres organized themselves into self-governing communities with a group of aldermen to carry on civic duties and mediate port affairs with the ruling authority. All citizens were corporately 'free and equal' within the bounds of the city, and all citizens were entitled to a share in the trading profits of the centre." (Jacobs, 33)

Jacobs writes about the free ports and free towns under feudalism in Japan. "The towns were consistently able to withstand serious political interference by outside authority..." (Jacobs, 88)

**Growth of trade and cities in Japan**

The trading cities "organized huge trading combines, such as the Nagasaki Kaisho, linking the economic prosperity of the remoter areas of Japan to particular ports. The profits of this trade, internal or overseas, were kept secret from the ruling authority." (Jacobs, 33)

**Independence and power of Japanese cities**

"Growing in wealth and independent economic power, the cities were able to resist the armed attacks of the ruler. To cite only the most notable example, the mighty Nobunaga failed to reduce Sakai." (Jacobs, 33)

**Foreign trade and merchants in Japan**

Jacobs argues that "in Japan (as in western Europe) the appearance of external trade reinforced the economic position of the merchant at the expense of the ruling authority, because the rights and privileges established earlier in the urban centres in internal trade were accepted as precedents for new rights now to be granted to merchants in external trade..." (Jacobs, 34)

"Restrictions on foreign trade, instituted by Hideyoshi...did not terminate that activity. Rather - free of the political, and now of the fiscal control of the ruling authority (since it was illegal, no tax was collected) the overseas traders turned to smuggling, especially between Kyushu and China via Formosa. Nagasaki was the primary smuggling centre, but other ports were also very active....Thus the Tokugawa ban on overseas trade was a failure....During the Tokugawa Epoch, internal trade also developed greatly." (Jacobs, 37)

**The development of guilds or companies in Japan**

"In Japan (as in western Europe) on the other hand, gild recognition connoted development of an elaborate system of government monopoly privileges offering political and economic protection for incipient commercial activity. Privileges were granted in return for minimum political regulation and the ruler's mercantilist hope that commerce would thus be expanded." (Jacobs, 38)
"The Tokugawa Epoch revived the Ashikaga gild, now known as 'kabu' or kimiai'. 'Kabu' denoted a right held in successive generations, guaranteeing to a family a monopoly over a certain occupation...On the basis of this privilege, the holders organized themselves into associations ('kumiai'). The Tokugawa 'za', in contrast, was a monopoly right in return for a tax; it provided protection for building domestic industries." (Jacobs, 39)

"These commercial gilds were particularly important, being equivalent to the regulated companies of Europe. They originated in the formation, by commission merchants in Edo and Osaka, of near-monopolies over certain distributive channels. They obtained recognition in 1714...Their significance lies in the 'inter-urban' connections which reinforced their independent economic power; in the mutual protective associations which insured their members against loss or disaster; and, above all, in their intricate system of banking, trust and credit." (Jacobs, 40)

**Local taxation in Japan**

In China, centralized tax system. "In Japan (as in western Europe) in contrast, fragmentation or localization of the larger concentrations of economic power led to local control of fiscal power. Appearing initially as mere local usurpation of tax power these concentrations develop into legitimate rights and privileges of autonomous local taxation....(p.43) The local usurpation of tax privilege and revenue established the separation of national and local taxation...." (Jacobs, 41)

**Early development of money and coin in Japan**

"Note also that taxes could be paid in coin ('yosen') as early as A.D. 797; this in spite of the ruler's desire to be paid in grain." (Jacobs, 43)

**Merchants find appropriate political and economics setting**

"In Japan (as in western Europe)...industrial enterprise appears within an institutional structure of politically and economically independent merchants...the social structure underlying the capitalistic utilization of that (i.e. industrial A.M.) machinery was native to Japan." (Jacobs, 44)

**Freedom and an incipient industrial revolution in Japan**

"In Japan, during the period of overseas commercial exclusion (1636 to 1857) an incipient industrial revolution was staking place....the appearance of certain types of economic activity, which led to new sources of economic power and wealth. This new wealth inherited from earlier times the assumption of freedom from arbitrary interference (fiscal or political) by the ruling authority." (Jacobs, 46)
Jacobs believed that "(most important for the present study) the independence of commercial interests, and the appreciation of the role of non-agricultural production in the creation of political-economic power." (Jacobs, 47)

**The independent power of the economic sector in Japan**

Jacobs argued that while in Japan, the State regulated and interfered in everything, in Japan, "the State had to accept the assumption that economic power could legitimately exist independent of the State's substantive and fiscal control. Consequently, the ruling authority intervened to aid, not repress, the independent power of the private economic activities." (Jacobs, 48)

While "the Chinese word for economics (ching-chi) literally denotes ruling or administering wealth" on the other hand "In Japan (as in western Europe) in contrast (to China), as concentrations of economic power were independent, in order to obtain the necessary economic co-operation of these independent economic interests, the ruler had to grant political-economic concessions, rights and privileges." (Jacobs, 48, 51).

Hence "in Japan, unlike China, there was no ethical right to intervene into these economic activities." (Jacobs, 54)

**Taxation by consent in Japan**

"Taxation is also a good indicator of the relations between a ruler and the economic interest. In Japan...it was by consent (in so far as any taxation is by consent) and in return for the ruler's protection of useful privileges." (Jacobs, 55)

**Separation of politics and economics and the power of money**

Thus there was an "appreciation of the function of money must arise, within a framework which allows economic power to exist apart from ruling authority..." (Jacobs, 56)

"In Japan,...the appreciation of money as a source of economic power, beginning in the Sahikaga Epoch, ushered in a policy of mercantilism and eager hoarding of specie by the government." (Jacobs, 60)

**not money in itself, but its use and context is vital**

"We hold that the development of the money economy, though it is a technical necessity for capitalism, is not a sociological prerequisite from which capitalism will necessarily, or even probably, follow. Rather, a money economy must function in a setting in which the increased supply
of money accumulates in the hands of such groups as merchants, not in those of a non-capitalist or anti-capitalist political authority. That situation existed in Japan but not in China." (Jacobs, 61)

**Early and developed coinage and money in Japan**

"Gold as a medium of exchange advances from dust to token by weight (Ashikaga Epoch) to coin (Nobunaga) and finally to legal tender (also Nobunaga). The Tokugawa Epoch instituted many reforms, namely: the standardization of the coinage, in all metals... (see the rest - important)." (Jacobs, 70)

**The powerful and independent rice brokers of Japan**

"In the penetration of the money economy in Japan a most important point was that the conversion of rice to specie, the source of power to the ruling authority, was handled by rice-broker merchants who were not (in that respect) under the control of the ruling feudal authority." (Jacobs, 71)

**The development of real banking in Japan**

"Under Japanese feudalism, just as in western Europe (e.g. particularly in Venice ) true banking ('hon-ryogaeya') developed, in contrast to mere money-lending and speculation ('ryogaeya'). True banking began with the exchange operations between the silver standard of Osaka and the gold standard in Edo. From the beginning dealings were in coin, not metal...From 1784 this took the form of a stock exchange with time transactions and limited number of members. " (Jacobs, 73)

"Next, a true exchange evolved, as credit between the consuming centre (Edo) and the producers' centre (Osaka) was established, based on futures (rice harvests)....Thus the exchange house became a true bank, and the bank now abandoned money-changing for cheque business ('tegata'). Cheques payable from deposits circulated as 'convertible' notes of the bank.../ which were valid in payment of all debts. " (Jacobs, 73)

**Bureaucracy restrained and small in Japan and Europe**

"Bureaucracy when it did appear was, as in western Europe, only the tool of existing occupational groupings; first of the feudal lords, and later of the modern industrial interests." Jacobs, 115)

**Importance of commerce and the merchant in Japan**

"In Japan (as in western Europe)...the significance of commerce and of the merchant, even under feudalism, derived from an / appreciation of the role of the merchant and his money in the struggle for control of independent political or economic power...the merchant...received in return a
respected and sought after position..." (Jacobs, 118)

"In Japan, recognition of a merchant occupation dates from the Nara era, when merchants in the metropolitan area were registered and received exclusive occupational rights in certain market towns ('schicho') free of taxation." (Jacobs, 120)

**Guilds of artisans in Japan**

"As early as the sixteenth century the artisan workmen formed gilds ('kumiai') to protect and extend their occupational interests." (Jacobs, 123)

**The freedom of the economy and technology to develop.**

Another similarity lay in the general 'freeing' of the economy from restraints. If one starts with Adam Smith's presumption that men will strive to maximize their wealth, and adds the insight of Stewart, that long periods of peace will lead to accumulation, one turns the usual problem on its head. The problem is not to explain why certain societies have industrialized, but what keep others from doing so. By looking at it like this, one might say that the natural barriers in England and Japan were less strong than in most cases. For various reasons which need to be investigated, there was no predatory state (a factor Gellner highlights), an absence of a strong predatory landlord class; no strong religious ethics and ritual which encompassed and inhibited economic activity; an absence of strong kinship determinants to economic action; a strong and firm politico-legal system that provided a framework for activity; status competition which encouraged endless accumulation and competition. If we add to this the fact that England and Japan were both relatively easy to defend from outside marauders and hence the productive system was not systematically destroyed from time to time, and there were long periods of peace, it is easier to see how capital was built up.

**The free-floating economy and technology.**

Because of the above features, a peculiarly 'free' economy could develop, the market, pursuit of wealth as an end in itself, etc. etc. This is really what we mean by capitalism. The absence of constraints, and the insecurity/anxiety created by the development of a contractual society, led to the search for ever improved technologies etc. As Needham and others have pointed out, this is what differentiated it from China.

**The mobile and pragmatic society.**

There are a number of strange similarities that developed at the social and mental levels - etiquette, social mobility, attitudes towards nature etc., when one compares England and Japan. There was also an emphasis on education and literacy, a particular attitude to women.

**Some similarities of Japanese and English economy.**
- a high emphasis on textiles (wool in England; silk in Japan)
- high level of cheap transport (water in each case)
- considerable variants of ecology in a short distance, thus encouraging trade in both cases
- a fairly mixed agriculture in both case (through Japan was more of a rice monoculture)
- quite a lot of non-human power in England (water/wind) after the twelfth century or so
- a high level of ‘proto-industry’ in both cases (small scale)
- relatively light taxation (a political factor), certainly in England, and how far in Japan?
- absence of a strictly domestic mode of production, in other words the presence of a manorial organization on top of the family
- a feudalized ownership structure, with 'layers' of ownership
- primogeniture and single-heir succession, which encouraged the growth and continuity of estates
- the absence of total family property (‘restrait lignager’)
- freedom of credit, absence of worry about borrowing
- relatively free market in land
- widespread markets and shops
- an 'agricultural revolution' in both countries (in both starting in the sixteenth century) which increased productive hugely
- relatively slow population growth and increasing wealth in both countries over the two or three centuries before industrialization, followed by a very rapid population growth during industrialization, as labour is needed.

Thus there are a considerable number of similarities of England and Japan, though many would rightly also apply many of these to much of northern France, northern Italy, Catalonia, parts of Germany and Spain.

The predilection for market domination, consumerism etc, is thus present in most of these instances and was probably about equally realized in fourteenth century England and fourteenth century Japan. Thereafter, their ways divided. England continued in peace and openness and expanded outwards through its Empire, and through scientific and technological advances. Japan closed itself and cut off these potentials. When the two did meet again (England through the proxy of America) in the later nineteenth century, there was a huge gap on the surface - e.g. in technological sophistication. But Japan was now centralized (a legacy of the Tokugawa), peaceful, and much wealthier in its agriculture and internal industry. When it reformed its polity and education and technology along western lines, after the Meiji restoration, it very rapidly made up for lost ground.

**Buying and selling of land**

Before the Edo period, there was apparently a lot of buying and selling of land, but it was stopped by the Tokugawa, a 'kind of re-feudalization'.

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**Peasantry in England and Japan**

One of the deepest ways in which spheres overlap in 'traditional' societies is in the 'domestic mode of production' (DMP) which is the central core of 'peasantry'. Hence, both Weber and Marx realized that the separation of the unit of production and consumption from the family was an essential pre-requisite for capitalism. Indeed, capitalism is largely a label to describe this change, the 'setting free' of labour which before was directed to produce for the family directly, but now produces for the market, and the ages are then used for necessities.

By this criterion, as I have argued elsewhere (Individualism), the English separated economy and society very early on with the institution of private property etc. By at least the thirteenth century the basic unit of production and consumption was not the family, but the individual (perhaps with his wife as well). Hence there were no proper 'peasants, there was the freedom to dispose of one's labour etc.

It will be interesting to trace this in relation to Japan. My preliminary impression is that the situation there is, as usual, somewhere between the two extremes. It does not seem to be a peasantry in the sense of India and Japan in that there is more mobility of labour, more 'private' property, the 'family' is a contractual rather than a natural association etc. ON the other hand, the situation is clearly not as extreme as England. Money has not penetrated as much, the family unit of production, even if artificial, is more important than in England, there is not as much flexibility and freedom, the community boundaries are stronger. Thus it lies about equi-distant from the two extremes, and it is impossible to classify it as either peasant or individualist.

Why was this the case? It could be put down to the different form of agriculture. Wet rice cultivation requires much greater integration and co-operation and the family is better adapted to this than other institutions. The dry cultivation of Europe and especially England allowed more freedom, though, as the history of Eastern Europe showed, this 'freedom' could be exploited to create serfdom. Or again, it could be related to a more general difference in the organization of production. In Europe, and particularly England, the manorial system provided an alternative way of organizing production which made the domestic system unnecessary - just as the guild made the family unnecessary in the city. In Japan, where there was feudalism and certain elements of the manor, it was not developed nearly as fully as in Europe. Hence the family retained some of its hold. Indeed, it might be argued, that the family with its large house and client houses looks much like a cross between family and manor.

Again, it would seem that the penetration of money and the market, the cash-nexus, which is what usually breaks up the non-monetary unit of the family, was much more extensive in England than Japan - but this is rather a circular argument, since it is also one of the features one is trying to explain.
Family property and alienation.

I asked about family property. The father decided what should happen to land. He could sell off land without children's permission. If he retired, those who succeeded could sell it. The eldest son succeeds. Retirement is at the will of the father. In Samurai society (as English gentry), only the eldest succeeded. In farmer society, it could be anyone. They thought it was rare to adopt in.

Market activity in villages.

Around the Kyoto area there was some transport business in the villages. In many villages there were small markets once a month. But by the late Tokugawa, there were a lot of miscellaneous businesses in the village, from the nineteenth century onwards.

Agricultural revolution of the sixteenth century.

Before the sixteenth century, the low flat river bottoms were not cultivated as the light Chinese plough would not work. They changed over from hoe to heavy hoes which, though much harder work, enabled them to exploit this rich river land. Part of the agricultural revolution was the better control of irrigation and rivers. A lot of the daimyo provided civil engineering works. At this time there was a change so that peasants were allowed to marry.

Business attitudes

Farmers were keen to export silk as soon as the ports opened. In Japan even inland and in the mountainous area people were keen to consider business, whereas in China only in a small area around the ports did the business/trading mentality flourish. In Japan spinning and weaving were separate businesses, whereas in China they were the same. The Japanese were happy to buy foreign cloths.

In the eighteenth century the Kinsai (around Kyoto) area became commercialized in textiles. Cotton was widespread. There was a large rice trade in the seventeenth century. Even in the eighteenth century the farmers bought and sold rice.
CHAPTER 10. THE FLUID SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The social structure, feudalism and capitalism.

At the global level, Weber noted that the rigidity imposed by the caste system seemed to inhibit capitalism and industrialization in India, in contrast to the more open system of the West, based on economic strata. Related to this was Marx's hypothesis that capitalism developed out of decaying feudalism and that feudalism was a specifically western phenomenon. Only in Europe was there this particular type of social organization which provided a nexus of services between superior and inferior, but was otherwise relatively loose. Once the nexus had been changed into a cash one, then the appropriate social structure for the development of capitalism had appeared, and such a transformation, he argued, occurred in the later middle ages. Again, it would seem no coincidence that the only other indigenous industrialization and true capitalism appeared to grow out of a feudal social structure, in Japan.

It could further be argued that England was an extreme case of the phenomenon; not only was it very heavily 'feudalized', but when the breakdown occurred it went further than in most other places, not only in that cash was substituted for services earlier, but in the fact that the class structure which replaced feudalism was less reign than that, for example, in France. The 'open' and competitive system of England, which enabled and encouraged people to succeed, is argued, was an important root cause or necessary feature of capitalism and industrialism.

Again, however, we have a permitting factor, for it is difficult to show that a relatively open social stratification will, in itself, lead to industrialization. It is clear, however, that Marx was partly right. He stressed that it was the relations of production, the relations between owner and worker, between landlord and tenant, between capitalist and peasant, which, above all, characterised and caused the peculiar features of north-western European society in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.

The centre of gravity in Japanese society

Several times Kenichi talked about the epicenter of power, or centre of gravity in Japan, which he believes is 'lower' than in England. In England roughly in the upper middle class, while in Japan in the lower middle class (lower samurai, middle merchants, prosperous farmers etc.). He thought there was little gap between the local squierarchy and the peasantry.

The stratification system in Japan and England alike: Jacobs

instability of stratification in Japan

"In Japan (as in western Europe) in contrast, there was no 'a priori' basis for the evaluation of
leadership in stratification. Consequently there was instability, and constant threat of a radical shift in the specific hierarchy." (Jacobs, 132)

slavery not rigid in Japan

Jacobs writes that in the early periods, theoretically slaves, "Nevertheless slaves, as a corporate class and not just as individuals, continued to rise to the status of freemen, free farmers, or even landowners..." (Jacobs, 133)

failure to preserve class distinctions in Japan

In Tokugawa Epoch, attempts to preserve class boundaries, "the effort to enforce these regulations failed utterly..." (Jacobs, 133)

instability and flexibility of stratification in Japan

"In Japan (as in western Europe) in contrast, there was no ideal system of stratification which outlived any specific hierarchy. Rather there was a constant rise and subsequent recognition of corporate occupational associations, and a constant instability in any specific hierarchy of stratification. This instability further accentuated the struggle to achieve self-legitimization and corporate recognition for one's novel role in the division of labour..." (Jacobs, 134)

mobility of stratification allows capitalist hierarchy to emerge

Jacobs argues that "the rapid changes in specific hierarchies eventually enabled the rise of a hierarchy satisfactory to industrial capitalism." (Jacobs, 135)

good account of feudal class structure during Tokugawa

Jacobs discusses the possibility for emergence of new corporate classes in Japan. (Jacobs, 136)

"In Japan (as in western Europe)...changes in the internal composition of any existing corporate class were possible...new corporate classes could constantly arise." (Jacobs, 137)

Japan and Europe have graded, not two-class stratification

"Chinese society has a two class system stratified between an elite...and a peasantry...", in Japan in contrast "corporate classes with novel and independent corporate interests continually appeared....the presence of a multi-class structure of stratification is also a function of a particular type of social structure. This type of structure is found in Japanese society and in western Europe..." (Jacobs, 140-1)

an independent peasantry in Japan (like English yeomen)
"The emergence of the farmer as a distinctive corporate class was a function of the flowering of pure feudalism in the Ashikaga Epoch...The farming population of Japan became a well-knit rural class of independent peasants, instead of serfs..." (Jacobs, 141)

merchants invest in the countryside in Japan

"With the closing of the country in 1636, many merchants invaded the rural areas as a field for investment. Fiscally, if not in name, they became landlords." (Jacobs, 141)

rise and fall of classes in Japan

Jacobs argues that "...Chinese society is not a mobile society...In Japan (as in western Europe) in contrast, the instability and constant re-shifting in the status hierarchy implied the possibility of the rise and fall (even repeatedly) of any class...." (Jacobs, 142)

possibility of industrial-capitalist class emerging in Japan

"In Japan (as in western Europe...commerce (and its heir, industry) inherit the ability to establish an industrial-capitalist corporate class, having the possibility of legitimizing a new corporate class...." (Jacobs, 145)

Merchant class protected in Japanese feudalism

"In no instance, however, was the corporate class of merchants as such under threat of destruction. This proposition is implied in the legitimate recognition of concentrations of independent power.../...there is the latent possibility or probability of a merchant's status being enhanced even under feudalism." (Jacobs, 146)

Absence of caste or class stratification in Japan

There has traditionally been a surprisingly small gap between the ruling Samurai and the rural classes in Japan, there is an overlapping 'common field' between them. This is shown in the tea ceremony, or the making of haiku, which is common to all. The tea ceremony is an attempt to eliminate all differences. It is a contrivance to crush all status differences. The merchant class is the most powerful economically and the most admired culturally for a long period.

The three major outcomes; status, contract and status-contract.

Norman Jacobs in his book does not hint at a structural approach directly, though it is implicit in the work. In such an approach, it is the relations of the parts, rather than the parts themselves, which is important. If he had developed this, he would have strengthened his case for a deep morphological
similarity between Japan and Europe as opposed to China. This difference might be put in one phrase. China (and India) are societies based on status (ascription), while Japan and NW Europe are societies based on contract (achievement). Or, more exactly, India and China are almost pure status, Japan is a curious blend of status and contract - what one might paradoxically call "achieved status", the West is pure (ish) contract (at least since 1789). Or again, turning the language a little, India and China are Gemeinschaft, the West Gesellschaft, with Japan as a very curious blend of the two - an important example being in combining very elastic adoption, with rigid descent, creating status by contract, constructing kinship.

**Groups and individuals**

See the original notes and diagram made during talk with Kenichi and Minamoto, which again contrasts three systems; groups and nothing else (tribal), groups within a society (Japan), and individuals within a society (America etc.).

**Some factors affecting Japanese success in technology.**

Norman Jacobs rightly plays down the material and technological side of Japanese and European capitalism, arguing that capitalism is a form of social and economic organization, rather than a specific technology. Nevertheless, it might have been worth stressing some of the factors which made Japan adapt so quickly and to be so effective with the new technology. These include: the high premium placed on crafts in Japan throughout history; the religious and cultural system which sees spirit as implicit in objects itself (Shinto); the miniaturization of things in Japan; the harsh natural environment which leads to a need for ingenuity and labour-saving etc.

**Modernity, continuity and the absence of revolution in Japan and England.**

The central feature of 'modern' societies, even deeper than the presence of money and division of labour, is the division of institutions and roles. If kinship is infrastructure in nearly all modes of production, and out of it is generated all the other 'levels', what provided such an infrastructure in England? To a certain extent the answer is nothing - or everything. Clearly back to the thirteenth century it was capitalist, ie. the market was important. But perhaps there is no infrastructure, already the different levels are held apart and this is the peculiar feature of such societies. Power comes through political institutions, land through legal ones, trade through economic ties and so on. Thus there is no need to separate them out.

One way to do this would be to look carefully at Weber and Marx's ideas on the Germanic/feudal mode of production. Once one liberates them from their mistakes, it no longer necessary to invent the huge fourteenth to seventeenth century transformation; there are structural features of the
Germanic mode which, as Marx half realized, linked it up very well to capitalism.

It would then emerge that many of the set of features which we call 'modern', ie. differentiation into spheres, rationalization, centralized and delegated politics etc., have their roots in very old Germanic customs. Having withered away elsewhere, they were preserved by accident in England and from there have spread elsewhere, as De Tocqueville realized. There is a danger of muddling 'modern' with 'recent' - they are different things. Thus the beautiful system which Montesquieu thought was 'invented in the (Germanic) woods is with us now; it is what we call democracy, capitalism etc.

This is why, as Barrington-Moore noted, England and North America (and Japan - Alan) did not need to go through a revolution from 'traditional' to 'modern' as did most of the Continent in the nineteenth century and Russia now. England (America) and Japan were 'born modern' in the sense above. And one central form of this, or one way of expressing it, is through the idea of the individualistic family.

**Braudel accepts the mistaken Weberian urban thesis**

Braudel swallows Weber more or less whole on cities. That is to say, he accepts the major Weberian opposition between western and Asiatic cities, and the causes for this opposition. Before turning to Weber, it is worth noting how Braudel interprets Weber.

He sees western towns and cities as unusual. "What were Europe's differences and original features? Its towns were marked by an unparalleled freedom. They had developed as autonomous worlds and according to their own propensities..." (p.396). This was miraculous. The "miracle in the West" was "the miracle of the first great urban centuries in Europe was that the town won entirely, at least in Italy, Flanders and Germany..." (p.398)

Why did such free towns not emerge in Asia? Towns of the new type could not develop in the East "because society was well and truly frozen in a sort of irreducible system, a previous crystallisation. In the Indies (?) the caste system automatically divided and broke up every urban community. In China the cult of the gentes (sic) was opposed to a mixture comparable to that which created the Western town - a veritable machine for breaking up old bonds and placing individuals on the same level..." (p.410). This is pure, if simplified, Weber - and clearly nonsense in relation to Japan. Or again he writes, "The sole original feature, which Max Weber strongly emphasizes, is that the social structures in both India and China automatically rejected the town and offered, as it were, refractory, sub-standard material to it. Therefore if the town did not win its independence it was not only because of the mandarins' beatings or the prince's cruelty to merchants and ordinary citizens. It was because society was well and truly frozen in a sort of irreducible system, a previous crystallisation.." (p.410)
Braudel took the Chinese town as an archetype of the problem. "No independent authority represented a Chinese town taken as a whole in its dealing with the state or the enormously powerful countryside. The countryside was the very centre of living, active, thinking China...The town, residence of officials and nobles...There was no comfortably expanding middle class there..."

He believed that this was shown by city plans. "Western towns developed gradually and in a haphazard way. That is why their plans are so complicated....All the towns in China, Korea, Japan, peninsular India and Colonial America were planned according to the chessboard pattern....Only two civilizations built confused and irregular towns on a large scale; Islam (including northern India) and the West in the middle ages..." The intriguing thing is that if we take this as a way of reading the nature of the civilization, Japan is not like China etc, but like Europe. Some of its towns are checker-board, of course, as early Nara, Kyoto and recently Sapporo etc. But its greatest contemporary city, Edo or Tokyo is an archetypical confused mess. Indeed, as Barthes (Empire of Signs) graphically describes, it is the most difficult city in the world to find one's way around (like the language?), for it is not only a jumble, but there are few signs, street numbers are determined by the date of the building of the house or office etc! How does this fit with the Weber/ Braudel thesis. It is worth looking at some other Japanese cities - e.g. Osaka, Nagasaki etc. to see if they are grids. (NB. need early town plans, before the bombing and re-building of 2WW).

**Weber on the City; England and Japan.**

It may be taken as axiomatic that the nature of cities, both sociologically and physically, will reflect the civilizations within which they occur. Weber recognized this when he differentiated many types of city "the cities of Asiatic, Ancient and Medieval types' (City, p.69), or "the trade city, the merchant city, the consumer city' (p.69).

In order to differentiate he put forward a definition of the 'true' or ideal type city. "To constitute a full urban community a settlement must display a relative predominance of trade-commercial relations with the settlement as a whole displaying the following features: 1. a fortification 2. A market 3. A court of its own and at least partially autonomous law 4. A related form of association 5. At least partial autonomy and autocephaly, thus also an administration by authorities in the election of whom theburghers participated."

Measured by these criteria, Weber believed, most 'cities' in the world had 1 and 2, but 3,4,5 were special to the West. "An urban "community" in the full meaning of the word, appears as a general phenomenon only in the Occident (the only minor exceptions being Syria, Phoenicia, Mesopotamia, p.80). There must be "the presence of a special stratum, a distinct new estate" (the bourgeois), and "measured by this rule...the cities of Asia were not urban communities at all..." They were large commercial centres and fortresses, "However the possession by the urbanites of a special substantive or trial law or of courts autonomously nominated by them were unknown to Asiatic cites..." (p.81).
Even more importantly, Weber argues, there were not real townsmen - just country people living in the town: "the appearance in the city of an association of urbanites in contradiction to the countrymen was also found only in rudiments. The Chinese urban dweller legally belonged to his family and native village...the Russian village-comrade, earning his living in the city but legally remained a peasant. The Indian urban dweller remained a member of the caste." (p.82) Thus, he argues, "In China, Japan and India "neither urban community nor citizenry can be found and only traces of them appear in the Near East". In other words, he believed that caste and kinship made real towns impossible.

The walls of the West were a symbol of a different social, economic, religious and political world within them. In the East they were just military defences. In the West the bourgeois was a separate estate and a separate breed of man; in the East, just a peasant or quasi-merchant in a certain location.

The further refinement within Weber's model, which Braudel does not notice, but which is equally important, is within Europe. Weber accepted that there was a very great difference between North and South Europe. Thus the "medieval occidental city presents striking contrasts to its Asiatic counterparts. This was particularly true for urban formations north of the Alps where the western city developed in its purest form". (p.91). In Northern Europe an added and essential feature emerged, "City air makes man free" (cf. p.197). Thus in the north alone, was the city dweller cut off from his status roots - whether of kinship or class. "The cutting of status connections with the rural nobility was carried out in relatively pure form only in the civic corporations of Northern Europe." (p.95).

Thus his schema has two major differences: Western and Asiatic, Northern European and Southern European. Asiatic and North European cities form the two poles, while 'the ancient (Greece, Rome ? Alan) and to a lesser extent, the southern medieval European city form a transitional stage between the Asiatic and North-European cities."

In all of this Weber seems only dimly aware that there is something odd about Japan, but he is half-aware of it. He tends to lump it in, as we have seen, with China and India. But elsewhere he hints at various oddnesses. It was a general rule of cities that they acted as fortresses or garrisons, with large walls. This was true in Antiquity, in medieval Europe and in Asia. But there was an exception - Japan. "In Japan, for example it was not the rule. Administratively one may, with Rathgen, doubt the existence of cities at all." (p.75) He caught the an oddness, but instead of asking why, he leapt to a spurious conclusion.

Again, he hints that Japanese self-rule was unusually developed. In certain early cities, "It was possible thus for them to be formed into communities with elected officials or hereditary elders." This, Weber says, "occurred in Japan where one or more civil-administrative body (Machi-Bugyo) was established as superior to self-administered street communities." (p.82) But again, instead of following this further as an oddity, Weber retreats in the next sentence. "However, a city law similar to that of Antiquity or the Middle Ages was absent. The city as corporate per se was unknown."
Or again, he realizes that in Japan "the merchants and tradesmen" were "partly united in professional associations." Again, he quickly qualifies this to fit with his oppositional model which would emphasize the special nature of the west. "However, here too, the concepts of a 'citizenry' and an 'urban community' are absent." (p.83) Thus Weber, perhaps badly served by his sources, manages to miss the vital clue to one curious similarity between north European and Japanese structures - the similarities of their cities.

If he had seen the similarities, his tentative suggestions on why North European cities could have critically cut the umbilical chord between their inhabitants and the country people would have been even more interesting than it is, or rather we could try to apply it to Japan.

**Weber on why Northern cities were 'free'.**

Although he fails to explain this, it is interesting that he should seek the explanation in roughly the same area as Bloch did for feudalism - the weakness of the clan. While it was caste and clan that had stifled the autonomous city in the East, "In the medieval period, chiefly in Central and Northern cities, the clans were weak from the beginning and they soon lost all importance as constituents of the city. Thus the cities became confederations of individual burghers (house owners). So why were the clans weak? Basically, he argued, that "clan exclusiveness" had been shattered by "enlistment in foreign legions, participation in piratical activities etc." and, particularly, in the north, "the century-long wanderings of conquering war bands of Teutons before and during the migration of peoples...". This latter "must have formed multiple barriers against the intensification of taboos and totemic rights." (p.99) This is rather implausible, but is groping, at a time before western cognatic kinship and its implications was much understood, in the right direction. Whatever the causes, the consequences are accurately described by Weber. "In any case logistic and military associations ...re-mained the decisive elements in the structure of the city...rather than the magical bonds of the extended family..." In other words, the townsman had been separated out from kinship and from 'magic' or religion. He or she was a 'free' actor.

This destruction of 'magic' was also related to a combination of background factor (Christianity) and the confusion or 'shaking' at the end of the Roman Empire. Christianity "became the religion of these people who had been profoundly shaken in all their traditions..." "Christianity was the final element in the destruction of the religious significance of the clans...thus becoming fundamentally important for the very founding of the medieval city." (p. ??)

The central thrust is the separation of spheres, which only occurred, Weber thought, in the western city. While the "urban resident in China normally belonged to his native rural community...Russian peasants retained their right to the land as well as, upon demand of the village community, their duty to share in the village work...All this was changed in the medieval city,
particularly in the North. Here, in new civic creations, burghers joined the citizenry as single persons." (pp.101-2). Or again, "The city of the Medieval Occident was economically a set of trade and commerce, politically and economically a fortress and garrison, administratively a court district and socially an oath-bound confederation." (p.104). Among the many fascinating parallels is the way in which exactly the same thing happened in Japan - i.e. through the system of primogeniture and disinheriting of younger children, the Japanese cities became filled with 'single persons' who had not automatic rights in their village. To change location was to change allegiance.

The final touches to this intriguing parallel comes when we come to the realization that even within north-western Europe, England was an extreme and curious case, and that this case is only paralleled by Japan.

**The curious case of the English city - Weber**

Weber saw even within Northern Europe different patterns; as Bloch had seen with agrarian systems. France "represents a transitional mixture of the patterns manifest in South and North respectively" (p.114), but England was the extreme case. "The Nordic and English city unions regularly bore the character of a corporation." "The development of the English civic oligarchy presents an extreme case." (p.133).

The paradox is that in this extreme case the oppositions between town and country which were the centre of his thesis - the town as a separate world - were carried to their logical conclusion and the whole countryside became 'urban', so that towns and country began to feel and look alike. Thus the sorts of oppositions and battles which were found elsewhere (and which Marx, q.v. took as a necessary phase in the emergence of a new ethic) were absent: "there are no reports from England of fights of urbanites against the King or against urban noblemen". (p.133)

In fact there were all sorts of peculiarities about English towns, some of which he noted. Not only did the bourgeois not constitute a separate 'estate' in Parliament, or socially (Maitland), not only were the walls allowed to crumble very early, or were never built, not only were towns not islands in a peasant sea, not only was there huge mobility between the merchants and the "aristocracy", but the barriers between town and country seem to have been slight.

From very early on historians (e.g, Maitland, Freeman) noticed the strangeness of English towns - symbolized in their lack of walls. At a superficial level this could be related to the fact that the country had long been at peace, an island, not needing walls, as opposed to Continental towns. In this they were similar to Japan. But whatever the reason, the deeper reasons and effects are intriguing.

It could be argued that towns were open, that towns and country from at least the thirteenth century and earlier (in Japan as well as England) were interlocked. Thus, when Johnson said that "A
man who is tired of London is tired of Life", he spoke truer than he knew. He who was tired of London would also find all of England intolerable for in many respects it resembled London in its mentality - **urbs in rure**. Just as Pirenne has described the Netherlands as a suburb of Antwerp, so one could describe England as a suburb of London. This is implied in many of the earlier travellers, who move in and out of London and other cities and then into the countryside with no sense of shock or surprise - which they certainly would have felt in China, India, Russia etc - but not Japan.

Weber wrote that "In contrast to Italy, English cities almost completely lost dominance over the countryside which they had possessed in the form of city marks. The cities were transformed into economic corporations." (133). One might interpret this in another way; the whole countryside had not become one large 'city', at least in terms of the 'mentality' (Simmel). If one follows Braudel and says that "Money was the active and decisive element...Money is the same as saying towns" (Capitalism, 397), then England is one large town, fully integrated into a money economy, very early, just like the Netherlands and just like Japan (though there we need to substitute rice for money). There was no need for city walls in either case, since there was no alternative civilization (peasants, lords) to keep out. There was no distinct 'bourgeoisie', since it was already a nation of shop-keepers in mentality.

These are some general thoughts, but what they indicate is that what I had taken to be an extreme and unusual form of urban civilization - namely England - may have some curious similarities with Japan, and indeed for similar reasons (bilateral kinship and primogeniture, feudalism, widespread use of money). A fascinating similarity which it will be worth exploring further.

**Artificial community in Japan**

We discussed marriage as a contract and I pointed out that marriage is a peculiar institution. It is the only one in the West which turns Contract into Community. It then struck me that a key to Japanese society is that in Japan there are large areas of gemeinschaft, but one is not born into them. One enters them through acts of will, rather like marriage. One might thus represent the situation as follows:

England - Gesellschaft  
Japan - Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft  
'Traditional' - Gemeinschaft

In England, married couples form tiny islands of 'Community' in a sea of Society. In Japan, the 'House', (ie), and now the family and job, provide quite large islands of Community in a sea of Society.

What seems to be one of the keys to Japan is that it is trying to create "artificial gemeinschaft". Strictly this is a contradiction in terms since the essence of gemeinschaft is its 'naturalness'. But in
Japan it is not created by birth and blood, but by will. Yet once it is created, it is almost as firm and stable as proper gemeinschaft.

We discussed the life-cycle and Kenichi drew a diagram (see diagram, p.20), which showed three stages in a life:

There is a period of insecurity/competition and 'Association' up to employment, then a period of secure employment and Community, then another period of insecurity and Association.

One related feature is that there is a tremendous pressure put on the educational system. Only during the period between the ages of eight and eighteen do people have some freedom to compete and place themselves in a position to get into a "lane" which they will be in for the rest of their lives. (see my diagram, p.20). Everything that happens in the rest of one's life depends on what happens in the competitive exams from eight to eighteen. Once at University, one's course of life is more or less decided.

**What held villages together in Japan.**

I asked what held villages, or people together; what integrated society. Inoye said that it was; shared experience, labour exchange and co-operation (e.g. planting rice) and in all forms of activity (e.g. building a house), communal festivals, paper - as used in the administrative system with lots of roles and documents.

**Conformity, self-policing etc.**

Why are there so few police in Japan? Not self-control from the inside, Yo thought, but the "managed society" (kandi-shakai). Everyone keeps an eye on everyone else and no-one likes to step out of line. There is self-policing, but not within the individual. The end or aim for the individual or society should given from the outside, an invisible power of conformity. We should do as others say. People feel easy and relaxed when they behave like others. The samurai group alone partly escape from this; they do something on their own, not imitating others. A few people have this 'will to rule', e.g. Yamagoto in the Meiji period.

**Groups and quasi-groups and networks in Japan**

I modified my picture somewhat (see diags. notebook p.18), with England constituted by a network of individuals, held together by law and money; Japan a set of fictive groups, not held together by blood but by loyalty; with India as a set of groups held together by blood. Nakanishi suggested that after the Meiji, the Japanese situation melted so that one had less rigid boundaries to groups and the groups took on an core/periphery structure. Those at the centre were influenced by
Bushido (the samurai ethic), those at the periphery were 'outsiders'. The labour agitation of the 1930's and earlier was for recognition of these outsiders as members of the 'inside', to be treated with respect as 'persons'.

**Kinship and socialization**

One area traditionally the preserve of the family is that of childrearing and socialization. The child grows up within the kin universe and learns how it works. He gains his skills and his prestige from his kin, either from wider kin or parents. Often a parent acts as teacher employer and father all rolled into one. If we look at the pattern of English childrearing as far back as the records go, that is at least back to the thirteenth century, we appear to have a situation where the family is not the only unit of socialization. As foreigners noted, many English children from a very early age were taken out of their family of birth and were reared by non-kin through the institutions of servanthood, through apprenticeship, and, for the wealthy, through formal educational channels such as schools and universities. The nineteenth century boarding school was just one stage in this centuries-long tradition. These institutions extricated the individual from the particularistic setting of the family. They converted the person from a dependent member of unit created by birth, a "status" relationship in Maine's usage, to a free-floating individual who entered into contractual relationships to establish his or her position. It turned a person into someone who had to compete as a "free" and equal citizen.

**Kinship, friendship and associations**

It is clear that once adult, it was the help of neighbours and friends that people treasured and whose company they sought. This is reflected, for instance, in that curious English institution, the village pub or alehouse, where people met with "friends" and neighbours, or with strangers, on an equal and open footing. The pubs, markets, fairs and other gathering places of this commercial society seem to have been packed, as they are today, with people who met, sometimes, liked each other, transacted, and then drifted apart. Likewise, when people travelled, they tended not to say with kin, but with those whom they paid. Thus we have the early development of that other English phenomenon, the coaching and other inn, the boarding houses, where people could stay for money payment.

**An associational world**

In this highly mobile and monetized world, of both social and geographical mobility, an individual became integrated into a world of relationships based on contract, on ties of expedience and mutual, often unspoken, consent, with unrelated individuals. He became aware of his own identity as a free-floating atom, a member of numerous associations and networks, not of firm groups and fixed communities. His or her deep emotional relationships, lines of support and
enjoyment and his eventual marriage were not mapped out for him at birth, but constructed through life his own will and actions. This helped to give him both a sense of individuality and freedom, but also, ultimately, of insecurity. Loneliness and separateness was the price paid for the absence of "Community". Instead we have that "Associational" world, where all relationships are subject to alteration; even children and parents have to constantly re-negotiate their relationship as their relative power and age changed. Certainly, brothers and sisters and cousins drifted apart.

The open stratification system.

The historical material presents us with a strange contradiction in relation to questions of class and status honour. On the one hand England is rightly thought of as one of the most "class-conscious" of countries, both now and in the past. Inherited and acquired differences have always been very important. The whole educational and social system from very early on emphasized minor differences between levels in the social hierarchy and people have always expended much energy on attempting to move up and down the ladder. In this sense, England was a very hierarchical society, consisting of a steep ladder with many rungs. Yet, in another sense, it was an almost classless society. This was partly a result of the ease and frequency of social mobility. WE have seen that inter-marriage between people on different "rungs" was always permitted, in opposition to many more rigid societies. There were no legal barriers to movement. The very multitude of rungs meant that it was relatively easy to move from one to another - and there was even some blurring between them, with several ladders erected by different occupations alongside each other. A rich tradesman's daughter was always a good "match" for a poor hereditary landowner's son, and the same principle worked all the way down the scale. There was no "middle class", just a very large group of the "middling sort", who varied enormously. There was thus a noticeable absence of any kind of "class consciousness".

It appears that there was hierarchy, but an open hierarchy, a meritocratic system of sorts. Ultimately, wealth no blood was the greater gainer of position and wealth can be created by skill or fraud, whereas birth is not so easily manipulated. It was a situation where money and contracts, not blood and status, ruled. Through luck and hard-work, or through bad fortune and sloth, a person cold move fairly quickly, certainly within a lifetime, from near the top to near the bottom of the ladder. There were no discrete, enduring groups or orders, based on some unassailable criterion which lay outside personal manipulation.

There was endless social movement and within one generation, children of the same parents could be near the top and near the bottom of the social pyramid. Life was hence a never-ending game, almost a gamble, in which a person could lose most of what he had won. The insecurities of fortune's wheel fits very well with those religious and social insecurities which Weber and his followers have documented. But instead of suggesting that the insecurity flowed from the terrible visions of hell and damnation for the pre-destined failures, as Weber did, it is clear that the anxiety which Walzer suggested lay behind both the religious and economic activity. It can be seen to arise naturally from this shifting world where nothing was firm, all was to be won or lost.
If we turn away from ownership of the means of production, or class, to status and status honour, or control over the means of consumption, there is the same contradiction in the material. It is clear that from the middle ages we are dealing with a society built on the assumption that the difference between different estates or callings are very important. The cultural markers which tell people about this - costumes, diet, deportment, sport, etiquette, linguistic codes, were all very elaborated. There were constant attempts to regulate and control them and a great concern with the aping of manners and so on. Yet, unlike almost all other pre-industrial societies, these ascriptions, while fairly fixed as a system, were not permanently attached by birth to individuals.

The extreme case, of course, is the caste system where all these elements are ritually and socially regulated and are attached to an individual by birth. Yet even in the non-caste systems of many traditional peasantries, a person cannot convert the set of costumes, diets, manners and languages into which he was born through his life. Yet the English "comedy of manners" in that tradition from Shakespeare to Gilbert and Sullivan or Pygmalion, is just part of the reflection of a world in which people learnt and unlearnt the cultural games appropriate to the level to which they aspired. The gradations were so many and so subtle, and the convertibility of wealth into status so easy, that people appears to have moved very rapidly up and down the ladder during their lives.

To take a few examples, we may see that much of the educational system was attuned to turning gains in wealth into gains in honour. The self-made man who became the founder of a nouveaux riche family is a very old theme. Much of the economic activity in England in vast and early burst of consumerism was geared round a wide market for good food, expensive clothes, lavish ceremony and entertainment, not merely by the very wealthy as in many parts of the world, but by the general populace, who were constantly displaying to themselves and to others that they were of a particular honourable level (as in Japan).

Honour and reputation.

There was an apparent absence of bitterly enforced codes of honour amongst the bulk of the population. Although people wanted to be honoured for what they had achieved and for what they were, the respect was diffused over the society as a whole and did not have to be shown by an enormously deferential face-to-face relationship. As compared to those societies in Mediterranean Europe and elsewhere known to anthropologists as "honour and shame" cultures, there is in fact a curious lack of emphasis on "respect" on "honour" and on "deference".

Leaving on one side the possible exception of a few courtiers and the highest nobility, the constant competition for the maintenance of personal honour, with its constant ramifications of wounded pride, dueling, taunts, gossip, the flaunting of male power, the insidious danger of the undermining of honour through assaults on the women attached to men, all this is largely missing in the majority of the population through most of time. Even at the level of Jane Austen's novels, it is difficult to speak of an honour and shame world, and certainly it is little in evidence for the villages.
about which we know. It does not seem that this is a society held together by those face-to-face competitions for honour, the equality of honourable men and their superiority over their weaker clients, which is characteristic of so many societies. For example, there are no instances, as one would find in many societies, of families killing or maiming men who have courted their daughters or sisters and hence dishonoured them.

The honour that is present is not of a familistic nature. It is the kind of honour that is needed in a commercial society. It is basically concerned with behaving honourably, that is to say being truthful, just, uncorrupt, keeping one's contracts and pledges, not being deceitful, being fair-minded. The honourable magistrate or Justice, the honourable merchant, the honourable clergyman, is not one who jealously guards and internal store of a precious commodity which is constantly under threat and assault by people who, if they can defeat him, will steal some of his power. An individual appealed to a wider public. He showed himself to be sincere and trustworthy, for these were the characteristics which both won respect and gave people confidence in those many and fleeting contracts on which the society and economy depended. Destroy a man's reputation, and he was likely to spiral downwards (cf. the destroy a man's reputation speech in Othello). But the way to do this was not to suggest that he was not brave, aggressive, virile, but rather that he could not be trusted - a liar or a cheat. Likewise, to destroy a woman' reputation was better achieved through attacks on her probity, intelligence and cultural performance than to attack her sexuality or chastity.

Male and female gender relations.

There appears to have been an unusually relaxed attitude between the two genders in England, and this is clearly related to the fact that the family and society are no longer integrated. In the majority of societies, where the family and family links constitute the basis of society, mating and sex, which bring together the sexes, have to be carefully supervised. When directed correctly, marriage furnishes allies, produces heirs, contributes to the labour force. But women's sexual and procreative powers are both an immensely powerful, but also a desirable and dangerous asset. In order to protect this asset, familistic system usually emphasize the opposition between males and females.

Gender is used as a major principle of organizing social life in the majority of societies and there is usually a very sharp opposition between the ideals and behaviour of the two sexes, as we find in Hindu, Islamic and, to some extent, Catholic cultures. In the extreme cases, the worlds of men and women overlap very little. There is often a strong emphasis on the threat and hostility between the genders and on the inferiority and subservience of women. Men have honour, women bring shame. Women should be dressed in an unprovocative way, be kept out of sight and in purdah, wear veils and hats.

Against such a background what is striking in the evidence we have examined is the absence of such a marked gender opposition in English culture. English women were, in their clothing, their
freedom, their openness, "shameless" by the standards of many cultures. There is a striking similarity between men and women, a relaxed and friendly attitude which is marked in many of the documents, a mutual and affectionate sparing of almost equals, an absence of most of the stress on male virility, machismo, and on female violability or shame and virginity. Women were not hidden away by dress, by etiquette or by architecture; they were not vulnerable, weak, possessions of men. The relatively relaxed and open relationship which existed from early life passed through unchaperoned courtship into companionate marriage.

The institution of friendship.

The phenomenon of friendship is another striking feature of the social structure. In most societies people like certain kin and neighbours more than others and will seek them out. But the idea of forming a relatively deep, shared, relationship with someone on an equal basis, based on nothing mutual liking, is rather unusual. The relationship is based on individual selection, not pressed upon a person by birth or proximity. The idea of such "friends" being of the opposite gender is an abomination. But in a society where relationships based on birth are weakly developed, friendship of a non-utilitarian kinds is, so to speak, given space. The public house where a person meets his "friends", the "friends" who advise on important decisions and who help in emergencies, the friends with whom one share's joys and woes are of great importance in all the English documents. Only a few of them are also kin. The person whom one marries is, to some extent, merely one's best friend.

Such "friends" are at the far extreme to those exploitative, a-symmetrical, non-kin relationship which have to be contractually set up to fill gaps in personal contacts in certain societies, what are labelled patron-client relationships. A patron and client may represent the relationship as one of "friendship" but this is evidently a mask.

Friendships are usually based on a mutual interest, whether in literature, religion, leisure or business. They are imbued with sentiment, with "liking" which can move into love, and they endure over a long period. Such permanent relationships were the extreme end of a continuum in England while at the other end were very fleeting, fragmentary relationships. Such relationships were so short-lived that it is difficult to perceive them through the historical documents and they therefore tend to escape the notice of historians. But in a society which we have argued was dominated by contract, rather than status, many of the relationships which people had were not deep, enduring and multi-stranded, but single-stranded one's based on a limited exchange or transaction. It was a world of "balanced reciprocity" (Sahlins), well portrayed by Maitland for the thirteenth century and summarized by Milsom as follows: it was "essentially a flat world, inhabited by equal neighbours. Lordship is little more than a servitude over the land of another, and its content is fixed and economic..." (P & Maitland, i, xlvii).

In this situation, people treated each other as potential partners or opponents in endless little games of exchange and contract. People were constantly doing deals - buying, selling hiring,
borrowing, promising, agreeing, both within the economic sphere and in the social, political and religious one. A sort of car-boot sale society, with endless short-term relationships. Such a system of fragmentary and daily negotiation is the opposite pole from the durable kinship world of true "Community". It can only operate in a world protected by an elaborate legal and customary code of law and a great deal of trust.

In such a world, life is an endless game or competition, in which people are constantly striving for minor victories and conquests. People are endless entrepreneurs and negotiators, constantly concerned not with that improvement in personal honour which is the obsession in many societies, but with accumulating wealth and with winning minor victories.

This insecure world, where birth and kinship create little stability, can become intolerably lonely and there is the yearning for creating more permanent bonds. Hence friendship and the enormous proliferation of voluntary associations which early characterized the English. Such associations were based on like-mindedness in individuals. Hence one had religious associations, trade associations, educational associations, the guilds, companies, sects, colleges, Boy Scouts, Women's Institutes, Independent Orders of Oddfellows and so on. If such havens against the pressures of loneliness did not suffice, the individual might find solace in a close relationship with God or possibly with one other human being - a married friend, to whom he or she had been drawn through a mixture of physical passion and intellectual and emotional separateness.
CHAPTER 11. THE OPEN MENTALITY

Empirical thought and its introducers in Japan

The merchants and samurai were the carriers of thought in Japan; whereas in China Confucianism developed into a purely scholastic tradition, in Japan it had a double strand, the intellectual and the practical needs to the Samurai for military and other tasks. Thus it had a practical and rational streak to it, because it needed to work. Empirical thought was a combination of Confucianism and militaristic science. The merchants were even more rational than the Samurai - believing in free competition etc. They were contrivers, with cleverness. The cleverest person tended to get to the top. In China there was a growing separation of the literate and the military classes - which did not happen in Japan. (Minamoto & co.)

Had Japan discovered the method of discovery independently?

Prof. Minamoto thought not. Although there were particular discoveries and parts of the puzzle were found, the whole was not there. There were bits and pieces, but not the system of discovery itself. Physics and mathematics were not combined in Japan. They quickly noticed that this had been done in the West and followed it up. There were no obstacles in Japan to its reception - thus they quickly learned Newton's law in the Edo period, and western mathematics. They realized they needed it.

Contrast of world religions and systems (Alan)

Christianity is realistic about the material world, and sees it as rational and real, non-magical. China is rational about the material world (Confucianism), but under a certain strand of Buddhism starts to consider it as an illusion. Japan sees the natural world as real, but is in certain respects somewhat irrational.

Curiosity and the Japanese

Minamoto stressed the curiosity of the Japanese, though did not explain what it stemmed from; there was a big flow of information from China, geometry, agriculture etc. But the expulsion of the missionaries in the C17 somewhat stemmed this flow. The difference can be seen, for example in the desire to learn how things work. In Japan, when they saw the superiority of Western weapons, they began to build them for themselves; learnt Dutch etc.

In China, when they saw the superiority of Western weapons, they bought them off the shelf.
The scientific and rational revolution.

One central theme of Ernest Gellner's work is the growth of rationality or disenchantment of the world. There is a "radical discontinuity" which exists "between primitive and modern mentality" (Plough, 42). This is the "transition to effective knowledge", which Gellner describes many times. There is "the great transition between the old, as it were non-epistemic worlds, in which the principles of cognition are subject to the pervasive constitutive principles of a given vision, and thus have little to fear, and a world in which is not longer possible", a "fundamental transition indeed". (Legitimation, 169, 173) While overlapping with Popper and Kuhn, Gellner's stress is on the fact that "the attainment of a rational, non-magical, non-enchanted world is a much more fundamental achievement than the jump from one scientific vision to another". Popper "underestimates the difficulty" of establishing an Open Society. (Legitimation, 182).

This parallels Weber's vision. The modern world of rationality has two central features; coherence or consistency, and efficiency. Coherence means "that there are no special, privileged, insulated facts or realms". Efficiency means "the cold rational selection of the best available means to given, clearly formulated and isolated ends.". This is "the separation of all separables ...the breaking up of all complexes into their constituent parts..."; it creates "a common measure of fact, a universal conceptual currency...all facts are located within a single continuing logical space.. one single language describes the world...", (Nations, 21,20,22,21).

Put in another way, 'rationality' here means that spheres have become sufficiently disentangled for the mind to move without constantly bumping into wider obstacles created by impenetrable barriers whether of religion, kinship or politics. Within the new world "there also is and can be no room either for magic or for the sacred". (Plough, 66).

What has happened is that thought, cognition, has been set free from its usual masters - politics, religion or kinship. We are open to all thought and to all doubt. God is dead, the father is dead, the king is dead. We are our own masters, to think what we please. The barriers are down and everything is levelled onto one plane in the intellectual sphere, just as it is in the social sphere by money (in Simmel's metaphor).

The relativism and 'open' predicament of Japan.

Norman Jacobs missed the situational ethics of Japan, which is an exact equivalent to what he nicely describes in the political field, in other words no hard and fast rules, expediency, "it all depends" etc. If the "suspended judgment is the greatest invention of the twentieth century" (Russell), then the Japanese had invented it by the twelfth century at least! Theirs was an 'open'
predicament in Horton's terminology, hence there was an early relativism. Here one might make a comparison with the flexible, pragmatic, relativism of the English Common Law.

Art and etiquette in Japan and England.

Norman Jacobs does not look at the curious similarities of the 'Gothic' art of England - incompleteness, incongruity etc., and the same feature, to a certain extent, in Japan. Nor does he examine the importance of etiquette and social manners in both cases.

Art in Japan and England - similarities of Gothic style.

Even the art has a curious similarity. Both might roughly be termed 'Gothic', that is to say there is a dislike of straight lines, exact balance, heavy styles. There is a preference for irregularity, understatement, suggestiveness. A love of gardens and concern with manners and etiquette is to be found in both.

Temperament.

Temperamentally, there is a similar pattern which one might call the 'stiff upper lip' approach. In both cases, a high degree of self-control is expected; the control of passion by the intellect and spirit. In both, romantic love is dangerous because it breaks through and destroys control. But in both cases, while passion is fiercely controlled, it is occasionally released either in love (romance - in England), or in duty and death (in Japan) which lead to the release from normal constraints into something which can only be called ecstasy.

An article by Keith Thomas (ref: XXX) notes that while southern Europeans and even the French gesticulate a lot, communicating as much with their hands and faces as with words, the English are extremely passive, inscrutable, stiff upper-lipped etc. This would again appear to be a rather interesting similarity between English and Japanese, for the latter, also, tend to be minimal in their gestures. Although they bough on meeting (an hierarchical gesture as opposed to the English hand-shake denoting equality), otherwise they use few bodily gestures, hand gestures etc. Yet, like the English, they communicate a great deal by silence, by absence of gesture. Just as irony, understatement, silence, the space between words etc. are characteristic of the English, so with the Japanese. The essence of communication for the Japanese is silence and stillness, as in hara or haragai (communicating with the stomach). Again the ceremonials (tea etc.), or the gardens are kept to simplicity and minimality. The art is minimal, restrained, understated, as is English art. Likewise, their religion with its ascetic, Protestant, Zen, streak, reminds one of the understated, minimal streak in English puritanism as epitomized in the silence and simplicity of the Quaker meeting house.
At the worst, this means for both races that it is very difficult to communicate. When there is a deep bond between individuals, and the minimal signals are picked up efficiently, then the system is extremely powerful. But in the presence of a more gesticulating race (Americans, Italians etc.), the English gentry appear tongue-tied, inhibited, unfeeling, restrained, etc. The minimalism may also be an indication of how much is shared. If almost all culture is shared, then it takes little to indicate the other ten per cent. But in many cultures, it is the major part of culture that has to be expressed, and hence all channels - voice, gestures, postures, need to be used simultaneously.

Ritual, ethics, etiquette, ceremonial and icons

The progress towards 'modernization', to extend Jesse L. Weston's famous title, could be described as 'From ritual to romance to etiquette'. One of the striking features of English society since the sixteenth century has been the systematic elimination of ritual or iconic society, and its replacement by forms of action which do not imply a mixing of realms (see K.Thomas' work). Thus ceremonial, etiquette, secular ethics and morality, have come to dominate. Since this is such a basic part of the "Protestant ethic", one would also expect it to be a feature of modern Japan. Is there anything in the life-cycle, annual calendar, or weekly or other activities which is the slightest bit ritualistic? My prediction is that there should not be.

The next day, after writing this, we had dinner with the Nakamura's and discussed this matter. They described about a dozen annual rituals, for ancestors, good luck and so on. They admitted, however, that they only did a few of them and that they were hazy about the origins and meaning of most of them. Furthermore, if they did not do them, it would not matter. In other words, they were like Easter or Christmas in England - mainly secular ceremonies. They claimed that the great change had occurred in the 1960's, when rituals had declined and faded away and there had been many other massive social changes.

Of the life-cycle rituals, marriage could be as formal/ritualistic or simple as one liked. One went to a hotel which provided a menu of choices, Buddhist, Shinto, Christian, informal, and arranged the food/priest/honeymoon etc. In the simplest form, one just filled in a government form with some witnesses and had a party.

In the burial, more elaborate things were done; relatives sat found for one night with the corpse, it was accompanied to the crematorium where, after burning, the bones were taken out with chopsticks, then a meal was eaten with the ashes/bones present, then the ashes were put in a family 'grave'.

Thus, in general, the situation in modern urban Japan is much like that in modern urban Britain; there is quite a bit of 'secular' religion, but little real ritual.
Sympathy, sincerity and other Japanese virtues

A very central place in Japanese life is played by a concept which can only roughly be translated into Western thought, but roughly means sincerity, true heart, devotion, authentic heart, a sense of beauty, compactness etc. - 'magokoro'

The pursuit of perfection.

The secret of Japanese life is the pursuit of perfection, and perfection is nothingness (Zen). There is no cost/benefit analysis in this, just emptiness or a void. This is the Japanese target. This has perhaps turned recently into hedonistic, amoral consumerism.

Capitalist penetration.

We discussed also the non-commercial sectors of life. Whereas in Britain there are quite large areas which are carefully fenced off from the intrusion of competitive consumer capitalism - sport, leisure, nature, love etc - in which commercial pressures, money-making, should not occur, in Japan almost everything from top to bottom is interpenetrated with money. Even art is heavily commercialized. Hence there is little of life that is an end in itself and not geared to profit in Japan. Kenichi thought that this is definitely a source of weakness in Japan.

Guilt, sin and work motivation.

I asked Yoh what he thought motivated the Japanese. It was not guilt, he said (there is no sense of original sin) or even acquisitiveness; it was the love of work, the sheer pleasure of working, that lured them on.

Saying yes and no in Japan

The word for 'yes' in Japan, 'hai' can be taken to be mean yes, but can also mean anything from yes, through maybe, to no. Really it is reflecting the other's words and intentions and saying "you know" or "you decide". A person must not say no directly in Japan, where it is almost impossible to say no. Rather he must leave it to the other's discretion to pick up the negative signals that underlie a 'yes'.

One should not say no in Japan, for the word for 'no' is much heavier than in the west. It is only possible to say no to very close friends. With others, only very occasionally can one say no. If one does so, it precludes all future intimacy and communication, and is tantamount to a declaration of
Unification of mind and heart

The split of heart and mind in the west is not accepted in Japan - the two are joined.

Changes in Japanese aesthetics; Zen puritanism

Japanese aesthetics revelled in colour and luxury, but then there was an equivalent to the Puritan reformation of manners; when Zen was imported black and white became the highest colours, the red leaves of autumn and blossoms of Spring were replaced by the snow and ice of winter as the highest aesthetic experiences. Ice with its absence of colour and transparency became important. Mono-colours began to dominate. Nara, similar to China, is very colourful with red and gold - Kyoto is a mixture of the old colours with the greys and blacks of the zen gardens.

Discussed this further on another occasion with Kenichi and Minamoto. With the emergence of reformist sects of zen, there was a change whereby food, art etc. lost some of its colour and freshness, to a situation of monotones, endurance etc. It later struck me as odd that exactly the same thing happened in England, at roughly the same time, with Puritanism. It is as if a purification in aesthetics is necessary in that crucial period before a society moves into full-blown industrial capitalism. There may be good reasons - as the Puritans argued. The riot and undisciplined of the earlier world needs to be 'purified', hence Puritans and Zen, and the effects spread everywhere.

Divisions of space

Prof. Minamoto and his wife were very struck by the fences between fields in England - suggesting an obsessions with private property which is absent in Japan.

The two strands in Bushido

There is the side of loyalty, devotion, self-sacrifice, to die for one's lord, loyalty and love to the lord. Then there is the 'Gentlemanship' side, Magasako - mixed with Confucian element and humanism - somewhat similar to Eliot's The Governour, they thought.

Real love in Japan cannot be declared

The deepest form of love is hidden love, which should not be expressed. It grows and crystallizes,
but the two people concerned should not show their love. They guess each other's love, like two mirrors reflecting each others, but it is not expressed in words. This also applies to the love of the servant for the lord and vice versa; they can guess the intention of the other. It is thus possible to have love and inequality - which the west tends to think as incompatible.

Discussed this further with Kenichi, who said one should hide one's real intention, if your partner or opponent really loves you, they should be able to identify your unspoken intentions, a subtle telepathy of relationships which is spoilt by talk.

Japanese attitude to nature

Minamoto stressed the fear that the Japanese have of untamed nature; they need to landscape, or create artificiality. Raw nature is very sharp and threatening and dangerous; everything has to be tamed. He asked how long ago English landscape had been tamed by man.

Shame and guilt in Japan

Kenichi dislikes this opposition of Benedict's very much. To start with, 'on' is a feeling of shame not towards others, but towards oneself, a failure on your own name; my image is within here. Thus there is an inner core etc. (see diagrams A and B in original notes.)

Two empty mirrors as symbol of Japan

One finds this metaphor in the works of Mishima and Maruyama (see the former's 'Silk and Observation' for instance). Each is searching for signals in the other, an endless searching. Interestingly, the Emperor fits into this in that the mirror is one of the three main symbols used in the coronation - the sword (power), jewel (wealth) and mirror (communication). The Emperor is the ultimate empty mirror, reflecting everything. The mirror is the absorption of every particle of light. This is 'kyo', the capacity of a person who could absorb the expectation of others - the Emperor and other leaders do this.

Noh plays and the contradiction of revelation and concealment

In the centre of Noh drama there is the contradiction that the best actors hide their feelings and expression; one should not express oneself, try to protest etc, but conceal. But through such concealment, one will leave to the audience of totally discovering oneself. One should hide one's real intentions etc.
Emptiness of people in Japan

Kenichi agreed that many young girls, before they marry, are 'empty', with no real responsibility etc. This is truly a floating world; this part of the zen tradition - try to nullify yourself, reduce yourself to zero. One protects oneself, but one cannot hide, and the more you hide yourself, the more you reveal yourself - an obvious contradiction. You cannot, in particular, hide before the really powerful, the Samurai, and indeed it would be shameful to do so.
## CHAPTER 12. THE TWO CAPITALISMS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

A contrasting table of characteristics  
(7.7.1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family and kinship</th>
<th>'England'</th>
<th>'Japan'</th>
<th>'India'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Agnatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descent</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Agnatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inheritance</td>
<td>Primogeniture</td>
<td>Primogeniture</td>
<td>Partible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succession</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>One son</td>
<td>All sons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household structure</td>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>Stem</td>
<td>Joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Smallish</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancestral links</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility to parents</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>V.strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband-wife relations</td>
<td>V.strong</td>
<td>Weakish</td>
<td>V.weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of women</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Middling</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Marriage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Neolocal</th>
<th>Virilocal</th>
<th>Virilocal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When (women)</td>
<td>Late</td>
<td>Middling</td>
<td>Early</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion</td>
<td>Most</td>
<td>Nearly all</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arranged by</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>Kin group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Love'</td>
<td>Basis</td>
<td>Outside mge</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eroticism</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Middling</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Political system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feudal loyalty</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sacred/Profane ruler</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Free cities (Weber)</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private property</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlord-tenant strong</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We discussed the spirit of 'bushido', which, in a secularized form, like the ethic of Protestantism, lives on in Japan. Then the question arose as to what caused the ever-searching, ever-working, ever-struggling ethic of the Japanese and English capitalists. I suggested that in each case there was a kind of see-saw, in which there was permanent inequality (see diagram, p.18).

In Christianity, the see-saw had God as weighty, with Man (with his original sin) in the air. God gave his only son to redeem us from original sin. We thus owe him a great, and never to be repaid, debt. The more we show our love, the more he makes us aware of our sins etc. This also ties in with our fear of damnation etc.

In Japan, in terms of the Japanese concepts of 'on' and 'giri', there is something similar. On the heavy side is the superior - not God in this case, but the lord, husband, master etc. On the light side is the man, wife, servant. In Japan the perpetual debt (on) is not based on the Man/God relationship, but on the premise of inequality among men. Men are born unequal, but through their lives they strive, through loyal service and hard work, to achieve equality. But those who are superior reciprocate the gifts and hence the inequality is re-enforced. It is a perpetual state of inequality, similar in mechanism to the blood-feud, to Mauss' idea of the gift, to Malinowski's principle of unbalanced reciprocity. In each case the individual is ever-restless, with every action leading to "another day older and deeper in debt".

Added to this is the lack of a ceiling, or boundary, in each case. There is no final goal - the goal posts are constantly receding away. Hence one finds mottoes such as "Boys, be ambitious" (the motto of Hokkaido University, devised by an American), or "Per ardua ad astra" (by hard work to
Some consequences and costs of the Japanese way.

Shoji talked about the "shadow side" of present Japanese developments. There is no democracy, no individualism. Another is the lack of legal confrontational disputes; instead there is a widespread use of informal and emotional compromise solutions. As a result, for instance, patients were very weak in relation to doctors etc.

We discussed the 'adversarial' system in Japan and agreed that it is totally inappropriate for Japan, with its emphasis on conformity, integration, co-operation etc.

Law as a boundary marker; mirrors contradictions.

The inherent contradictions in capitalist law have been expounded by David Sugarman in a paper (1987). He outlines the contradictions in English law and its many 'irrationalities', but suggestively argues that instead of trying to defend Weber against inconsistency or being contradictory, we should "render the contradictions as the core - rather than the periphery - of his account of law and modernity." (p.13). Thus Weber was mirroring real contradictions and paradoxes. For instance, the 'conceptual core' of English law, 'the forms of action and the dichotomy between common law and equity' were irrational in the Weberian sense. The law was organised in complex procedural terms: around forms of action and remedies rather than as a small body of clearly defined, substantive rules arranged in discrete spheres. Sugarman points out that "a variety of other features (have?) this irrational dimension. For instance, there is the importance of 'common sense' over the rational" etc.

Thus Anglo-Saxon common law, which has acted as the basis for the first major developments of modern capitalism, is contradictory, ad-hoc, 'irrational', yet it both seems to have worked and been extremely important. The English put their genius into their law.

Why is it then that the Japanese have so little formal 'law'? It would seem to be that if we regard law as the oil that stops the conflicting spheres of a society grinding together - it marks and polices the boundaries of the State, Family, Church etc. - where it is desired to keep these apart. There is no need for this policing of boundaries in Japan. Japan is and has for long been a society where instead of keeping these apart, they have been fused. Hence there is no need for oil; the parts are united, not separated. The machine is friction-less.

Why are Japan and England different?

What then leads to the group conformity, "wa", which Shoji spoke about? When I asked him, he had no real idea, rather weakly suggesting that perhaps it was related to islandhood! I suggested that it might also be related to the following. The rice cultivation of Japan needs group work and a great
deal of conformity in productive methods. The method of child-rearing makes the child very dependent on the mother, a link that is never broken.

**A preliminary conclusion on the uniqueness of Japan**

From all observations and discussions it would seem that Japan presents a new type. It is an exact intersection (see diagrams on p.20v). One has:

Individual/Capitalist - As England and America

Group/hierarchical - As India

**Mix or Venn intersection of the above - Japan**

Thus it shows that rapid economic growth and capitalism is possible while retaining a good deal of the group or hierarchical system. Put in another way we have:

Gesellschaft - England/ America

Gemeinschaft - India/China

Thinking about Japan is thus a salutary intellectual exercise. Both Kenichi and Sarah thought that religion was the key to the differences. Kenichi several times said that there was no problem for Japan when they tried to introduce economic freedom and the market or political freedom and democracy. What was difficult, indeed impossible, was to introduce Christianity with its possessive, exclusive and jealous God and loyalty demanding obsessions. It was a brand of religion and individualism which could not be tolerated. Or again, it is difficult to introduce romantic love, which is again possessive and individualistic, two things which he clearly saw as causally related.

**Communications technology and the break-down of hegemony.**

One of the necessary, if not sufficient, set of facilitating causes behind the 'open' world, lies in the development of the technologies of transmitting and communicating value and information.

In thinking about the morally relativistic world of western capitalism, it seemed clear that Simmel's insights into how money "with all its colourlessness and indifference, becomes the common denominator of all values; irreparably it hollows out the core of things, their individuality, their specific gravity...all things lie on the same level and differ from one another only in the size of the area which they cover." (Capitalism, 119). Like law, money can be seen like oil which keeps the
different spheres, kinship, religion, politics and economy from grinding against each other. Its rapid
development in the contemporary world of super-money, plastic money, debt and vast money
markets shows it power. Money makes the world go round.

But the technology of communicating knowledge is equally important. At first, as Goody and
others have shown, there was a dramatic shift from oral to literate cultures - in two phases, writing,
then printing. Francis Bacon was probably right in putting printing first in his list of dramatic
developments that had created a new world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, alongside
gunpowder and the compass, and in believing that "no empire, sect or star appears to have exercised
a greater power or influence than these mechanical discoveries." (Novum Organum, 129).

He would have been equally right to see that the revolution in communications of the second half
of the twentieth century, computer and television, are having an equally dramatic effect. Knowledge
can be stored, accessed, transmitted in extraordinary ways. There can be no doubt that this
contributes to the chaos and contradictions in capitalism, just as it makes it spread and conquest
much more rapid.

With reference to the Japanese, it could be argued that they have taken these two features; the
fact that money translates between spheres and puts them all on the same level, and that print and
television stores and disseminates knowledge very efficiently) to their absolute extremes. As has
often been noticed, if we include rice as an alternative for cash, Japan has for a very long time had a
highly 'monetized' economy, as has England - and now probably has the most advanced cash
economy in the world. Likewise, from very early on, Japan was a deeply writing/print directed
culture. Writing, reading, literacy etc. were very early important - perhaps more so than anywhere
else in the world. And now it leads the world in print's successors, television and computing. The
fusing, rather than the division, of the spheres in Japan may reflect and also be caused by this
monetized and communications lead.

**The two solutions; separation and merging of spheres.**

Through exploring the nature of the legal system in the two situations, one can see on the surface
a total opposition, but deeper, two solutions to the same problem. English law is confrontational and
boundary-maintaining. It basically polices the zones between the various institutions, for there are
endless boundary clashes when one tries to hold politics, society, religion and economy apart.

On the other hand, in Japan, the different spheres are melded together at the level of the group,
rather than the individual. The groups hold themselves apart as much as possible, but the law does
not have much role. The policing is done by the group and the immensely complex body language
(hara), concepts of debt etc. (on), subtle language, and positional ethics make sure that people get
their roles and relationships and duties right.
**Japan and the contradictions of capitalism**

To a large extent, the Japanese have managed to create an almost perfect (i.e. internally consistent/smooth) capitalist society. There is apparently little of the following: anomic suicide, crime, violence, psychological illness, extremes of wealth and poverty, obvious clash between spheres (religion and politics etc. How have they done this, as well as creating an incredibly efficient productive system? It is a mystery, but a few points can be made:

1. The absence of religion helps - the peculiar nature of a 'religionless' society takes away one of the binding absolutes, the absence of material and spiritual duality.
2. The related absence of ethical absolutes helps. The situational ethics of the Japanese allows a flexibility not found in most societies: - an absence of right/wrong duality, all is 'yes'.
3. The strength of etiquette and inter-personal relations (often likened to the millions of tendrils which interlace in the rotting bean sprouts that are a favourite Japanese dish) helps; again it provides a flexible system that allows people to move with the group and the group to police the individual.
4. This means that politics and law can be quite weak and underdeveloped; the group can be left to look after itself, exercising strong self-policing.
5. The economic sphere is the opposite of a zero sum game; instead it is a system of energetically casting one's bread upon the water in the knowledge that it will return.
6. There are, of course, costs in all this. For instance, there is educational over-competition, conflict of women, herd-matality, lack of innovation and creativity. But the price is bearable when we compare the problems with those of the U.S. and Europe.

**Synthesis of the argument on similarity and difference**

It would seem, therefore, that we have to maintain the paradoxical stance that Japan is both in essence different, and represents an alternative to Western civilization (refreshingly so), and also that it has certain structural features in common.

Whether we look on the two capitalisms/industrialisms as similar or dissimilar depends on whether we stress the central similarity - the absence of hegemonic determination by one sphere - or we stress the central dissimilarity, that while Europe has overcome this problem by keeping the spheres apart, Japan has overcome the contradictions by melding them together.

One salutary lesson from Japan is that this is possible. It was an axiom of conventional thought in the west that increasing 'rationalization' in Weber's sense (i.e. division of labour in the widest sense) was the only solution to the problem of how to increase wealth etc.

It now looks as if the Japanese have provided an alternative, which may well be more attractive to developing societies and more appropriate for a world of global communications and total, post-modern, integration.
Put in another way, two alternative world civilizations have been incubated on islands off
continents. One, a variant of the European mainland civilization, has colonized America and much
of the world. The other, sharing some features with China and south-east Asia, but on the whole
rather distinctive, is now colonizing much of the world at a technological level.

Their basic premises are rather different, but structurally at the deepest level they are quite similar.
By independent and alternative roots they have arrived at roughly the same spot; but in order to
understand what is going on in the world it is helpful to understand their distinctive 'spirit'.

Consequences for the world.

Wallerstein and others have shown how a "world system" developed in the sixteenth century
onwards in terms of economy and in the nineteenth century in terms of polity, through imperialism.
When people look back from the twenty-first century, they will probably see a third wave, basically
occurring in the second half of the twentieth century, whereby economic and political appropriation
was followed by cultural appropriation. As Gellner puts it, "Scientific/industrial civilization clearly
is unique.. because it is without any shadow of doubt, conquering, absorbing all the other cultures of
this Earth." (Plough, 200).

The first occasion when men escaped from the embedded pre-industrial world has "transformed the
entire world", for the "modern industrial machine is like an elephant in a very small boat...(it)
presupposes an enormous infra-structure, not merely of political order, but educationally, culturally,
in terms of communication and so forth." (Gellner, Plough, 277; Gellner, Spectacles, 288).

This predatory expansion, whereby many other cultural systems were snuffed out or deeply
contaminated, has been the theme of a growing lament from Montaigne onwards (QUOTE), rising
to a crescendo during the last hundred years, as 99% of the tribal societies were extinguished.
Anyone visiting any 'Third World' society today can see how fast consumer capitalism is eroding the
economy and system of values of these societies.

A particularly dramatic example of this erosion is the way in which this 'package' or ensemble is
so rapidly undermining, and changing from day to day, the half of mankind who seemed to have put
up a successful wall against it, namely China and The Soviet Union. Communism and Islam, are the
two world faiths and associated social and economic systems which have stood up against the
capitalist-industrial systems of the West. There is little doubt that Communism, at least, is
crumbling fast.

As we can see with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, once the spirit of capitalistic
industrialism invades the body of a society, it is difficult to stop, for it operates at all levels
simultaneously. It is very attractive to the individual. It gives a new picture of man in his relation to
nature, exploitative yet preserving; it provides a new justification for self-regarding actions. It
provides excitement and passion and the justification for egotistic individualism in the purist of
self-fulfilment, whether in the economic market, in pursuit of power, or love. It promises equality,
stable government, democracy, fair law. And, above all, it brings a new technology and technological organization with its promise of untold wealth, or at least an escape from the horrors of a world of pre-industrial crises. It is difficult to resist; what the sword or the tanks have failed to conquer, its bible, *The Wealth of Nations* is everywhere achieving.

In moving rapidly in this direction towards a world culture of capitalism, each new part absorbs with the economy a political and cultural package. These contain a number of contradictions which are built deeply into the whole ensemble. As one loses certainties and enters the open society, there are costs as well as benefits.

**The tearing of the seamless web.**

The separation of spheres, the insulation of the parts, which has precariously been achieved in the West, has its own costs as well. Although it allows people to think 'freely' and to act 'rationally' it is, of course, caught in the deeper contradiction that the real world is not separated into water-tight compartments. We have to live with the myth that religion and politics, morality and economics, kinship and politics are separable and live reasonably amiably alongside each other. But the garment is thereby torn apart arbitrarily. Reality is a seamless web, as the majority of human societies have realized. Marx recognized this in his concept of 'alienation', Durkheim in 'anomie'. Gellner adds some further dimensions to these contradictions.

We have already seen the Kantian clash between a cold mechanistic controllable world, and the desire for social cohesiveness. Put in another way, "the world in which we think is not the same as the one in which we live...the colder the one, the more fanciful the other, perhaps". Hence the manifestly irrational features, romantic love, obsession with nature and feeling, modern paganism and astrology, and so on. There is a huge contradiction between the orderly, rational, 'society', and the arbitrary, bizarre, random "culture". (Legitimation, 194-5). As we have gained logical cohesiveness, so we have lost social cohesiveness. We live in a "cognitively powerful, and socially disconnected" world. (Plough, 61, 70). This insight, Gellner partly owes to another of his sources of inspiration, Ibn Khaldun, who showed that you "could have communal, civic spirit, or you could have civilization - but not both." (Muslim, 17).

**Consequences for all of us.**

What the rest of the world gets is, basically, the package of features which we roughly label consumer capitalism. What exactly is this package?

a. the technology - massive power; describe its main features.

b. the economy - massive power - describe
c. the political system - democracy etc.

d. the religion - toleration

e. the social system - absence of caste, mobility, small families, a particular demography etc.

e. the law - rights of individual

All this is well known; perhaps what is less appreciated are some of the paradoxes, conflicts and contradictions which are implied by the above.

(- see my 'Culture of Capitalism' talk and elaborate a little.)

- attitudinal/perceptual

- morality

- psychology and emotion

- legal system

- power and the state

- wealth and status

- intellectual ; our sense of time and history and causation, ambiguity, uncertainty the suspended judgment etc.

We are dealing with a cultural, political, economic and social system that is built on contradictions. This does not mean that it is unstable; far from it. But it does mean that in looking at its effects, as well as the contemporary confusions with which we are presented every time we look around us, we need to try to understand that they are produced by clashes and inconsistencies which are part of the deeper levels of the civilization of the West as it has developed.

**Fraternity, equality, liberty.**

There is a conflict in Japan between fraternity and inequality. There is a tendency towards inequality, groupism, lack of liberty in Japan, whereas England has gone far towards, liberty, equality and fraternity by the eighteenth century and America even further. Pre-Meiji Japan and pre-Revolutionary France had not espoused these. But when they came in the later nineteenth century, they created a highly dynamic situation, when the two traditions were creatively mixed.
Legal systems of Japan and England.

We discussed the legal systems of England and Japan. Yoh agreed that trust and fairness was the basis of the economy in both countries and that this was held in place by the idea of equity. But whereas in England there was Equity, but also Common Law and Statute Law, in Japan there was only equity and custom, little formal law.

Paradoxes of capitalism: man and the natural world

For England, it has been pointed out that there is a strange ambivalence about nature. "England has been one of the most urbanized countries in the world, yet one where the yearning for the countryside and rural values was the most developed. Its anti-urbanism is notorious, and is shown in the prevalence of parks, ubiquity of flower gardens, the country holiday industry, the emphasis on nature and rural values in the Romantic and pre-Raphaelite movements." (Macfarlane XXX). England was the most industrialized country in the world by the mid-nineteenth century, the one where animal power was largely replaced by steam, and where animals were consequently no longer central to production. Yet it was "paradoxically the country where the concern for animals was most developed in the world, expressed in creative literature, in painting, in concern for animal welfare and in the widespread prevalence of pets." The most carnivorous society in the world, yet the most concerned with vegetarianism. Nature was more tamed than anywhere else, yet the wild and the wet were worshipped. The paradoxes are infinite, mixing exploitation with enchantment, ruthless use, with completely "useless" adoration.

My first impression is that there is the same paradox in Japan, but more so. That is to say, the subjection of nature is even more extreme (it is even more tamed, whether in rice cultivation, or in the artificiality of the gardening - bonsai, gravel and moss gardens etc.). But there is also a huge release found in nature - the spirituality of the cherry blossom, of the heron on the lake (see haiku), of Mount Fuji. The paradox is encapsulated in flower arranging - natural objects, but captured, cut and made into something more beautiful being artificially arranged. Is there any of the genuine English love of wildness and wetness? Anyway, there does seem to be both ruthless exploitation and arrangement, with mystical and emotional attachment. Japan might be seen to take the English paradox one stage further, and then to eliminate it by taking the leap into fusing nature and culture by making all nature totally artificial. The contradiction is overcome in a purely man-made, but natural seeming world. This is symbolized in the arranged flowers, the trained tree, the painted natural scene. The cultural is made natural, the natural cultural.

Paradoxes of capitalism: moral rules.
In England, capitalist society, with its traces of a highly ethical religion, Christianity, is one of the most heavily 'moralistic' known to history. And yet it is totally confused about its absolute moral standards. This is notably expressed in great literature. Shakespeare, for example, is concerned in many of his plays in a "grey world where good and evil are interchangeable; where it is impossible to be certain, to have absolute moral standards; where nothing is entirely black or white. This is clearly the case in his treatment of all his central characters - Hamlet, Brutus, Prospero, Macbeth and even Iago. For them, the choices are difficult, there is no absolute standard, things are not what they seem. " (Macfarlane,)

Shakespeare, and later Marx, saw one of the reasons for this central paradox, namely the transforming power of money: "Thus much of this will make black, white; foul, fair; / Wrong, right; base, noble; old, young..." (Timon of Athens - on gold). This confusion at the heart of the moral world of English capitalism is echoed in Milton's Paradise Lost. The poem can be read "as an attempt to state the paradox that good and evil are entirely separate, yet also entirely the same." Eden, though perfect, also contained Evil. Satan struggles throughout with God, but they are both playing the same game, that is trying to transmute good into evil and vice versa. Both realize that neither good nor evil is an ultimate, untouchable, undisputed, value. "If then his providence / Out of our evil seek to bring forth good, / Our labour must be to prevent that end, / And out of good still find means of evil."

The paradox was strongest in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as formal Christianity proclaimed ethical absolutes, yet people lived in a world where most people knew in their heart that context, motive, power, ultimately determines what is 'good' and what 'evil'. The realization of this deeper moral relativism long pre-dates the death of God in the nineteenth century. As Pascal observed in the seventeenth century: "We hardly know of anything just or unjust which does not change its character with a change of climate....There is not a single law which is universal." (Pascal, ?)

Again this 'open' predicament, where absolutes of good and evil disappear and everything is relative, grey and contextual, is taken even further in the Japanese case, and the same thing happens as with the relations of nature and culture - namely the contradiction is overcome by abolishing it. There is no pretense that there is a good and an evil. Everything is contextual; it all depends. This is a feature which has been noticed in the most striking aspects of Japanese religion - neither Shinto nor Zen proclaim ethical absolutes, neither require the believer to subscribe to a force of evil and of good in opposition to each other. Yin and Yang blend into each other. It is, as Chie Nakane has said, a world without principles (ref:??). This is something that needs to be documented more fully. But if I am right, then the Japanese have once again echoed a tendency in western capitalist culture, and taken it to its logical conclusion - and hence overcome the contradiction. Everything is good, everything is evil, it all depends on the context, motive etc. For instance, 'sincerity' justifies murder etc. This extreme relativism is somewhat shocking for western societies which in their ideology, if not in their practice, pretend to live by absolute standards. But it helps to free the individual from some of the pressures - particularly guilt - which arise from constantly failing to live up to supposed
standards. Perhaps this is part of what is involved in the famous (Benedict) debate about whether the Japanese have a sense of guilt - or only shame.

**Paradoxes of capitalism: mind and emotion.**

There is a strong contradiction within western capitalism between the supposed 'rationality', mind-dominance, and order of the economic and bureaucratic systems of capitalism, and the 'instituted irrationality' at its psychological heart, namely romantic love. The split between head and heart is maintained strongly. There is a polarization of mind against emotion, rationality against irrationality, head against heart etc.

I suspect that none of this is the case in Japan. Head and heart (or stomach), mind and body, thought and emotion are not conceived as at war with each other, but are fused. The 'disassociation of sensibility' of which Eliot speaks and Wordsworth writes, never occurred in Japan.

**Paradoxes of capitalism: ideal and reality.**

A further contradiction in capitalist society is that there is a combination of *de jure* equality, with the presence of massive differences at the *de facto* level. Most civilizations take the view that man is born, and by nature, unequal. Given that premise, it is not hard to explain or justify the obvious inequality in the world. They are 'natural'. The problem epitomized in the 'American Declaration of Independence', though stretching much further back, is that 'if man is born free and equal', with equal endowments etc, why is it that some men are conspicuously better off in every way than others? This contradiction faces the individual with not only financial, but also moral and psychological failure.

Again, the Japanese have overcome the contradiction by altering the two terms of the opposition. Men are not by nature equal at birth - all is unequal, and this is recognized as the 'de jure' position. In practice, however, inequalities are not as great as in many societies; there is a less pronounced caste, class or status hierarchy than in almost any other known advanced society.

**Uncertainty, doubt and conviction.**

An effect of the contradictions in western capitalism can be seen in the uncertainties and doubts which assail all of us. As Stocking has nicely put it (Victorian, 230), "if paradox is the intellectual side of the coin of cultural ambiguity, ambivalence is its emotional obverse." This is a necessary consequence of the real contradictions in western capitalism, and it is not new. One of its finest expressions is by Pope in the early eighteenth century.

"Chaos of thought and passion, all confused;  
Still by himself abused, or disabused;"
Created half to rise, and half to fall;  
Great Lord of all things, yet a prey to all;  
Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurled;  
The glory, jest, and riddle of the World!
   (Essay on Man, epistle 2)

This uncertainty enters all of our life and leads to the guarded, cautious, grey, undemonstrative, non-extreme nature of capitalistic civilization. One can never be completely certain about anything. "Ah what a dusty answer gets the soul / When hot for certainties in this our life!" (George Meredith, Modern Times). "On the one hand, and on the other; costs and benefits; arguments for and against". It is a world of "moral premislessness" (Gellner, 278), a contradictory and restless world, where head and heart are divided: the 'open predicament'. It is a world which has struck Gellner as one with an "icy indifference to values", a "total inability either to validate norms and values or to offer any guarantee of their eventual success..." (Plough, 64-5). Or, in the words of Matthew Arnold:

"...the world....  
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,  
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;  
And we are here as on a darkling plain  
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,  
Where ignorant armies, clash by night."

Only in certain moments are we sure - when facing love, or when facing death:

"A lonely impulse of delight  
Drove to this tumult in the clouds;  
The years to come seemed waste of breath,  
A waste of breath the years behind  
In balance with this life, this Death." (Yeats, An Irish Airman...)

It would appear that in Japan the doubts and uncertainties are largely overcome. "The west has no conviction, the east is full of deadly certainty" to paraphrase Yeats. There is less self-questioning, hanging in doubt etc. What one has to do is given by the context and the expectations of others.

On the other hand, there is an even stronger stress on the 'impulse of delight' side of things; the pursuit of perfection, the well-known Japanese search for ecstasy and nothingness, the revelation in religions such as Zen which will make it clear what one should do. In the end, it is not the individual who has to decide; the group decides, and the person can relax and float on the collective decision. Japanese suicide is usually the result not of deep existential clashes in the personality, but the moment when the demands of the external codes of honour, obedience etc. become confused and contradictory - and the only way out is in self-annihilation.
**Contradictions in marital and sexual system.**

The benefits include the positive benefit to material and economic growth; the more humane preventive check of rational self-control, rather than external irrational control of the positive checks; the personal and individual choice of when, whether and who to marry; the reduced fertility burden for women; the long period of relative independence before marriage. The costs would include the sexual and psychological frustration of waiting for sexual intercourse; the anxiety of wondering whether one will marry; the loneliness of many who do not; the increased strain on marriage is for good; the inducement to a constantly calculative approach to everything. These are a few.

**Costs and benefits of the family system.**

The benefits include autonomy, self-regulation, freedom, mobility, responsibility etc. The costs include loneliness, the treatment of the old, constant anxiety about the young - Lear etc.

**Costs and benefits of individualism.**

Ethical individualism, legal individualism etc., bring the rights of man and individual rights, freedom, responsibility etc., but also a lack of responsibility, selfishness, loneliness etc.

**Separation of spheres and the stages of modernity.**

One might have a very rough schemata as following:

early tribal societies - no separation, pre-modern
totally mingled, no religion/ economy etc. as 'instituted processes', everything mixed with everything else.

ancien regime societies - partially separated, in that the spheres had been separated into institutions, religion, politics etc. etc. But they were still held together - economy still largely embedded in kinship and religion, politics and religion linked etc.

early modern societies - archetypically England and Holland, already a good deal of autonomy and separation - they had the separations which makes them 'modern', but they lacked the industrial economy and continuous technological development which would make them feel entirely 'modern'.

modern societies - countries that were 'born modern' like the U.S. and those which achieved it, like much of modern western Europe etc. A complete separation of spheres - in theory, if not in practice, with domination by the economy etc.
post-modern societies - particularly Japan, but growingly others, where the institutions remain, and have been firmly established, but there are new signs of a melding, blending, loss of demarcation and division of labour. Because this happens on top of an industrial base, and is largely related to an information and communications explosion, it is a different state from the 'pre-modern' or 'early modern' worlds. But it begins to take the hard edges off the highly divided world of early capitalism.

In a sense Japan passed from early modern to post-modern, without passing through the intervening phase of modernity; it could graft 'modern' science on technology onto a curious kind of other than modern social structure. Through its example and other pressures, other countries are following suit.

**Giri and responsibility in China and Japan**

Giri in China is much more general; in Japan it is more particularistic, meaning honesty or faithfulness.

**The concept of the public good in Japan**

Oyeke is the concept of the public; in the West all people have a responsibility to act in the public good as a duty to God; this is absent in Japan, though there are elements of it in Confucian moralistic reasoning.

**Private property in Japan and England**

Minamoto sensed that in certain senses Japanese property is more privatized; anyone can do anything with their own - hence the horrors of developments etc. In England, there seem to be invisible controls which have preserved the landscape.

**Trust and co-operation in Japanese business life**

Toshiba and Matsushita actually communicate a lot with each other, try to say the true things to each other, shouldn't tell a lie, give a certain amount but not everything, etc. At formal meetings, they will say nothing, but in informal meetings, at drinks, the real intention will come out, and a great deal will be conveyed. This is in a situation of trust - for there are no external sanctions.

In Japanese business, you must show the opponent your naked self; it is most efficient if there is direct and honest communication, straightforwardness, pragmatism, sympathy etc. With the authentic samurai, it is "no good in telling a lie, a waste of time; need for real decision makers, straight forward. Thus there is a special ability to identify the real scholars, people one can trust and break through all the time-wasting outer shield. One needs not go through the greeting period.

Why is there this trust and co-operation? Kenichi pointed to irrigated rice cultivation and its needs, to the fact that taxes were levied on the whole community, both real taxes and labour taxes;
that the senior village man was in charge, and that the village was given much autonomous power in decision-making, a participatory political system.

**Sympathy and family relations in Japan.**

The relations which one Japanese ideally has with another are based on family relations, not contractual relations, but relations of sympathy, based on self-control and reasonableness etc. One should think of others.

**Fukuzawa and his aims - to re-unite or combine elements**

Fukuzawa was principally interested in how one combined reason and intellect, knowledge and virtue or sympathy. He assumed this could be partially based on the responsibility of the father to the child, the village chief to the villagers etc. Sympathy of this deep kind was assumed, by Fukuzawa, to exist in Japan. The Samurai have such an ethic e.g.

**Confrontation and co-operation; premise of goodness**

One should have a respect for one's enemies, 'jo', ; if we get to know each other, we will have such feelings. (Alan; Japan is based on the premise of basic goodness or virtue of human beings, while Christianity is based on the paradox of the basic honesty, yet sinfulness (original sin) of human beings.

**How far was England different from Europe and why?**

This account is taken from 'Marriage, pp.338-342. It will be necessary to look at the same problem in relation to Japan. How was it that it became so different from its Continent, and particularly from China, by which it was heavily influenced? For there seems to have been a curiously similar drifting apart, almost like some Darwinian species differentiation.

It should be stressed that "even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the differences were probably most marked, there was much more in common between England, Holland and Belgium, Germany, northern France and Scandinavia, than there was to divide them. Their demographic pattern was very similar, they had a similar households structure. Many of the deepest assumptions in Christianity, and in particular a Protestant variety of it, united this part of Europe. Similarly, the economic ethics and institutions of England and Holland, for instance, largely overlapped. Thus from a perspective outside Europe, we are dealing in England with a phenomenon which is still very recognizably north-west European. This is why someone like Jacobs lumps the whole of Europe together, when comparing it with Japan. On the other hand, since we have been arguing that something strange happened in England, which did not happen in other countries, it is important to establish when the differences became obvious.
It is worth emphasizing that the differences between England and much of the Continent which were so obvious by the eighteenth century, may have grown over time and that De Tocqueville's guess that the political and legal systems of the Middle Ages over the whole of France, England and Germany had a 'prodigious similarity', that 'in the fourteenth century the social, political, administrative, judicial, economic, and literary institutions of Europe' bore a close resemblance to each other' may be roughly correct. (Ancien, 18). He may have been wrong about the timing of the divergence, but the intuition of earlier similarity is worth considering.

"It would not be difficult to argue convincingly that in the eleventh century the legal and social systems of the whole of the northern half of Western Europe were almost identically, based almost exclusively on the Germanic law of the conquerors. But during the twelfth to sixteenth centuries much of northern Europe was reconquered by a renovated Roman law. As Maitland put it,

'Englishmen should abandon their traditional belief that from all time the continental nations have been ruled by the 'civil (i.e. Roman) law', they should learn how slowly the renovated Roman doctrine worked its way into the jurisprudence of the parliament of Paris, how long deferred was the 'practical reception' of Roman law in Germany, how exceedingly like our common law once was to a French coutume. " (Pollock & Maitland, i, cvi)

"By the thirteenth century, England was beginning to look distinctly different from the rest of Europe, not because England had changed, but because Roman law had made no conquest there: 'English law was by this time recognized as distinctly English.' This feeling of contrast was heightened because, although 'Roman jurisprudence was but slowly penetrating into northern France and had hardly touched Germany' by the thirteenth century, many Englishmen thought that the whole of Europe now had written Roman law, which 'served to make a great contrast more emphatic'. (ibid, i, 188). Certainly, by the sixteenth century England was an island carrying on an old Germanic legal system, and lying off a land mass dominated by Roman law. The contrast, for instance, can be seen in relation to criminal law - the absence of judicial torture, the use of juries, process by indictment, in England."

One of the central features of modern capitalism is in its concept of property. And here the growing divergence between England with its customary Germanic law, and the revived Roman Law is dramatic. The contrast has been described by Peter Stein and John Shand: 'the civil law tradition, reflected in the Codes of France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and even the Soviet Union, tends to identify ownership with the thing owned, and to limit its definition of things to movable or immovable property, as opposed to more abstract rights. The common law, on the other hand, has developed from the tenures of medieval feudalism and has been more ready to analyse ownership in terms of bundles of rights, obligations, and inter-personal relationships arising from the control and enjoyment of property. ' (Stein, Legal Values, 216).

"The more flexible English system enabled several individuals to have property rights in different parts of an asset. This difference was the basis for the early development of full private property. As
the comparative jurist Sir Henry Maine argued, this was of fundamental importance. He believed that the modern concept of 'private property', held by the individual, the basis of the capitalist system, arose out of the difference. 'Nothing can be more singularly unlike than the legal aspect of allodial land, or, as the Romans would call it, land held in dominium, and the legal aspects of feudal land. In passing from one to the other you find yourself among a new order of legal ideas.' (Maine, Early Law, 342). The basis of this new system was the idea of the impartible, individually owned, estate which could be bequeathed to specific individuals.

"In England there persisted over many centuries a concept of individual ownership that was not drowned by a resurgent Roman law. This meant that any individual - man, woman or child - could have absolute rights in their 'own' property, and the concept was fully established by the middle of the thirteenth century, at the latest. People could also have complete rights in themselves; in other words, they were not in the hands of the powerful Roman law concept of patria potestas.

The peculiar nature and essential contribution of a preserved system of non-Roman law was stressed by Weber. "The basis of the rational state is rational law, yet...ironically, capitalism flourished most in the one area of Europe without Roman law, namely England...'England, the home of capitalism, never accepted the Roman law', it is clear that 'in fact all the characteristic institutions of modern capitalism have other origins than Roman law'. Weber gives a list of these devices. 'The annuity bond... came from medieval law, in which Germanic legal ideas played their part. Similarly the stock certificate arose out of medieval and modern law...likewise the bill of exchange...the commercial company is also a medieval product, so also the mortgage, with the security of registration, and the deed of trust'. (Weber, General, 249-252).

Or again, the refusal of English common law to allow families to tie up their property, and to prevent any kind of monopoly differentiates it from continental law and is fundamental in the development of capital. "By such devices as the rule against Perpetuities or the breaking of the entail, the common law has long favoured the commercial concept of property". (Stein, Legal, 218) This is an argument that Adam Smith had earlier. Entails in England were "more restricted there than in any other European monarchy"...for "the common law of England, indeed, is said to abhor perpetuities". (Smith, Wealth, i, 409)

" It was not that England changed fundamentally from an older 'Community' world, but rather than the laws and customs of its early conquerors were retained. Increasingly, this made sit feel different, and this difference was compounded by two further factors. In Europe, Christianity was not a static phenomenon. During the crusades and monastic movements of the twelfth and thirteenth century, and during the resurgence known as the Counter-Reformation of the sixteenth, the Catholic Church established a deep hold on the political and social systems of much of Europe. The Roman Church was the ethical and spiritual counterpart to Roman law. Here again, England remained stranded. The establishment of a separate, Protestant, Church by Henry VIII was but one step in the distancing from a resurgent Catholicism. Through the work of Weber, Tawney and others, we know how this Protestantism shielded and even encouraged those capitalistic tendencies already present.
Ultimately, it protected private judgment and independence of belief. The Inquisition, which destroyed huge trading networks and corroded economic development throughout continental Europe, never took root in England.

A third and growing gulf which opened up between the Continent and England was in the political system. A dominating feature of English government, affirmed in the Magna Carta and explained in Sir John Fortescue's *Learned Commendation of the Politique Laws of England*, written in 1461, was that England was a constitutional monarchy - the king was under the law. Ultimately the law was supreme: England was not an absolutist state. Despite the activities of Henry VIII and the attempts of James I and Charles I, it remained so. The absolutist monarchies that spread over much of the rest of Europe during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries failed to destroy this older tradition in England. Like England, Holland kept the resurgent Catholicism and absolutism at bay, which helps to account for the great similarities between the two countries. But in Spain with Philip II, in France with Louis XIV, we see at its most extreme that growth of the absolutist state that has been charted by Perry Anderson (Anderson, Lineages). In England alone (and Holland?), there was no large standing army, no centralized bureaucracy, no huge court, no theory that placed the king above the law.

There was, of course, nothing inevitable about this continuity in England. The success of the Armada in 1588, for example, would probably have brought Roman law, Roman religion and an absolutist monarchy. The subsequent course of world development would have been very different, for the major alternative to the English, the Dutch, might then also have been swamped. But the curious and fragile experiment was allowed to continue, and within another hundred years it was too late to swamp it.

(77,000 words)